1 Ni-Mo effectNitish KumarThe local goodwill matches perfectly Narendra ModiNational appeal. Voters read this combo as offering stability+delivery: a chief minister known for roads, electricity and policing and a prime minister known for scale, speed and organisation. The possibility of parity (approximately 50:50 seat-sharing) and the apparently cordial equation anticipated ‘co-ownership’ of governance. The launch of major projects and welfare schemes for Bihar in the Union Budget was already a strong platform. After wins in Maharashtra, Haryana and Delhi, the massive majority in Bihar is another indication that the BJP’s decline in Lok Sabha seats was an aberration rather than pointing to a new pattern. Despite being in power for 12 years, Modi has been consistently winning elections, even in elections where he himself is not on the ballot, making it a unique case of political resilience in an era of volatile expectations.2 NDAart of coalitionThis election was a masterclass performance by the NDA in both building and running social and political alliances. The victorious alliance expanded its tent by bringing in Chirag Paswan with a generous seat share and even including him. In the end, the NDA might have made it without Upendra Kushwaha and even Jitan Ram Manjhi. But the need to build a broad social coalition prevailed over maximalist calculations. The results were clearly visible at the ground level. BJP and JDU divided seats with unusual clarity and kept the campaign disciplined despite inherent contradictions. JDU acted with extraordinary professionalism, with working president Sanjay Jha preferring to win over emotions and coordinating with BJP in-charge Dharmendra Pradhan for candidate selection. The joint objective was to ensure district-wise compatibility between the partners. This helped in removing local wrinkles. Each NDA partner brought value to the table.memories of 3 rule of the junglemisgovernance during Lalu YadavTenure was a strong topic. Voters still remember the anarchy, corruption, brutal single caste-domination and general non-governance under the 15-year long ‘Lalu-Rabri Raj’. After Tejashwi Yadav was projected as the CM candidate, when the NDA promised ‘Mangal Raj’, the most prominent beneficiary of Lalu’s reign became an easy target. Modi and Amit Shah stuck to this theme throughout the campaign and ironically, they got effective support from RJD’s overzealous supporters. The NDA had a great day telling the voters about the RJD hardliners’ katta (country made pistol) and ‘dream’ of running bhaiya ki satta (tejasvi government).4 women, half of NDASchemes launched before the contest – Rs 10,000 assistance for Jeevika self-help group members, hike in old age pension – helped the alliance build on the huge amount of goodwill that already existed because of women’s quota in jobs and local bodies, as well as educational assistance, free ration and LPG connections. Besides, NDA’s housing schemes and better law and order were also to be provided. Women suffered the most from RJD’s Jungle Raj, where crimes like kidnapping and rape were rampant. Women voters were determined not to lose the freedom they enjoyed under the Nitish-led NDA. Bhojpuri songs like ‘RJD ke maal’ and ‘Ghar se utha leb’ (We will take you away from your house too) created fear in the minds of women that RJD’s victory would again confine them to their homes. Reporters covering the campaign often met women who not only strongly expressed their preference for the NDA, but also insisted that they would ensure that their men voted just as they themselves did. After two rounds, pundits were divided on explaining women’s 10 percentage point lead over men in the poll. The results leave no doubt as to what such a large participation of women means.5 pounce on MGB’s mistakesModi’s popularity and Nitish’s gratitude for providing basic governance were key factors for the NDA when it came to blocking efforts by the MGB and Prashant Kishor to cut into non-Yadav OBC, EBC and upper caste votes. In fact, the scale of the NDA’s victory suggests that the welfare schemes might have helped it snatch votes from at least ‘MY’ (Muslim-Yadav) women. The aggressive behavior of many Yadavs and the alliance’s support to Osama, son of the dangerous “gangster” politician Shahabuddin, were major mistakes of the MGB. This ensured that the NDA’s so-called “alliance of extremists” – EBCs and Dalits at one end and upper castes at the other – remained intact.6 NDA’s fast reactionsA great example of the winning alliance’s ability to think outside the box was its huge patronage for Chhath Puja. The BJP credited Modi with the idea, which turned a purely regional festival into a national celebration. It had a major impact on many Biharis, who saw it as the state gaining an image that it never had before. The Indian government ran thousands of special trains for Biharis traveling home for the festival, Chhath songs were played at 100 railway stations across the country. Rahul Gandhi’s wrong criticism of Modi on this issue proved only beneficial for BJP.7 RJD stuck in MYThe Muslim-Yadav core vote has not largely deserted the RJD, but the strength of this alliance itself has put it at a disadvantage when it came to attracting other social groups. EBC in particular was kept away from Yadav rhetoric. Because RJD’s biggest strength turned into a significant weakness, the party lost heavily in constituencies where it needed extra votes to make the cut. It was particularly unable to attract outside women and may, in fact, have lost some of its female voters to the contest. The BJP may now make a proposal to the Yadavs, and the outcome will strengthen JDU’s belief that Muslims continue to have a soft spot for Nitish.Rahul’s wrong focus on vote theftRahul Gandhi’s allegations found almost no takers among voters, whose ground experience of the Election Commission’s SIR did not support his claims of disenfranchisement. It was a repeat of his 2019 campaign theme which played badly on Rafale and proved useless. His obsession with SIR, which became his favorite subject, resulted in the wastage of valuable election campaign time that could have been far better used to focus on bread-and-butter issues. Tejashwi was forced to do so. Rahul learned the wrong lesson from the crowd he raised. Most of the people in his rallies were from MY group. Crowds at road shows are never a good predictor of votes. Also, Rahul chose to behave rudely with Tejashwi for some time. This affected the unity of the opposition alliance.9 Tejashwi has never been very measuredHe was burdened by the same legacy of which he had been the chief beneficiary. His efforts to present himself as a break from the RJD’s jungle raj past were overshadowed by the fact that he was Lalu’s chosen successor and a key co-accused in high-profile corruption cases. Over-enthusiastic supporters ensured that there was no disconnect with the past in the voter’s memory. There was also his reluctance to consistently engage with voters at the grassroots level, something Lalu was good at in his heyday. His son’s election-time enthusiasm was no substitute for the hard work that helped his father. Crucially, his reckless promises did little to sway voters.10 Forward vs Backward doesn’t work anymoreIt was once a winning theme in the caste politics of Bihar, but has now lost its potency as the upper castes have braced themselves for losing power. There is no threat from above for non-upper castes and both Modi and Nitish are OBCs, this was again a big plus for the NDA. In an election fought on issues beyond traditional fault lines, Congress’s attempt to make it an upper caste versus the rest contest had failed. This did not take into account Nitish’s own credentials as a fighting ‘social justice’ warrior. His government’s decision to conduct a caste survey, in which the BJP was fully involved, and the Modi-led Indian government to conduct caste-wise enumeration in the census, also weakened this MGB attack line. There was no repeat of 2015, when the MGB had attacked the RSS chief’s remarks on quota and made the election a contest of forwards versus backwards.11 The bond wasn’t exactly greatThere was a lack of unity in the opposition alliance from the beginning. Congress expressed displeasure when it agreed to support Tejashwi as coalition leader. This cost the alliance partners the synergy needed for a high-risk fight with rivals like BJP and JDU. The MGB reduced the number of ‘friendly competitions’, but mistrust persisted. Also, the last minute launch of a smaller player, who is a proven defector leader, seemed too opportunistic and achieved little. In fact, it gave Asaduddin Owaisi an opportunity to complain about the MGB taking Muslims lightly. And RJD made a big mistake by giving 63 seats to Congress, whereas Congress has very little ground presence in Bihar and Rahul’s engagement in actual election campaigning was most appropriate.
