Should the tenure of legislatures in India be fixed?

Does fixed legislative tenure promote better governance by reducing the disruptions of frequent elections?

PDT Acharya: It is worth raising the question whether this bill and the proposal to hold simultaneous elections is absolutely necessary? The claim that such a system would reduce election expenditure lacks credibility. A part of the expenditure is allocated by the Election Commission and state governments through the budgetary provisions of the Center and the states. However, the majority of election expenditure is incurred by political parties. Even if some costs are saved, it is unlikely that political parties will redirect these funds towards development or infrastructure projects. More importantly, frequent elections increase political accountability, forcing representatives to engage regularly with voters.

MR Madhavan: This Constitution Amendment Bill does not propose a fixed term for legislatures, as it allows mid-term elections. This ensures accountability to the legislature in line with the basic principle of the parliamentary system. This bill is also in line with the basic structure of the Constitution by allowing mid-term elections. However, the main change is that in the event of midterm elections, the tenure of the newly elected legislature will be less than five years. It is uncertain whether this will improve governance or not. However, it does not provide the same stability as for example the American presidential system, where the sitting president can only be removed through impeachment.

Does aligning the tenure of state legislatures with that of the Lok Sabha compromise federalism and pose a threat to political pluralism?

MR Madhavan: I find this Bill symmetrical because it also aligns the tenure of Parliament with the tenure of state legislatures. For example, if the central government falls after three years, new elections will be held for the Lok Sabha, and the newly elected legislative body will serve only for a reduced period of two years. Therefore, I do not think that the state legislatures are being aligned with the Parliament. Rather, the bill standardizes the timing of all elections on a common date. I do not see any threat to federalism in this approach.

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The argument that holding simultaneous elections will induce voters to select the same party for both the Central and State Assemblies is flawed, as it underestimates the intelligence of the voters. Historical examples, such as the 2014 elections in Delhi, show that voters can and do make different choices. Despite the BJP’s landslide victory at the Centre, voters chose AAP in the state assembly – despite both elections being held within six months of each other.

PDT Acharya: For the first time, this Bill seeks to make the tenure of state legislatures dependent on the tenure of Parliament. For example, if Parliament completes its term while the state assembly is in its second year, the assembly will be prematurely dissolved, and elections will be held simultaneously with the parliament. This approach weakens the principles of federalism. Under the existing constitutional framework, state legislatures function as autonomous legislative bodies. This Bill seeks to change their independent tenure, which is an important feature of the federal structure.

Could such a system discourage efforts to destabilize governments and curb practices like horse-trading?

PDT Acharya: This is a novel proposal, and it is difficult to estimate whether such a system could effectively stop these practices at this stage. However, a major concern is the potential erosion of India’s identity as a federal republic, which lies in the autonomy of its legislative bodies.

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MR Madhavan: My understanding of the Bill is that it aligns the tenure of state legislatures with that of Parliament for the first time. However, after some election cycles, if there is a mid-term election for the Parliament, the state assemblies will continue and will not be dissolved.

Recently, large-scale defection occurred in Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka, where MLAs resigned or were disqualified, leading to by-elections. However, I doubt that the bill will curb such practices. A more important concern is the dissolution of the House. If a government falls after three and a half years, snap elections will be necessary, taking an additional 4–6 months. This will result in a Lok Sabha with a tenure of one year or less, which I believe is undesirable.

Does the Bill adequately take into account political imperatives? For example, if the ruling party splits but the breakaway faction refuses to go along with the opposition.

MR Madhavan: I believe that the Bill effectively addresses such contingencies. For example, the 2013 Delhi and 2005 Bihar Legislative Assembly elections resulted in hung assemblies. The Bill resolves such deadlocks by allowing fresh elections. The only difference is that the newly elected legislature will serve a shorter term instead of the full five years.

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PDT Acharya: The Constitution prescribes a five-year term for state legislatures and the Lok Sabha, but allows their dissolution to address political exigencies. This flexibility reflects a pragmatic approach towards governance. While fixed legislative terms provide stability, the option to dissolve assemblies is important to address political instability. For example, state governments have often dissolved assemblies to seek fresh and decisive mandates through mid-term elections – a contingency which the Bill fails to adequately address.

Can the German model of a constructive no-confidence vote help resolve the political impasse?

PDT Acharya: Such a proposal was rejected by the high-level committee led by former President Ram Nath Kovind. This has been discussed before, but I doubt it is possible to adopt it in India.

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MR Madhavan: I don’t think this is a viable option given our system. In most cases, when a ruling government loses a no-confidence motion, no alternative government has a majority in the House. This could lead to a situation where the current government remains in power but will not have the required majority to pass necessary bills or the budget.

The UK’s Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011, set to be repealed in 2022, was criticized for triggering a constitutional crisis and policy paralysis. What lesson can this be for India?

MR Madhavan: The bill is being misinterpreted as proposing fixed legislative tenure when it merely introduces a “maximum term.” This differs from the system in place in Britain, where a newly elected legislature would serve its full five-year term, even if snap elections were to be held. In contrast, under the system proposed by the bill, if the government loses the confidence of the legislative majority, midterm elections will be called, and the newly elected legislature will then serve a shortened term.

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PDT Acharya: In a country like ours, political instability is a real possibility, especially at the state level. While the tenure of Parliament will remain five years, states may face situations that will require mid-term elections, resulting in shortened tenure of state legislatures. I strongly believe that the existing system should be maintained despite its flaws. The proposal to hold simultaneous elections risks creating unnecessary unrest and there is no compelling reason to pursue it at this time. Instead the government should focus on tackling more serious challenges affecting the people.

to listen to the conversation In The Hindu Parle Podcast