PPick up any newspaper, scroll through social media, or attend a rally in Bihar electionAnd you’ll see a familiar political playbook in action.
The Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) continues to field candidates from its core base – Yadavs and Muslims. But recognizing the limitations of this strategy, it now promises Government jobs for a population desperate for a steady incomeYears of poor economic growth have forced millions of people to move out of Bihar in search of work. The RJD hopes to gain momentum on this theme and garner the support of voters for whom migration has become a major issue.
The Congress has lost its old support base among the ‘forward castes’ to the BJP and has brought its own national narrative to Bihar: inclusivity, constitutional values and secularism. It is pitting them against the divisive communalism of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This message resonates in parts of semi-urban Bihar. But it is clear that behind this are the golden days of the party.
Editorial Debate on migration: On the first phase of 2025 Bihar assembly elections
Left parties speak the language of rights and redistribution – land reform, labor rights, respect for workers. But except in some areas he has not created any support base. Smaller players like the Vikassheel Insaan Party have been brought in to snatch support from marginalized communities that have traditionally supported the ruling Janata Dal (United) or JD(U).
the other side
On the other side, JDU and its leader Nitish Kumar are standing. The party is the heir to the Karpoori Thakur formula – uniting the small but powerful non-Yadav Other Backward Classes (OBCs) like the Kurmis and Koeris, as well as the Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs) and ‘Mahadalits’. To expand further from this base, Mr Kumar has spent years courting women voters through welfare schemes. Now he is betting heavily on the popularity of one-time cash transfers to women to win this election.
The BJP wants to retain the support of ‘forward’ castes – who view the political dominance of OBCs with resentment. But it is also trying to build a broad coalition through central government welfare schemes and a tough appeal to Hindutva, aiming to unite Hindu voters across caste lines. To retain middle class and urban voters, it emphasizes “development”, which in Bihar broadly means building roads and bridges across rivers. In a state with India’s worst human development indicators, this limited definition of development speaks volumes.
Apart from the BJP and JD(U), the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) includes smaller caste-based parties – Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), Hindustani Awam Morcha, and Rashtriya Lok Morcha (RLM), each representing specific non-Yadav OBC and Dalit constituencies.
And then there is the newcomer: the Jan Suraj Party (JSP), which claims to offer something different – less focus on caste protection, more emphasis on good governance and welfare through better governance.
In short, Bihar’s 2025 election reflects the three forces that have shaped Indian politics since the 1990s: Mandal (caste-based reservations and identity politics), Mandir (Hindutva integration), and Bazaar (developmentism). Each party emphasizes these in different combinations, but divisional politics remains the most prominent factor.
This competition – with its promises of jobs, welfare, women empowerment and development – obscures a basic reality. Except for the Left parties, which lack electoral strength, no major player is talking about the core problem of Bihar, which has two interconnected parts.
The first is land. Despite decades of fragmentation, land ownership in Bihar remains skewed towards the upper caste elite. This concentration of agricultural land is not just an economic issue; It is the foundation of social and political power that has endured for generations. The second is the missing industry. Bihar has one natural strength: fertile agricultural land. This should have given rise to a thriving agro-processing industry – food processing units, packaging facilities, supply chain infrastructure that creates employment and adds value to agricultural produce. Instead, Bihar exports its raw agricultural products and its people. The concentration of land in the hands of an elite class, which has historically prioritized rent-seeking over capital investment, has prevented the emergence of a dynamic agro-industrial sector.
These two issues – land concentration and the absence of agro-processing – are key to understanding why Bihar remains poor despite decades of “social justice” politics and years of “development” governance. These are also issues that every major party is carefully avoiding because addressing them would mean challenging powerful interests: big landowners (including wealthy farmers from OBC communities), upper caste economic dominance, and the entire political economy that keeps the current system running.
Backward caste leaders from Bihar – Lalu Prasad Yadav, Nitish Kumar and others – came to power in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Most people give credit for this to the socialist movements of the mid-20th century. But its roots go back to the Triveni Sangh movement of the 1920-30s. At that time, backward caste leaders challenged the dominance of the forward castes (Rajputs, Bhumihars, Brahmins, Kayasthas) who controlled land, wealth and power. They wanted literacy, education and fair distribution of resources.
Nearly a century later, Bihar’s basic problem remains the same: a small minority still controls most of the wealth. Bihar caste survey reveals a bitter truth. The forward castes constitute only 15.5% of the population, yet they hold 31% of all government jobs. While 10% of forward caste households earn more than ₹50,000 per month, this figure is only 4% among OBCs, 2% among EBCs and Scheduled Castes, and less than 1% among Scheduled Tribes. According to the India Human Development Survey (2011) and National Sample Survey Organization (2019), more than 80% of large land holdings (more than 20 acres) belong to forward castes. This concentration of resources has not persisted without reason; It has reproduced itself through networks, influence and access to power.
political power without economic change
Bihar has achieved political democracy. Backward castes have been in power for decades. But this has not translated into economic democracy. The wealth is still in their hands.
To understand why political leaders of Bihar – even leaders from backward castes fighting for social justice – have avoided these fundamental issues, we need to look at which battles they chose to fight. Shri Prasad aggressively supported social justice. But they focused on challenging the forward castes while ignoring or even suppressing other backward and extremely backward castes. They did not address land redistribution or economic inequality. They fought only “neighborhood battles” – challenging the castes directly above the Yadavas in the hierarchy, rather than the entire system of inequality. This approach increased tensions between Yadavs and other OBC/EBC groups.
Mr. Kumar took a different path. They built roads, schools, and provided electricity – infrastructure that benefits everyone. It seemed like progress without endangering anyone’s property. He also initially set up a Land Reform Commission, but soon abandoned anything that might challenge the large landowners. outcome? Infrastructure improved, but there was no change in wealth distribution.
Neither Mr. Prasad nor Mr. Kumar was ready to challenge the big landlords from their own caste (Yadavs and Kurmis), even though their numbers were relatively small. Mr Kumar, who has been in power for two decades, would have been out by now if the state of Bihar’s economy was any indication of governance. But despite successful rallies and mobilization, the opposition Grand Alliance (MGB) has not presented itself as a clear alternative.
Bihar now has two possible paths. The first is growth for the few – a continuation of the existing model of development that benefits big business and land owners, with some welfare schemes to appease the masses. The second is inclusive growth – addressing the wealth gap, redistributing land, ensuring jobs and income reach all castes, and creating agro-processing industries that create broad-based employment.
New political entrants provide an example of the first path. LJP’s Chirag Paswan promises food processing industries, while JSP’s Prashant Kishor emphasizes on service sector development and better governance. Both talk about development, but pay no attention to wealth redistribution or land reforms. Their models accept the concentration of resources in the hands of large landowners, businesses, and bureaucrats, and only promise to make the system work more efficiently.
Both the NDA and the MGB are multi-caste alliances, which prevents them from moving forward decisively in any direction. The MGB’s recent policy papers – ‘Parivartan Patra’, ‘Mai-Bahin Maan Yojana’, and ‘Ati-Backward Nyaya Patra’ – show some understanding of inclusive development with plans to empower women, EBCs and Dalits. But given past broken promises, voters are skeptical.
Left parties have economic plans to redistribute wealth, but they have failed to link these to social justice issues. Their politics still do not match the facts such that an upper caste landless laborer faces very different obstacles from a Dalit or EBC woman, even though both are poor. Many Dalits who have been officially allotted land ownership are unable to take physical ownership due to social barriers.
To be seen as a credible alternative to the NDA, the MGB needs to send a clear, credible message that they are serious not just about winning elections, but also about inclusive growth. He should have delivered a message of redistribution and opportunity to voters rather than making wishful welfare promises. He should have created a sharp ideological contrast with the NDA. Now their hopes are pinned only on the anti-incumbency wave.
