US President Donald Trump’s post on Truth Social ahead of his October 30 meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea – “G2 will be held soon!” – US-China pair’s talks revived to manage global affairs. The theater was unmistakably Trumpian, but the substance of what followed was strategic and counterintuitive: modest tariff adjustments, reversal of increased export controls, resumption of Chinese purchases of US agricultural products, suspension of some planned operations for a year, reopening of military hotlines, narrow-scope regulatory dialogue and mutual visits in 2026. These measures were useful de-escalation, but they did not constitute an architecture of monopoly or co-governance. Yet the notion of a “G2 overlay” could have important implications for India.
The shorthand “G2” refers to the grouping of two, in which the US and China act as joint stewards of global governance. The label was most prominently coined by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Fred Bergsten in 2009 as a prescription for crisis management during the global financial crisis. Over time, shorthand expanded to envision the two powers setting rules, managing crises, and, in troubling versions, dividing spheres of influence. It has remained an infallible idea. Trump’s rhetoric doesn’t change that fact. Despite all its buzz, a durable G2 has remained elusive. Any initiative to move the G2 beyond rhetoric into co-governance or sphere of influence runs into four stubborn realities.
First, the difference between symbolism and substance. Busan was a theater of strategic de-escalation, not institutional co-governance. The understandings that have been reached are risk mitigation tools, which are easily lost when politics changes.
Second, strategic competition between America and China will continue. Even though Trump is currently downplaying the rivalry, Beijing’s assessment of the US-led West attempting to “comprehensively control, encircle and suppress China” has not changed. This was reflected in the “clarification” of the Fourth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party decisions issued two days before Busan.
Third, power today is not a well-ordered bipolar division. India, Japan, the EU, ASEAN and others actively oppose binary systems or regions created at their expense. Their agency, combined with the role of corporates, non-state players and minilaterals, increases the costs of any monopolization attempt. Even if the US and China want to “co-lead”, they will still face setbacks in trade, technology and security.
Ultimately, China’s dilemma matters. Beijing is publicly supportive of multipolarity, but privately Chinese scholars argue that the US and China have no counterparts in the Asia-Pacific, making a “multipolar Asia” impractical. This explains the attraction of bilateralism. Yet China’s leadership has avoided the “G2” label, preferring a flexible arrangement. Moreover, China has neither the capacity nor the inclination yet to become a major net security provider. He wants to “oust” the US as the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific, but is not yet ready to “replace” it.
At its core, the G2 idea accepts the dominance of both in economic scale, military projection and technological prowess. One attractive possibility is a “G2 overlay”. Even without formal institutions, if Washington and Beijing tacitly give the appearance of coordinated responses, their combined weight could yield widespread influence in decision-making.
For Washington, bipartisanship offers quick wins: clearing the fog in the Taiwan Strait, and fixing supply chains amid election year jitters. Beijing, always pragmatic, enjoys regulatory opening-up and economic oxygen without the domestic sting of open concessions. In moments of systemic stress the temptation to bifurcate decisions becomes strong. Repeated strategic collusion can become a habit and narrow the policy space for others.
India will have to grapple with emerging ground realities. Busan has confirmed that China has become markedly stronger since Xi and Trump last met in 2019, and perceives the balance of power as shifting toward Beijing. There is a widespread view in China that it has put pressure on Washington and managed growing dominance more effectively, even if the US claims short-term victories. On balance, U.S. concessions increase Chinese market penetration while giving Beijing short-term relief without reducing its long-term industrial advantages or policy autonomy.
India will also have to face the fact that the positive trajectory of its strategic partnership with the US has been fundamentally disrupted. Trump’s ambivalence regarding China as a strategic rival and India’s role in America’s Indo-Pacific strategy is a major complication. Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy explicitly labeled China a “strategic competitor”. However, in his second term, his administration emphasizes transactional deals, pressures allies to increase defense spending, and focuses less on strategic frameworks. For India, Trump’s dilemma on China, indifference towards India and missing pivot in the Indo-Pacific risks sidelining New Delhi’s role.
Despite the thaw, India-China relations will remain tense, and even limited China-US cooperation will create uncertainty. This is not a “G2 overlay” architecture; It’s the atmosphere, a shadow game that prevents choices. If the China-US partnership is deployed to address systemic challenges, India may find itself reacting to bargains it did not help shape.
India must adhere to clear imperatives. First, it should sharpen diplomatic signals and make clear to partners and rivals alike that it values open regional architecture, not areas carved out by others; That it will cooperate on an issue-by-issue basis where interests converge but will oppose exclusionary bargaining; And that it will firmly protect its core sovereignties – land borders, vital interests within its periphery, developmental goals and the ability to choose partners. At the same time, India should deepen institutional options by accelerating engagement across the continents with Africa, the EU, ASEAN, IBSA, G20, BRICS+ and new middle-power coordination channels that can set standards and offer alternatives to bilateral rule-making. Aspirations to emerge as a leading power can wait while the country focuses on capacity building. Real politics matter, but foreign policy cannot be principle-agnostic. India’s reluctance to take a stance on issues like Gaza has diminished its stake in the Global South, where China has made progress.
Second, India needs to strengthen economic resilience through dual de-risking. Both Washington and Beijing are adopting industrial policies and weaponizing interdependence. Therefore, New Delhi needs to reduce sensitivity to both sets of pressures. This requires diversifying suppliers, investing in frontier technologies, localizing critical inputs, and creating interoperable standards that preserve access without forcing alignment.
A continued strategic tilt toward the US may be desirable, provided Washington responds, but it must be embedded in a new, tighter balance in which the litmus test is how much it helps build India’s indigenous capabilities – economic, military and technological. This inclination may be a defensive preventive posture, but it should not turn into a binary alignment that closes off diplomatic and commercial options. At the same time, it would be naïve to look for answers to the difficulties in America’s elusive relations with China or the Russia-India-China troika.
India can borrow a few pages from China’s strategy, although Beijing’s tools cannot be prepared quickly. This will involve playing the long game of developing domestic capabilities, reducing dependencies, diversifying economic ties and leveraging ourselves to avoid a repeat of the current crisis. Ultimately, India’s rise must be based in its neighbourhood, not beyond it as a policy option.
We are not at the threshold of formal or substantive monopoly. The more likely trajectory is one managed by US-China competition, punctuated by episodic cooperation with other major and middle powers, regional institutions, non-state players, and “the rest,” ensuring that governance remains contested, plural, and messy. Navigating this uncertain terrain requires accurate assessment of trends and steady strategic choices, avoiding knee-jerk reactions.
Ashok K. Kantha is a former ambassador to China. Views expressed are personal
