In a landmark judgement delivered on 23.05.2025 by a bench comprising of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Abhay S. Oka, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the maternity leave is not a favor or discretionary benefit given by the employer, but a legal right flowing from a woman’s reproductive rights. The court held that maternity leave is an essential part of the maternity benefits and is closely connected to women’s right to health, privacy, equality, non-discrimination, and dignity, all which are protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.The court set aside the decision of the division bench of Madras High Court, which had denied maternity leave to a government school teacher by applying the State’s two child norm policy, rather than as a right connected to motherhood and reproductive dignity.In the judgement authored by Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and concurred by Justice Abhay S. Oka, the Supreme Court brought, much needed clarity to the intersection between service rules, constitutional guarantees, and maternity welfare legislation. The court held that administrative policies such a two-child norm cannot override a woman’s entitlement to maternity benefits, especially when such entitlements flow from constitutional values and human rights principles. It clarified that service rules must be interpreted harmoniously with the constitutional rights, and not in any manner defeat the very purpose of maternity protection laws.
Brief Facts leading to the Supreme Court Appeal:
The appellant, K. Umadevi, joined the government service in December 2012 as an English teacher in a Government Higher Secondary School in Tamil Nadu. Before joining the service, she already had two children with her first husband, who were still in custody with her ex-husband. This wedlock ended in divorce in 2017. In 2018, Umadevi remarried and out of this surviving marriage, she conceived a child. In August 2021, she applied for maternity leave covering both the pre-natal and post-natal period.The education authorities, however, declined her request based on Fundamental Rule 101(a), applicable to Tamil Nadu government employees, which limits maternity leaves to women having less than two “surviving children”. Thereby, meaning that the child conceived from her second marriage as a “third child” hence denied the maternity benefit. This mechanical and literal interpretation of the rule became the rigger of the legal dispute.Aggrieved by the rejection of maternity leaves by the authorities, Umadevi went to the Madras High Court by filing a writ petition against the authorities. The learned (Ld.) Single Judge allowed her petition, holding that the expression “two surviving children” must receive a purposive interpretation. The Single Judge observed that the children are not in the custody of the woman employee cannot be used to deny maternity benefits. It also held that such provisions must be construed liberally to protect the dignity and health of the working women and directed the State to grant maternity leave. The State of Tamil Nadu challenged this decision before a division bench of the High Court, which reversed the Single Judge’s ruling. The division bench held that maternity leave is not a fundamental right, and that the State’s two-child norm policy must prevail over individual claims. This prompted Umadevi to approach the Supreme Court.Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that the child that was conceived by her second marriage was her first child in service. She further submitted that the two children born to her by the first marriage were not under her custody and were living with her former husband, and therefore, could not be taken into account for denying maternity benefits.She heavily placed reliance on Deepika Singh vs CAT (2023), where the Supreme Court adopted a purposive and liberal interpretation of maternity rules. It was further argued that maternity leave was an aspect of reproductive autonomy and dignity as provided under Article 21 of the Constitution and that though the Maternity Benefit Act may not be directly applicable to State employees, it provides excellent legislative guidance.The State, however, justified its two-child norm by the fiscal discipline and population control. It claimed that the extension of maternity benefits to more than two children would compromise the State policy and would cause administrative challenges. In the opinion of the State, the maternity leave is not a human right or fundamental right, but a statutory or service benefit, which should be handled through the service regulations.The Supreme Court rejected the narrow and literal interpretation adopted by the state and High Court Division Bench and undertook an extensive, constitutional, statutory law analysis. The Court held that Article 21 of the Constitution is not confined to mere physical existence. This means that for a working woman her pregnancy, health, and decision to become a mother are matters of dignity and autonomy, not mere service conditions or administrative privileges. It also cited Article 42, which mandates the State to make provisions for maternity relief, and Article 51(c) which urges state to respect the international law and treaty obligations.Drawing from its earlier decisions, including Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, Devika Biswas v. Union of India, X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, and Deepika Singh v. CAT, the Court reiterated that a woman’s right to make reproductive choices and to receive maternity support is inseparable from the right to live with dignity.The Court further observed that maternity benefits are now universally recognized as part of reproductive rights. It emphasized that maternity leave is an integral component of maternity benefits and plays a crucial role in safeguarding the health and dignity of both the mother and the child.The Court also examined the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, and noted that, there is no absolute bar on maternity benefits based on the number of children. Instead, it only regulates the duration of maternity leave based on the number of surviving children. Section 27 of the Act also gives an overriding effect over inconsistent laws.The Court, while rejecting the mechanical application of the two-child norm, held that the phrase “two surviving children” cannot be understood out of context. In Umadevi’s case, the two children from her first marriage were neither born during her service nor are in her custody. The child from her second marriage was her first child in service, and denying maternity leave in such circumstances would defeat the very purpose of maternity welfare legislation.The Court further explained that FR 101 is a service rule meant to facilitate maternity benefits, not to defeat them. Therefore, the expression “surviving children” must be understood in a meaningful and humane manner. It cannot be interpreted to include children who are not in the custody of the woman, especially when such an interpretation would completely deny maternity leave for a child born during service.The Court also made it clear that the objective of population control and maternity benefits are not exclusive of each other. The two should be balanced by way of making purposive interpretations, where the women employees should not be punished unfairly because of personal situations like remarriage or custody.Relying on precedents such as Deepika Singh v. CAT, Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, and Devika Biswas v. Union of India, the Supreme Court once again confirmed that reproductive autonomy, maternal health, and dignity are inseparable aspects of the right to life in the Article 21.The Supreme Court, accordingly set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court and declared that K. Umadevi is entitled to maternity leave under FR 101(a). The Court directed the State to release her maternity benefits within two months, which would put constitutional primacy over inflexible service regulations.(Vatsal Chandra is a Delhi-based Advocate practicing before the courts of Delhi NCR.)
