In 2019, Indonesia held historic one-day elections for the president, national and regional legislatures, and local councils. While intended to cut costs and simplify administration, it came at a tragic human cost: nearly 900 polling workers died and more than 5,000 fell seriously ill. In 2024, massive devastation occurred again – more than 100 deaths and approximately 15,000 illnesses. In June 2025, the Constitutional Court, citing voter and administrator overreach and the impact on democratic participation, ruled that national and local elections should be held separately from 2029, at an interval of two to two and a half years.
Proponents of India’s ‘One Nation, One Election’ (ONEO) proposal argue that holding Lok Sabha (general elections) and state assembly elections simultaneously would reduce expenditure, limit prolonged security deployment, reduce disruptions caused by the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), and prevent political parties from being in constant campaign mode. However, Indonesia’s experience offers a cautionary lesson.
Comparative constitutional practice provides little support for enforced electoral coordination. Federal and provincial elections are held independently in Canada. In Australia, synchronization is impossible: state legislatures serve fixed four-year terms, while the federal House of Representatives has a maximum term of three years.
Germany is often misunderstood. Its stability does not come from synchronized elections – Länder elections are deliberately staggered – but rather from a constructive vote of no confidence, which requires the Bundestag to elect a successor before removing the Chancellor.
South Africa and Indonesia use proportional representation, which spreads political power and protects minority voices. India’s first-past-the-post system lacks the safeguards that could lead to a national wave in state elections. The United States offers an even weaker analogy: fixed electoral cycles work there because the executive’s tenure is insulated from legislative confidence in the presidential system.
constitutional amendment proposal
The most comprehensive blueprint emerged from the high-level committee (2023–24) chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind, which is now taking legislative form in the Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024. The proposed Article 82A empowers the President to notify an “appointment date” by which the tenure of all state assemblies will align with the cycle of the Lok Sabha. The tenure of assemblies constituted after this date will be reduced, even if their The bill also introduces “unexpired elections”: the new legislature will serve only the remainder of the original term if it proves impractical under Articles 83 and 172. Amendments are proposed in 327.
India deliberately adopted a parliamentary system where governments survive only as long as they retain legislative confidence. Dr. BR Ambedkar told the Constituent Assembly that democracy cannot simultaneously maximize stability and responsibility. India chose continuous executive accountability rather than guaranteed tenure.
Articles 75 and 164 establish the collective responsibility of the executive towards the legislature. Articles 83 and 172 prescribe only a maximum term of five years for legislatures, with no guaranteed tenure. Therefore, early dissolution is not a vice, but a democratic protection, allowing voters to renew the mandate if confidence is broken. ONOE reverses this logic, treating dissolution as an administrative inconvenience and shifting India toward a semi-presidential model that weakens legislative accountability.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court of India confirmed that federalism is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. States are not mere administrative units but have an independent constitutional identity. Their democratic rhythms may legitimately differ.
ONOE destabilizes this theory. This allows state mandates to be reduced, not because legislative confidence has collapsed, but to align with the national electoral calendar. If it is introduced in 2029, the mandate of the state, which elects its legislature in 2033, will expire in just one year.
In contrast, separate elections for Parliament, state assemblies and local bodies create a continuous feedback mechanism, keeping governments conscious of public sentiments. In a system without the right to recall, they serve as the next best means of accountability. As James Madison wrote in ‘Federalist No. 52’, frequent elections ensure that governments “maintain the immediate dependence and sympathy of the people.”
Problem of ‘unexpired-term’ elections
The most disturbing thing is the mid-term elections without the end of the legislative term. The Constitution does not recognize any concept of residuary mandate. Although proposed articles 83(6) and 172(5) claim that a newly elected House will not be a continuation of the previous House, they effectively preserve earlier electoral cycles to maintain coherence. Many distortions arise from this.
First, it devalues the franchise. Mid-cycle elections will result in governments with reduced mandates, temporarily limiting elections and risking deep voter apathy.
Second, it weakens governance and accountability, as governments with remaining terms lack incentives for structural reform, leading to populism and policy drift. Unlike the temporary restrictions imposed by the MCC, truncated mandates could weaken the regime for years rather than weeks.
Third, it risks creating a “governance dead zone.” The amendment bill does not specify the minimum period of “unexpired tenure” that would trigger snap elections.
At the state level, postponing elections could prolong President’s rule, which is contrary to Article 356(5), which limits it to one year, which can be extended only to three years during a national emergency with Election Commission of India (ECI) certification.
At the Union level, a caretaker government may remain in office awaiting simultaneous elections, potentially violating the Article 85 requirement that Parliament meet every six months. Such a government cannot present a full budget under Articles 112-117 and will be limited to the Vote on Account (Article 116), which will hamper fiscal governance.
Thus the “unexpired-term” mechanism is legally unviable at the Union level for more than six months and would require sweeping constitutional changes that risk distorting the identity of the Constitution and violating the basic structure principle.
Proposed Article 82A(5) empowers the ECI to recommend postponement of state elections without clear criteria, time limit or parliamentary oversight, if unable to be held simultaneously with the Lok Sabha. Even Article 356 contains safeguards – parliamentary approval and temporary limits. In contrast, Article 82A(5) creates an area of unguided discretion.
If the government of a state collapses mid-term, the central government can impose President’s rule and postpone elections, effectively ruling the state through the Governor. The government that comes after the elections can get only a short tenure.
The issue is not whether such abuse is likely, but whether the Amendment makes it constitutionally possible. As Alexander Hamilton warned in Federalist No. 59 (1788), the constitutional possibility of abuse is in itself “an undeniable objection.”
In the NJAC case (2015), the Court held that constitutional validity depends on institutional design, not on assurance of benign practice. An amendment that structurally jeopardizes a basic facility is unconstitutional, regardless of how the power may be exercised in practice. ONOE risks violating federalism by enabling prolonged unelected state rule in the name of synchronization.
cost argument
The fiscal burden of elections is macro-economically negligible and the numbers do not justify a constitutional change on such a large scale.
The Parliamentary Standing Committee estimates that the combined election expenditure of the Lok Sabha and state assemblies is about ₹4,500 crore (2015–16), which is about 0.25% of the Union Budget and 0.03% of the GDP. PRS data shows that the cost of Lok Sabha elections historically ranged between 0.02%-0.05% of GDP (1957-2014). The elections are held in phases (82 days in 2024), allowing the ECI to rotate EVMs, VVPATs and security forces. Holding simultaneous elections would remove this flexibility and demand costly new resources, thereby undermining the claimed administrative benefits.
Is it wise to amend the Constitution and weaken federalism to save a fraction of 1% of GDP? Elections are not an overhead expense to be cut, but a recurring cost of self-governance, which ensures that power remains accountable to the people.
The Justice Kurian Joseph Committee on Union-State relations constituted by the Government of Tamil Nadu has recommended in Part I of its report (February 2026) that the Bill should be withdrawn – the stance supported by the Government of Tamil Nadu is that the promised benefits of the ONOE proposal are exaggerated, while its structural disadvantages run deep. It distorts the identity of the Constitution and violates the basic structure. India will have to avoid repeating the mistake of Indonesia.
MK Stalin is the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu
