India-Pakistan relations By Satish Chandra, apt subtitles Saga of endless controversiesIt is very timely. Its 18 chapters cover all the major issues that have plagued bilateral relations, some since 1947. Many books have been written on Pakistan by learned scholars and diplomats, but this is a concise and easy-to-read collection of issues ranging from Jammu and Kashmir, sharing of river waters and terrorism to the disputes in Junagadh, Hyderabad, Jinnah House in Mumbai, alienated assets including the Rann of Kutch. Declaration of war. Interestingly, the book also covers topics that are not bilateral in nature but are important for a better understanding of Pakistan’s dual actions on key issues like the merger under pressure of Kalat State, the saga of NWFP (now Kyber Pakhtunkhwa) merger with Pakistan and the appalling treatment of the country’s minorities.
Satish Chandra’s extensive experience in a number of key government positions, including High Commissioner to Pakistan and Founding Secretary of India’s National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) (in 1998, the erstwhile Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was reorganized into the NSCS), puts him in a uniquely unique position to review a relationship that has by far been India’s most difficult to manage.
When I opened the book, the first page presented was related to the erstwhile princely state of Mangrol, which, with Babariaism, had acceded to India in 1947, even though Pakistan claimed it along with Manawadar on the basis of specific claims made by the Nawab of Junagadh.
My family originates from Mangrol on the coast of the Kathiawar peninsula. My grandfather, Barrister CN Chinoy, who was Diwan of Rajkot State in the late 1930s and early 1940s, often advised the Sheikh of Mangrol on state matters. We had a deep friendship with Sheikh and his family. For the record, Major Mohammed Ali Raz Shaikh of 16 Light Cavalry, a scion of the princely state of Mangrol, had earned the Vir Chakra (posthumously) for bravery in action against enemy armor in the Sialkot sector on 8 September 1965. I remember reading in the memoirs of Lieutenant General (retd) Harbaksh Singh that when he visited the hospital as GOC-in-C of Western Command, a mortally wounded Major Mohammad Ali Raz Shaikh tried to stiffen his body. Even saluting his commander as he lay there taking his last few breaths. So much for Pakistan’s imagination about the two-nation theory!
Junagadh is also covered in some detail. In April 1947, its Diwan, Khan Bahadur Abdul Qadir Mohammad Hussain, rejected allegations of Junagadh’s desire to accede to Pakistan and the impression was given that its constitutional advisor, Nabi Baksh, would advise the Nawab to accede to India. It is noteworthy that when Sir Shah Nawaz Bhuttu (Benazir’s grandfather) was appointed Diwan in May 1947 and he remained in that position during the crucial period of independence in mid-August, Junagadh suffered a complete reversal. Interestingly, the book states that after the Nawab fled to Pakistan, the Begum of Junagadh met Mr. Prakash, India’s first High Commissioner to Pakistan, and told him that her son wanted to choose India. He requested that he be installed as the Nawab. Delhi saw no merit in the idea, although in the case of Mir Osman Ali Khan, the Nizam of Hyderabad the following year, after Operation Polo, he was brought into the political mainstream of independent India under a constitutional role, leading to the formal integration of Hyderabad into the Indian Union. The difference between the two situations was that the Nizam had not fled India.
Operation Polo in Hyderabad was a major success and ended with the Nizam being allowed to return and continue as constitutional head. The commander of Operation Polo was none other than General Rajendrasinhji, who later became the first COAS.
There is a story popular in Junagadh. When the Nawab fled in the face of popular demonstrations led by Samaldas Gandhi (nephew of Mahatma Gandhi), he not only left behind one of his Begums, who had to return from the tarmac at the last minute to collect her child, but apparently filled her place with one of his favorite dogs. Apparently, the Begum was not among the favorites of the eccentric Nawab Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III. The author writes that his interest in Junagadh after his escape focused particularly on the fate of the many dogs he left behind. When the Indian representatives entered the Nawab’s palace they found “a dog on every chair in the drawing room”.
The story of Jammu and Kashmir and its merger with India is well known, but the bias and prejudice of the Western powers needs to be recounted for the record. After Pakistan retaliated to the UN Secretary General, the UNSC changed the agenda item from Pakistani aggression to the broader India-Pakistan question, also expanding UNCIP’s mandate to cover irrelevant issues like Junagadh.
On the one hand, Joseph Korbel, president of UNCIP and father of Madeleine Albright, proved to be the most prejudiced. This can be gauged from his book. danger in kashmir.
The author mentions that UNMOGIP’s presence in the subcontinent after the Shimla Agreement is completely unjustified. A body established to monitor the 1949 ceasefire line, it no longer has any jurisdiction after the CFL was converted into the Line of Control (LOC) through a bilateral agreement in 1972. Terminating UNMOGIP, however, is the sole prerogative of the UN Security Council and it has decided not to do so due to vested interests. India has done well by denying UNMOGIP any special privileges, even if Pakistan favors it.
The author describes an extraordinary fact, how at the time when Pakistan was waging a war against India in Kashmir after independence, the Reserve Bank of India paid ₹Rs 75 crore from its cash balance and total ₹Rs 228 crore (partly in pounds sterling) to the offensive from its issuance and banking divisions. Mahatma Gandhi fasted to ensure that Pakistan’s demands were met, and the Indian government had to capitulate. Surprisingly, India also took over Pakistan’s pre-partition debt and allowed it to repay it in 50 installments from 1952. It is a different matter that the “deformed, mutilated and worm-eaten” state, as Jinnah himself lamented, reneged on its responsibilities.
Another irony of history pointed out by the author is that after the signing of the Kalat-Pakistan Standstill Agreement in 1947, the Kalat State invited India to enter into a similar agreement recognizing its independence and requested Delhi to allow the establishment of a trade agency. In fact, Kalat State National Party President Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo met Indian National Congress President Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in Delhi to seek help in maintaining their independence. Kalam agreed that Baluchistan was an independent entity and was never actually a part of undivided India, but advised that India could do nothing in the matter. The author has described the thinking of the Congress as “devoid of the spirit of real politics”. Pakistan backed down and later through military pressure forced the Khan of Kalat to sign the instrument of accession, even though the standstill agreement remained in force.
The author describes the many ups and downs of the NWFP saga, the crucial role of “Frontier Gandhi” Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (also known as Badshah Khan), British manipulation, the use of communal violence by the Muslim League for regional gain and the failure of the Congress to maintain its hold on the province when it could have opted for India, had its Legislative Assembly voted on the issue. He says that if the Congress had not walked out of the provincial governments, thereby eroding Badshah Khan’s popular relationship with the people, the Muslim League would never have achieved the strength that it did with the support of officials like Olaf Caro. Nehru finally succumbed to Mountbatten’s repeated insistence to agree to a referendum in the NWFP on the issue of “Pakistan or New India” and the rest is history!
The author details Pakistan’s appalling record of mistreating its minorities from the beginning, particularly the majority of the exodus from West Pakistan in 1947–48. In contrast, the exodus from East Pakistan occurred gradually, peaking in 1971 when the Pakistani Army carried out genocide against East Pakistanis, especially Hindu minorities. The author considers the root cause of this to be the politics of hatred and violence spread by the Muslim League and its two-nation theory. The treachery of the British officials encouraged this sentiment.
The author says that Pakistan is beyond relaxation on this aspect and will leave no stone unturned to weaken India, which will leave India with no option but to adopt punitive policies to stop Pak-sponsored terrorism. In his view, the disintegration of Pakistan in its present form is the only permanent solution to the problem.
The chapter on evacuee property also throws new light on Jinnah’s properties, especially on the specific claims made by Pakistan while he was unwilling to give justice to refugees who fled Pakistan, especially on the property of Seth Shivratan Chandralal Mohatta in Karachi. In contrast to Pakistan’s dual stance, India tried to work in the interest of the displaced regardless of religion.
The chapter on financial and commercial issues shows how ridiculous it was that India inherited all the foreign debt of undivided India as well as had to pay Pakistan more than its fair share of the Reserve Bank balance while Pakistan was attacking Kashmir in 1948.
The chapter on the battle of Kutch is interesting. This is one of the few disputes that India agreed to mediate in the 1960s because Pakistan kept raising it, even though the alignment between the Maharaos of Kutch and Sindh had been settled decades earlier. I dealt with coastal security and Harami Nala issue during my tenure with NSCS and visited the disputed areas along the G-Pillar Line, which extends westwards from BOP 1175. After obtaining India’s consent for the alignment of the vertical line between BOP 1175 and BOP 1153, Pakistan challenged the horizontal G-Pillar line to boost its speculative claims to the east in the Creek area.
On the Durand Line, Satish Chandra has rightly underlined that the line was never clearly defined and the oft-referenced 1893 agreement did not make it a sacred international border. Soon after the British left, the Afghans rejected all treaties made with them, including the Durand Line, and called for an independent Pashtunistan. It was the only country that opposed Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations. Over the years, no Afghan government/regime, including the Taliban, has ever recognized the Durand Line. I was pleasantly surprised to see that a reference was made to me and the ‘colonial cartographic mischief’ used for the Durand Line issue was mentioned.
Sujan Chinoy, former ambassador, is the Director General of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses.
