The latest episode of Hindustan Times’ ‘Point Blank’, featuring Executive Editor Shishir Gupta in conversation with senior anchor Ayesha Verma, paints a clear picture of a Middle East war that is on hold, not over, and a global order that could be reshaped depending on what happens in and around the Strait of Hormuz.
Blockade at the world’s chokepoint
At the center of the talks is the United States’ declaration of a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, ordered by President Donald Trump after talks failed. islamabad And reports of Iranian oil tankers headed towards China. The plan, as outlined, is to prevent Iranian and Iran-allied vessels from entering or exiting while allowing non-Iranian ones. Shipping to pass, Implementation is scheduled for 8 p.m. Washington time.
Yet, as Gupta insists, this is “easier said than done”. Key operational questions remain unanswered: Will the encirclement remain in the Gulf of Oman, at the mouth of the strait, or deep into the Persian Gulf? US has reportedly advanced two Arleigh Burke-class destroyer In the strait, but warships usually turn off their AIS (Automatic Identification System), making independent verification difficult. What is clear is that the US naval presence is now concentrated in the Gulf of Oman and the North Arabian Sea, with a comprehensive plan to effectively block Iran’s maritime access, including ports on the North Arabian Sea and potentially the Caspian region.
Gupta warned that such a move could invite retaliation from Iran, using mines, explosive-laden kamikaze boats, missiles and drones against US and allied ships. Any such attack would certainly trigger retaliatory action from heavily armed US destroyers and aircraft carriers, increasing the risk of wider tensions.
From nuclear standoff to fragile ceasefire
Gupta argues that the Islamabad talks, which aimed to consolidate the ceasefire, were “doomed from the start”, as both Washington and Tehran came away with maximalist stances and inconsistent red lines on Iran’s nuclear program.
He misses the root cause of the war: Iran’s uranium enrichment campaign. For civilian nuclear power, enrichment is typically between 3.75 and 5 percent, but Iran has already reached 60 percent—dangerously close to weapons-grade, in the range of more than 80 percent. He says the military objective of the US-Israeli campaign was to “debilitate” Iran’s nuclear capability.
In this logic, any lasting peace would require Iran to limit its program and hand over 60 percent of its enriched stockpile to a third country or the IAEA. But such a concession would be politically suicidal for Tehran’s hardline regime and would actually amount to regime change. On the other hand, the US and Israel cannot accept an Iran that has the capacity to move rapidly toward weapons-grade enrichment; Simply promising not to build bombs is not credible in their eyes, especially given the Iranian leadership’s elliptical public messaging.
This structural conflict meant that the Islamabad talks were never likely to lead to any breakthrough, and their collapse caused the center of gravity to shift back to the Strait of Hormuz.
Economic shock and domino risk at sea
Beyond the military dimension, Gupta outlines the huge economic risks. An estimated 900 ships remain stranded in the Persian Gulf; If they cannot get out, the immediate result will be an energy crisis that could rapidly turn into a global economic crisis. This, in turn, could force central banks to raise interest rates again, leading to a tightening of financial conditions around the world. Crude prices have already increased.
He points to another, more systemic concern: precedent. If the world accepts the controversial closure of the Strait of Hormuz today, what stops other powers tomorrow from blocking other major chokepoints – the Strait of Malacca, the Ten Degree Channel between the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the Strait of Gibraltar, or even the heavily trafficked routes into East Asia? International maritime law through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is clear that no country can arbitrarily block transit routes. Allowing unilateral tolls or closures would open the door to a domino effect in which vital sea lanes become bargaining chips in regional rivalries.
Gupta says this is why the US cannot allow Iran to “occupy” Hormuz and actually collect tolls, but also cannot treat freedom of navigation selectively without undermining its own legal and political arguments.
India’s role: not a failure, but a different game
The breakdown of talks and Pakistan’s role as mediator between Washington and Tehran have triggered comments domestically whether Indian diplomacy has “failed”. Gupta strongly rejects this framing.
He has described Pakistan as a “convenient stooge” of the US, which has been repeatedly used for decades, has a long-term relationship with Iran and has a history of playing along with both sides, from facilitating the flight of al-Qaeda leaders through Iran following the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom to acting as a middleman in the current crisis. He argues that Islamabad’s presence in the room says little about India’s diplomatic strength and much about Pakistan’s usefulness as a transaction partner.
In contrast, he says, India is working at an entirely different level, focused on “post-ceasefire diplomacy”. He cites New Delhi’s support to Sri Lanka through fuel supplies during the crisis, improved relations with Bangladesh after the exit of Mohammad Yunus, strong ties with the new leadership in Nepal, pragmatic engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan and the management of a difficult relationship with the Maldives. Especially in the Gulf crisis, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s visit to Abu Dhabi was aimed at thanking the UAE for supporting Indian expatriates when Iranian missiles were flying, with a similar plan being planned for Saudi Arabia.
For Gupta, attempts to link India with Pakistan in this scenario are wrong. India is not competing to be the fixer between Washington and Tehran; It is protecting its diaspora, its energy security and its broader regional ties.
China’s shadow, and the limits of its leverage
The talks also discussed reports of China supplying air defense systems, ammunition and missiles to Iran during the ceasefire and Beijing’s alleged role in pushing Tehran to negotiate. Gupta is skeptical of claims of widespread Chinese influence.
He points out that President Trump has openly threatened to impose tariffs on China if it is found to be supplying arms to Iran, suggesting that Washington believes something is happening on that axis. However, he argues that Western media often exaggerate Chinese clout while underestimating India’s, and there is little transparency on what Beijing has actually done, beyond the fact that some of Iran’s air defense systems are of Chinese origin.
Importantly, he said, Iran has been “pulverized” by US strikes and does not need China to tell it when to talk; Its own strategic dilemma is incentive enough. At the same time, the US is struggling with domestic inflation of around 3.3 percent and a midterm election cycle that makes Trump unable to appear weak, just as Iran’s leadership cannot be seen as capitulating to Washington without the risk of regime change. In this context, the claim that China is the decisive broker seems exaggerated.
Gupta suggests that Pakistan, given their “iron brother” relationship, has almost certainly kept Beijing informed about the talks, but this is very different from China being the mastermind on the diplomatic track.
Israel’s slow strategy and the Gulf dilemma
On Israel, Gupta stressed that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu still enjoys substantial domestic support despite criticism and war fatigue. He points out that Israel’s strategy has never been about a clean, decisive victory, but rather about systematically crippling opponents’ capabilities – whether pushing Hezbollah north of the Litani River or exploiting every avenue to attack Iranian assets.
Looking ahead, he anticipates “sporadic escalation” rather than an immediate return to full-scale war. Much depends on whether Iran wants to respond to the Hormuz blockade militarily; If that happens, retaliatory attacks are inevitable, but in the absence of such measures, guns may remain relatively quiet even as tensions rise.
For the Gulf monarchies, the war has been a sobering reminder of their insecurity. There have been reports of Pakistan sending 13,000 troops and 18 fighters to Saudi Arabia following the ceasefire, although Gupta stressed that there is “no transparency” on this deployment nor has there been any confirmation of it. In any case, he argues, states in the region will have to deepen both defensive and offensive capabilities and work closely with each other to ensure that they are not treated as collateral damage in someone else’s war.
The United States also faces tough questions from its Gulf partners about how they were allowed to be hit so severely despite years of security assurances.
For now, as Gupta says, the war is over, but the peace is “very, very fragile” and could unravel at any time. Yet he remains cautiously optimistic that in the long term, “negotiations and diplomacy will ultimately take precedence over missiles and bombs” – not out of idealism, but because all the major players from Washington to Tehran to the Gulf have too much to lose.
