Citizenship Circus: How three generations of Hindu refugees became Bengal’s permanent hostages Vote | india news

Last updated:April 17, 2026, 11:31 IST

Who are the Hindu refugees of Bengal – a political faction built on caste, numbers and displacement

Hindu refugees in West Bengal are not a single, indivisible group or an individual. It is a layered social formation, increasingly structured by caste, clustered by geography, interpreted by history, and consolidated over decades into one of the most decisive political factions in the state. Over the past decade, Hindu refugees in West Bengal have emerged as a decisive electoral force, reshaping political dynamics beyond the traditional and convenient Hindu-Muslim binary.

At the broad level, this population falls under the Scheduled Caste (SC) matrix of Bengal. There are about 60 subcastes in the state, many of them originating in erstwhile East Bengal (present-day Bangladesh).

They ranged from partition in 1947 to the later stages of the 1950s, 60s and 1971. Districts such as Cooch Behar, Nadia, South and North 24 Parganas became the primary sites of their settlement, where refugee colonies gradually transformed into permanent, but still disputed settlements. In this scenario, some communities dominate numerically and politically.

Hindu refugees of West Bengal

West Bengal’s Hindu refugees have evolved from a displaced population to a politically pivotal constituency, which has shaped the state’s electoral landscape in complex ways. However, like most caste groups, these communities are internally diverse. Some sections are native to Bengal, while others trace their origins to migration into the region.

Namasudras are one of the largest classes, spread throughout Bengal with an estimated population of about 40 lakhs. Historically organized and politically aware, they have maintained a consistent presence in the state legislative assembly and remain at the center of any electoral calculations involving voters of refugee origin. However, like all other caste groups, every class has populations on both sides; While one group is native to Bengal, the other migrated to Bengal.

In North Bengal, the Rajbanshis, approximately 42 lakh (as per 2011 census and future projections by government departments), represent another important block. Once holding a dominant political position in the region, their influence has changed over time, but importance has not diminished. Their demographic strength continues to shape the politics of the northern districts.

Along with these larger groups, there are also smaller but strategically important communities. The Malo community, centered in Nadia, is limited in numbers, but has a reputation for intellectual and political expression that often far exceeds its size.

The Suri community, with around 3 lakh voters, has produced several MLAs and has maintained a distinct electoral imprint. Occupational castes such as the Dhobi and Rabidas (cobbler) communities form additional layers within this broader refugee identity. Overall, these are not marginal populations. They are structured, self-aware and selectively decisive. Most importantly, over time a large portion of this population settled in the state.

It is now within this caste-based framework that the Matua community emerges not as a distinct entity, but as one of its most visible and politically organized expressions.

Centered in Thakurnagar, the Matuas trace their origins to the reformist movement led by Harichand Thakur and later shaped by his son, Guruchand Thakur. The word ‘Matua’, which is derived from ‘Matoyara’, once denoted spiritual absorption. However, over time, it has become a symbol of collective identity while negotiating the question of citizenship.

Thakurnagar has evolved into much more than a geographical location in itself. This is a political signaling point. Yet, even within this relatively organized structure, the core issue remains unresolved. Some sections of the community struggle with documentation deficiencies, and in some cases, the shadow of being classified as Bangladeshi citizens persists despite decades of residence.

A West Bengal government document states, “The influx of refugees from the erstwhile East Pakistan was a major event in Indian history. The 1971 census figures show that the population of displaced persons in the state is about 60 lakhs, as the West Bengal government told the Planning Commission in 1974. According to the report of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Committee, the number was estimated at 80 lakhs in 1981. Refugees, relief and dealing with the sudden influx of refugees And to address the problems of immigrants, the Department of Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation was merged with the Department of Land and Land Reforms in 2016 to ensure greater coherence and improvement in systemic efficiency in providing services to the people. The department is now focusing on distribution of freehold title deeds and development of infrastructure of resettlement colonies.

The paradox of Bengal’s refugee politics

A population that is deeply embedded in the social and electoral fabric of the state faces uncertainty over legal affiliation. Citizenship, which should have been a settled matter, remains elastic, enforced, promised and deferred in political cycles.

Deep Halder, a writer and political analyst who has worked on Bengali Hindu refugees, said, “It is as difficult to predict as it is to predict who Bengal will vote for in this election. Bengali Hindu refugees do not come as a block. Moreover, to suggest that the pain of partition will establish a clear Hindu-Muslim binary for the erstwhile Bengali Hindu refugees would be a flawed argument.”

He said, “On CAA and NRC, Bengali Hindu refugees were divided as they are now on SIR. Bengali Hindu refugees are also divided on the basis of caste. While in the first wave of migration from the former East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, upper caste Bengali Hindus moved to West Bengal and other parts of India, subsequent waves included mostly lower caste Hindus. And their voting choices have also evolved over time.”

Elaborating on the Matuas, he said, “Take the Matuas. Their vote has shifted from the Congress to the Left to the TMC and to the BJP and is now believed to be divided between the BJP and the TMC. Their voting choices in 2026 will be guided mostly by current realities and not by the pain of 1947.”

Successive governments have dealt with these communities with caution. Recognition has been expanded, representation enabled, but final decision has often been deferred. The result is a constituency that is both irreconcilable and unresolved.

Professor Badri Narayan Tiwari, Vice-Chancellor of Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) and an author, explained the situation in Bengal and the Hindu refugee matrix.

Professor Tiwari said, “What we are seeing in Bengal is a contested redefinition of Bengali Hindu identity. Both the Trinamool Congress and the BJP, under the leadership of Mamata Banerjee, have aggressively mobilized identity in sentiment and strategy, but the BJP has created a deep inroads among groups like the Matua by converting marginalization into political gain through some of its policies, including the CAA.”

He further added, “While many Hindu refugees have long since assimilated into the Bengali middle class and have left a living refugee consciousness, sections like the Matuas are still negotiating representation and respect within mainstream Bengali culture. The community remains politically vulnerable. It is within these fractures, and not in old binaries, that electoral power is now being built.”

As elections approach, this layered caste matrix becomes the blueprint for political strategy. Namasudra base was assessed, Rajbanshi sentiment was monitored, Matua integration was closely monitored. Each section has weight and together, they shape the results.

Three generations after displacement, Hindu refugees in Bengal are no longer defined solely by migration. It is now defined by caste structure, numbers, political relevance and the constant wait for closure.

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