Small island states, often dismissed as peripheral spots on the world map, have emerged as important players in contemporary geopolitics. Their strategic location, vast Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and control over vital sea lanes extend their influence far beyond their size or population. In an era of great power competition, climate vulnerability and supply-chain fragility, these nations serve as lynchpins for maritime security, resource governance and regional stability. Mauritius exemplifies this reality in the Indian Ocean, where its centrality highlights how geography can provide advantages even to a country of just 1.3 million people overseeing an EEZ of more than 1.3 million square kilometres.
Mauritius is located at the crossroads of the Western Indian Ocean, connecting Africa, Asia and major sea routes. Its location enhances its role as a gateway for trade, investment and security cooperation. Yet this centrality also exposes it to global shocks. Recent conflicts in West Asia, including disruptions related to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in early 2026, have created an acute energy crisis for the island. Mauritius depends heavily on imported fossil fuels; It accounts for about 80% of its power mix, with heavy fuel oil (HFO) important for power generation. Geopolitical tensions have disrupted supplies, leading to emergency import of 65,500 MT of HFO from Singapore. ₹The fear of 2.4 billion more blackouts has increased. The government has warned of possible rotating power outages and called for floating floating power plants to increase resiliency by 2028, while accelerating a 405 MW renewable energy pipeline including solar, wind, battery storage and home solar kits.
This crisis exposes widespread vulnerabilities. possible “suffocation” of the Strait of Malacca; Through conflict, increased piracy, or great-power tensions, the pain will increase. The Strait of Malacca carries about 25% of global maritime trade, including vast quantities of oil and goods linking the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean. About 80% of China’s oil imports pass through this chokepoint, but the disruption would extend outward, increasing shipping costs, delaying energy deliveries and affecting re-routing through longer routes such as the Cape of Good Hope or the Indonesian Straits. For Mauritius, which is already struggling with an HFO shortage linked to West Asian instability, the Malacca crisis could further push up global oil prices, put pressure on foreign exchange reserves and disrupt its role as a trade and financial centre. Small island states like Mauritius lack the buffer of larger economies; Their open, import-dependent systems make them early targets of remote chokepoint instability.
These risks are further exacerbated by Mauritius’s deepening economic ties with China, which have created significant imbalances. China is a major source of imports, with bilateral trade highly skewed: Mauritius imported approximately $993 million from China in 2023, while exporting only $26 million. The 2021 China-Mauritius Free Trade Agreement, the first such FTA between China and an African country, aims to boost access but does not address deficits. Chinese investment flows into infrastructure, finance and under the Belt and Road Initiative position Mauritius as a gateway to Africa. While beneficial for financing projects such as development, airports, dams and special economic zones, asymmetry raises concerns over interdependence, debt sustainability and strategic autonomy. Mauritius serves as a financial platform for Chinese outward investment on the continent, yet it tilts the balance of influence toward Beijing at a time when diverse partnerships are essential for resilience.
Mauritius hosts the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Secretariat, underscoring its convening power. Its EEZ and proximity to chokepoints positions it as a node for maritime surveillance, blue economy initiatives and disaster risk management. In an ocean where 90% of India’s trade and significant hydrocarbon imports transit, Mauritius’ stability directly impacts key players. Its cultural and historical ties, with a significant percentage of the population being of Indian origin, add depth to soft-power, while disputes such as Chagos highlight sovereignty claims amid external bases and alliances.
To deal with these pressures, Mauritius should leverage partnerships with India and like-minded countries through groups such as IORA, the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), and the Colombo Security Conclave. India has long been a trusted partner with deep historical ties and a shared vision of a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. Recent developments illustrate its potential: during high-level visits in 2025-2026, India and Mauritius advanced an oil and gas supply agreement to enhance energy security amid the Middle East crisis. India is also deploying a defense attache to Mauritius, expanding joint maritime surveillance, and supporting renewable projects, including 100,000 home solar kits. Infrastructure such as the Agalega facility strengthens coast guard capabilities and regional surveillance. These steps are in line with India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and its Evolving Ocean Approach, which positions Mauritius as a key hub for mutual security and development.
Within IORA, which comprises 23-member states and dialogue partners including Australia, the EU, Japan, the UK and the US; Mauritius can support practical cooperation. IORA’s priorities, such as maritime safety and security, trade facilitation, blue economy, disaster risk management and renewable energy, provide a platform for joint capacity building, information sharing and diverse supply chains. Mauritius could emphasize enhanced energy resilience initiatives such as regional renewable grids, fuel storage mechanisms, or alternative shipping protocols to mitigate chokepoint risks. Cooperation on sustainable fisheries, marine pollution and climate adaptation will address SIDS vulnerabilities while promoting rules-based governance under UNCLOS. Dialogue partners such as Japan and the US bring technology and financing to the green transition, reducing excessive dependence on any one partner.
Broader groups increase this leverage. IOC, with its focus on the Western Indian Ocean islands, enables targeted maritime and economic projects. A Quad-like alignment or minilateral involving India, France, Australia and others could diversify the security architecture without confrontation. By investing in domestic capabilities, such as 60% renewable targets by 2030, energy efficiency and transport electrification, it can reduce import dependence by 80% and build negotiating power.
The way forward requires strategic pragmatism. Mauritius will need to accelerate its 405 MW renewable pipeline, liberalize domestic solar programs and integrate battery storage to handle peak and intermittent demand. Diversifying fuel sources through agreements with India and others avoids Hormuz or Malacca shocks. In trade, leveraging the India-Mauritius Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement with IORA can boost exports and correct imbalances. Diplomatically, hosting IORA activities and advocating for the voices of small states in global forums strengthens the agency.
Ultimately, Mauritius shows that small island states are not passive spectators but active architects of the regional order. Their vulnerabilities, energy vulnerabilities, trade imbalances, chokepoint exposures – reflect global risks, yet their centrality provides agency. By deepening partnerships with India and like-minded countries in IORA and beyond, Mauritius can build stability through diverse resilience rather than dependency. This approach protects sovereignty, supports sustainable development, and contributes to a rules-based Indian Ocean where prosperity flows equitably. In an interconnected world, the “little” people often hold the big keys to security; Mauritius is poised to transform its geography into an enduring power, provided it acts with foresight and balanced partnerships.
This article is written by Shriparna Pathak, Professor, China Studies and International Relations, Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat.
