On the night of May 9, 2025, the Pakistan Army had 30–45 seconds to decide whether the missiles arriving at Rawalpindi’s Noor Khan airbase had nuclear warheads or not. That was the entire decision window. By the time the assessment was completed, 11 of Pakistan’s 13 major airbases had already been attacked. Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif later publicly admitted at an event in Azerbaijan that his armed forces had planned a retaliatory strike at 4:30 am on 10 May, but that the BrahMos had already done its job before that time came. India reportedly launched 15 to 19 BrahMos missiles during the four-day clash, and none of them could be intercepted.
No marketing campaign could have written that story. No defense exhibition exhibit could present that evidence. BrahMos missile was sold in the skies of Pakistan and the world kept watching. Defense Minister Rajnath Singh confirmed that the missile’s performance during Operation Sindoor attracted the attention of more than 14 countries interested in acquiring the system. That number is not a projection. This is a queue.
There is a concept in defense procurement called combat verification. This means that a weapon system has been used in real combat, under real conditions, against a real opponent, and it works. Combat-validated systems carry a premium of confidence that no factory test or simulated exercise can replicate. Before May 2025, BrahMos was widely respected on paper. After Operation Sindoor, it became far more valuable – a weapon with a verified operational record that Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied air defenses could not touch. The success of the operation depended on a multi-layered strategy: pilotless drones provoked Pakistani radars to activate, followed by Harop kamikaze munitions to disable them, paving the way for BrahMos and French SCALP missiles. Debris of the BrahMos booster and nose cap recovered near Bikaner in Rajasthan confirms its use, underscoring the missile’s fire-and-forget reliability.
That fire-and-forget ability is the insight that drives every purchasing conversation that happens right now. A missile that cannot be jammed, tracked, or intercepted does not enhance a country’s deterrence capability. This increases it many fold. A BrahMos battery sitting on a Vietnamese beach forces a Chinese naval planner to re-direct the entire task force. Thirty missiles do not produce 30 times more deterrence than one. They pose a credible threat of thirty independent, simultaneous, unstoppable attacks. This is a completely different strategic calculation. The countries in the South China Sea, the Persian Gulf and Latin America are not just buying a missile. They are purchasing a deterrent effect that China’s defense technology ecosystem cannot currently provide them.
The Philippines was the first buyer, signing a $375 million contract for three BrahMos coastal defense batteries in January 2022. With a verbal assurance given to Rajnath Singh by Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in December 2025, Russia has expressed no objection to further exports. Vietnam and Indonesia have long been interested, combined value of proposed deals exceeds estimates ₹4,000 crore, approximately $450 million. Vietnam is going to become the second Asian country after Philippines to acquire BrahMos, the value of this deal is approximately ₹5,990 crore, approximately $700 million, which includes missiles for both Army and Navy applications. Apart from BrahMos, India is offering Vietnam three to four offshore patrol vessels, 14 high-speed patrol boats, MRO support for Su-30 fighter aircraft and Kilo-class submarines and submarine batteries under a $500 million line of credit. This is not a missile transaction. It is a comprehensive defense relationship that is being assembled around a battle-proven core.
Beyond Southeast Asia, the UAE was apparently highlighted as a potential buyer in November 2024 by BrahMos Aerospace co-director Alexander Maksichev. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and Egypt have shown interest from West Asia. Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Venezuela have expressed interest in coastal and naval variants for Latin America. Indonesia’s strategic motivation is equally clear – securing its vast archipelagic waters and strategic chokepoints, with the proposed deal including a shore-based anti-ship variant similar to the Philippines configuration. Three continents, one missile, one war record.
The leverage point that India identified years ago was simple: if not anticipated, export demand would eventually outstrip domestic production capacity. The BrahMos Aerospace Integration and Testing Facility in Lucknow, slated to be inaugurated in May 2025, is built on 80 hectares of land provided by the Government of Uttar Pradesh. ₹300 million. It is designed to produce 80 to 100 BrahMos missiles annually, with plans to produce 100 to 150 next-generation variants each year. The facility operates as part of the UP Defense Industrial Corridor spanning Lucknow, Kanpur, Aligarh, Agra, Jhansi and Chitrakoot. The India-Russian joint venture, with 80% Indian content, now targets $2 billion in annual revenue, according to CEO Atul Rane.
The feedback loop this creates is the real story. More export revenue funds, more R&D. More research and development leads to the production of BrahMos-NG. The next-generation version, whose first flight is scheduled for 2026, is 50% lighter and three meters shorter, with greater compatibility with smaller platforms, further broadening the export market. Countries buying BrahMos today are buying a product line with a clear upgrade path. Each new customer increases India’s production volumes, which reduces per-unit costs, making it easier to close the next export deal that finances the next generation version. Feedback loop compound. This is the industrial logic that Israel devised in the 1990s and that India is now starting to implement on a large scale.
The historical comparison worth making here is Israel’s defense export model. Israel built its defense technology ecosystem not through large tenders alone, but by turning operational problems over to fast-moving companies and then supporting those companies for production and export. The result, in 20 years, was a defense industrial base exporting to over 130 countries and producing some of the most tested technology in the world. India is at the beginning of that cycle, and BrahMos is a proof of concept. When a country buys a weapons system, it buys a relationship. It trains its soldiers on Indian simulators. It depends on Indian spare parts. When something needs attention it calls on Indian engineers. This quietly but consequentially, aligns with Indian strategic interests. Apart from BrahMos, India is simultaneously offering Akash air defense system and Pinaka multi-launch rocket system to Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, UAE and Brazil, creating an integrated Indian defense supply relationship rather than a single platform transaction.
Each BrahMos sale is a node in a growing network of Indian defense relationships. Vietnam is dependent on Indian missiles for coastal defence. The Philippines is dependent on Indian delivery schedules and spare parts. Once the deal is closed, Indonesia will be dependent on Indian training simulators and lifecycle support. A country that is dependent on Indian weapons systems for its national security does not treat India as a peripheral partner in any diplomatic interactions. This is the kind of strategic impact that no summit release can create. India’s defense exports have increased almost 30 times in the last decade, with DRDO Chairman Sameer V Kamat predicting that exports could reach this level ₹50,000 crore by 2028-29, primarily driven by demand for BrahMos. For most of independent India’s history, the country was one of the world’s largest arms importers. While flagging off the first batch in Lucknow, Rajnath Singh said in clear words: India is now playing the role of a giver and not just a taker. That sentence, spoken at a missile factory in Uttar Pradesh, is a strategic summary of where India stands now.
Fifteen to 19 missiles were launched. Nobody stopped. Eleven out of 13 Pakistani airbases were attacked. Fourteen countries in active procurement discussions. Two export contracts worth $455 million were signed within months of the conflict, with negotiations ongoing with at least five to six additional countries. A new manufacturing facility in Lucknow is producing its first batch. The order portfolio of $7 billion covers both domestic and export demand. The next generation version will enter flight testing in 2026.
What is emerging from all this is not simply a successful weapons program. This is India’s emergence as a credible, war-validated, full-lifecycle defense exporter with an industrial corridor, upgrade roadmap and a growing network of strategic customers. BrahMos did not initiate that evolution. This accelerated it. Operation Sindoor did not create a market. This opened it. India’s task now is to build up production capacity, diplomatic relations and next generation technology fast enough to retain the position it has just acquired.
(Views expressed are personal)
This article is written by Sudhanshu Kumar, doctoral candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
