In a field in Kiev, a group of patriotic teenagers are conducting military exercises under the supervision of army instructors. The youngest is 14 years old. They come here four or five times a week after homework, and sincerely say that they are ready to step up for the fallen. “Our people are not eternal. Someone must take their place,” says 18-year-old Danilo, his emerald eyes banded over a khaki balaclava.
Across town, a 28-year-old man has been staring at the walls of his safe house in lockdown and digital silence since fleeing recuperation in February. At the beginning of the war Ivan raised money for the army. Now, pale from lack of sunlight, he rejects the very idea of an independent Ukraine. He is one of an estimated 300,000 Ukrainian men absent without leave.
The two sights are close enough to share the same Kyiv postcode. But they describe two different wars: one where Ukraine is starting to get the edge on Russia, and one where it is still struggling. The front lines are being stabilized, Europe is delivering cash, and the country is taking on a role as a defense power, producing the drone technology the world needs. Volodymyr Zelensky is leaning toward the idea of a longer war, as there is a growing belief that Russia, with its burning refineries, stalled economy and bumbling elite, is becoming more unstable.
Ukraine has achieved something extraordinary by remaining sovereign. But survival alone is not victory. Serious questions remain about its people and resource reserves – and what kind of country might emerge from a war with no end in sight.
Ukraine is winning the war
By every conventional metric, Ukraine should have already lost. It is blocking a rival with 4.5 times its population, 28 times more land and an economy 12 times its size. This requires military, social, economic and sometimes political astuteness.
The news from the front lines is the most promising in years. The fighting is fierce, but Ukrainian commanders believe their drone-led forces have found a formula to thwart Vladimir Putin’s ground offensive. For several months they have been putting troops out of action faster than the Kremlin. Russia has reduced the training period for its so-called elite airborne units to just ten days. Ukraine is killing or seriously wounding an average of 35,000 Russian soldiers every month. The target is 50,000 – the limit of Russia’s training capacity and the point, Ukrainians hope, at which Mr Putin’s arithmetic breaks down.
Russia keeps throwing dead bodies into the furnace, but there is less and less to show for it. That is at least two years behind an already compressed timetable for annexing the rest of Donbass, Mr Putin’s key political objective. Ukrainian presidential aide Brigadier General Pavlo Palisa says the Kremlin has again ordered its troops to reach the administrative borders of the Donbass provinces, this time by autumn. He rejects this possibility. “Not everything on the battlefield can be counted in numbers. We have the edge in professionalism, speed, technology and morale.”
The increasing effectiveness of Ukraine’s extended-range drone campaigns is significant. Medium-range attacks are wreaking havoc on Russian supply lines; The long-range missiles are hitting strategic targets ranging from oil facilities to weapons factories, sometimes more than a thousand kilometers inside Russia. Despite the countries’ strained relations, the US continues to provide vital intelligence. But perhaps 95% of long-range systems are designed and manufactured by Ukraine’s own emerging defense industry. The military is reaping the rewards: increased production, a pipeline of better weapons and a systematic campaign to destroy Russian radar and air defenses, which cannot be quickly replaced.
Yevhen Karas, commander of the 413th Regiment, says reaching such goals is now “three times easier” than before. His unit has led several significant operations, including the March attack on Silicon L, a microchip manufacturer for Russian ballistic missiles. He predicts a Russian air-defense crisis by autumn. By then Ukraine’s domestic ballistic production will be in full swing, creating fear and embarrassment within Russia. “War is no good thing for Ukraine, but it is getting much worse for Russia, and it will get worse still.”
Meanwhile, in Europe, political elites are increasingly realizing that their security is tied to Ukrainian resilience, at least until their own armed forces are in better shape. This should guarantee broad economic support for the foreseeable future. Viktor Orban can no longer block EU aid after losing Hungary’s election in April, and a long-promised €90 billion is on the way. This came at the right time: the government was writing IOUs to some of its employees.
cost of war
Despite all the promise of these developments, the war, fought mostly on Ukrainian soil, has left the rear hollow. Critical infrastructure is deteriorating. Air defenses, especially anti-ballistic, are dangerously thin. At least 40 locations were affected as a result of a massive missile and drone attack on Kiev on the night of 23 May. Russian first-person-view drones are crippling civilian life in front-line cities like Kherson, Zaporizhia and Kharkiv.
The capital came close to a total blackout this winter; Insiders say the system collapse in February was just a targeted attack. Thanks to the courage of emergency workers, the lights remained on. The economy, boosted by a growing defense sector, performed well even in adverse circumstances. (For example, Ukraine’s labor force has shrunk from 17 million before the war to about 12 million.) But the blackouts reduced GDP growth this year by an estimated 2.5 percentage points. Now it is estimated to be 1.5%.
Taras Chamut, a civil-society activist and sometime adviser to the Defense Ministry, says he is now more concerned about energy than the front line. People are tired, but morale is not breaking. Failure to adequately prepare for the upcoming year may put it to the test. “Wars are not fought by armies, but by societies. If confidence in our ability to withstand war is broken, the will to fight will also be broken,” Mr Chamut says. An unpublished survey of Ukrainian public sentiment conducted by an American NGO found that society was divided into three camps: patriotic (46%), skeptical moderates (36%) and discouraged (18%). Clearly, the main discouraging factors are not trauma or exhaustion but elite corruption and distrust of institutions.
The perceived injustice in recruitment is hitting the nervous system. The army’s shortage of soldiers is lower than before, and it has largely met its recruitment targets over the past year. On the modern battlefield, only a small portion of soldiers are in contact with the enemy; Half a dozen men can hold a 5 km strip. But for the unlucky few deployed in the kill zone, it’s often a one-way trip. The fear of such deployment, sometimes used to punish those captured, has destroyed the willingness to serve.
Ukraine’s Defense Minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, is pushing for higher front-line pay and international recruitment to attract more volunteers. For now, forced recruitment is common, much of it violent. Ivan, a fugitive from conscription, was bundled into a van after being chased through the back streets of Kiev. Like an estimated 30% of new soldiers, he deserted during training, after paying a bribe of $10,000. He rarely leaves his flat now, and never without a can of pepper spray. In Odessa and Dnipro, where draft campaigns have been the harshest, a significant portion of men of conscription age have gone into hiding.
Internal politics pose considerable risks to the country’s prospects. National unity was almost complete at the beginning of the war, at least publicly. Wartime pressures and corruption scandals have since reopened divisions; One involved approximately $100 million and implicated members of the president’s circle. The scandals prompted the first real protests of the war and forced Mr. Zelensky’s powerful number two, Andrey Yermak, to resign last November. He was formally named as a suspect in May. The atmosphere is heated, like campaign season without an election’s release valve: proper voting would be impossible during a war, although Mr. Zelensky continues to hatch a plan.
For all the President’s courage and diplomatic agility, he is weak. Instead of embracing all-talent government, insiders say, he has moved to an increasingly isolated, Byzantine style of governance. His office controls much of the media landscape, including anonymous social-media accounts used to discredit opponents. Anti-corruption investigators have been decimated by counter-prosecutions. Former domestic intelligence chief Vasil Maliuk was demoted after refusing to help in harassing them. Kirill Budanov, the powerful military intelligence chief and Mr Yermak’s rival, was sidelined by a “promotion” to the post of head of the presidential office. “Zelensky does not tolerate strongmen,” complains one senior intelligence official. “He has created a cult of loyalty around himself.”
endless war
For a short time earlier this year, US-brokered peace talks looked like they might lead to an uneasy agreement in which Ukraine withdrew from parts of Donbass in exchange for dubious security guarantees. Mr. Putin never approved any concrete proposal, and the idea is no longer under serious consideration. On May 22, America said that it was ending its role in the talks. Optimistic insiders believe dealmaking could resume this summer. More likely, fighting will continue until a crackdown occurs in Ukraine or Russia.
Russia’s breaking point is unknown. Some weaknesses are visible: growing discontent and a stagnant economy, affected by sanctions and Ukrainian attacks. The state budget has been saved from the Iran war; Higher oil prices will bring in a $60 billion windfall in 2026. But it is not clear how long this can last. “We have become very similar, although our risks are different,” says one Ukrainian diplomat, comparing Germany’s collapse in 1918 after its promising spring offensive. “Who collapses first, or what will happen if neither of us collapses? That’s something no one can tell you right now.” Government sources say Mr Zelensky has ordered preparations for war for the next two to three years. There is no good reason why Ukraine cannot continue the fight for so long. It will survive, even if tarnished by militarism and wartime corruption. For some Ukrainians, that’s not enough. “What are we fighting for”, asks Ivan, “if we are no better than Russia, just loading people into vans?”
Yet most are more optimistic. Ukraine will likely emerge as a damaged but functioning democracy and a new middle power: poor, suffering, but confident in its identity. “No matter how crazy things look, we’ll make it work,” says the senior intelligence source. “I have this strange sense, this confidence, that, I don’t know, God loves Ukraine.”
