A fragile ceasefire in Iran, the high stakes of the Modi-Trump comeback and a strong case for “India First” – in the latest edition of ‘Point Blank’, Hindustan Times Executive Editor Shishir Gupta explains how all these aspects are converging in a decisive few weeks for New Delhi’s foreign and security policy.
The war stops, it doesn’t end
The starting point is the impending Iran-US interim agreement that could lift the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz after three and a half months of war. US President Donald Trump has announced that the blockade will be lifted and an interim arrangement will be signed on June 19, reopening the world’s most important energy chokepoint to maritime traffic. For India, which is heavily dependent on Gulf oil, this alone is a relief: The 16-day ceasefire has already depressed prices and injected optimism into global markets.
Yet, as Shishir Gupta insists, this is no peace deal; That’s 60 days to negotiate the real prize – the nuclear deal. Washington’s first military objective in this war was to neutralize Iran’s rich uranium reserves; They argue that without a verifiable rollback on that front, the coming deal risks looking like “no deal,” no different from the 2015 JCPOA that Trump tore up. In this reading, the Strait of Hormuz was always a secondary objective for both the US and Israel, useful leverage but not the main strategic issue.
There are three layers in that core…
Iran’s nuclear program, especially enriched uranium.
Its ballistic missile arsenal is increasing.
A network of powerful proxies – Hezbollah, the Houthis, Kata’ib Hezbollah and others – are laying siege to Israel with long-range rockets and missiles.
Unless they are addressed, Gupta warns, any celebrations will be premature; “The devil lies in the details” of yet-unseen text.
Who has Iran’s uranium – and why it matters
An interesting subplot is whether a third country could physically take possession of Iran’s enriched uranium in order to stick to the agreement. Moscow has done this before and has reportedly offered to do so again, leading to speculation over a Russian role. Gupta is skeptical, echoing the US line that any deposits should be in the custody of the neutral International Atomic Energy Agency, not a rival great power.
Bringing Russia – or by that argument, China – into the core of the Iran file would, in Washington’s eyes, turn the bilateral war into yet another arena of major-power competition. It would also reopen the domestic political wound of Trump’s perceived closeness to Moscow by effectively “opening a third front” with Russia as the custodian of Iran’s most sensitive material. He suggests that for the US and Israel, real victory requires Iran to give up its enriched uranium under an arrangement that is both technically uncontested and politically salable domestically.
Iran, for its part, will publicize whatever comes out as a victory: it stood up to the US militarily, blocked externally imposed regime change and demonstrated that it can close and reopen the Strait of Hormuz at will, now it is also hinting at charging “maintenance” and “security” fees for energy traffic. That narrative of leverage will run strong in Tehran, no matter what the fine print says.
Modi-Trump: Tariffs, tankers and a test of relations
All this forms the backdrop to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming meeting with Trump on the sidelines of the G7 – his first in a year and a half and, according to Gupta, a packed agenda. The headline item will be Iran: Modi wants to hear directly what the US believes it has achieved in the 60-day ceasefire and what the horizon of nuclear talks looks like before Delhi realigns its energy and regional posture.
The second pillar is trade. Under Section 301, the US has imposed a 12.5% tariff on Indian goods on the grounds of forced labour, while Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Vietnam – all deeply linked with Chinese supply chains – face only 10%. An earlier Indian attempt at reciprocal tariffs was struck down by the US Supreme Court, forcing Delhi to come back to the table for what Gupta calls “competitive tariffs” – parity with peer exporters so that Indian products can gain a foothold in the US market. He says Washington may try to add another lever by resorting to “excess capacities” under the pretext of new sanctions, but Delhi’s position is clear: if the tariffs are competitive, they can live with it; If not, friction is inevitable.
Third, politically sensitive would be the recent killing of three Indian sailors when US forces targeted a tanker in the Gulf of Oman. Gupta says, Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar’s talks with Foreign Minister Marco Rubio were “very tough” and ended with both sides talking to each other. Delhi described the use of deadly force as “unwarranted”; Washington argued that the ship had violated instructions and tried to run the blockade. Gupta believes that Modi will personally make it clear that there cannot be any collateral damage to Indian lives in a war to which India is not a party.
Alongside these flashpoints are a range of structural issues: delays in the supply of F404 jet engines to India, broader supply-chain concerns, and the entire gamut of strategic landscape from China and Russia to global energy security following the Ukraine war and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Despite the tensions, Gupta insists there are “a lot of advantages” to the relationship, not least the ability of Modi and Trump to speak clearly and directly to each other.
Pakistan’s moment – and its limitations
The Iran file has also given Pakistan the diplomatic role it had long desired. Along with Qatar, Islamabad has helped broker the interim arrangement, which is now close to signature, with some talk of Saudi support behind the scenes. Pakistan’s generals have historically enjoyed Washington’s support – from Ayub and Yahya Khan to Zia‑ul‑Haq and Asim Munir – and the military will demonstrate this mediation to reposition Pakistan as a “mainstream” player rather than a terrorism hub.
Gupta outlined what Islamabad would want in return: better equipment from the US, more money from the IMF and World Bank, and some relief in the Financial Action Task Force, all aimed at ultimately gaining leverage over India. But he also outlines the structural problem – Pakistan “plays both sides”, appeasing both Washington and Beijing, and buying major defense hardware from each. That dual-track strategy fits in with a broader reality: Neither the US nor China is particularly invested in India’s emergence as a seamless success.
In his view, Pakistan’s current heights may prove to be fleeting. If the Iranian nuclear question is indeed resolved and Tehran’s destabilizing role since the 1979 revolution is diminished, the Middle East may find calm. Afghanistan no longer provides Pakistan with the strategic depth it once did; Once the Iran file is closed, Washington will turn its attention to the adversaries it “should have focused on first” – China and, to a lesser extent, Russia.
India first in the West after confusion
Perhaps the most notable part of the conversation is Gupta’s argument that India should stop viewing the world through an American, Chinese or Russian lens and return to an “India first” approach based on pure interests. The border crises of 1962, Doklam and May 2020, he said, all emphasized the same lesson: in the end, India stands alone at its borders. That means buying Russian oil if the economy remains afloat, being tough on military acquisitions by Pakistan and China, and investing heavily domestically in research, development and defense manufacturing.
Interestingly, he credits Trump for accelerating strategic introspection. By pressuring India on tariffs and by exerting pressure on Delhi during the India-Pakistan clashes, Washington forced India to accept that it could not rely on any outside supplier – American, European or otherwise – for critical military kit. According to him, the push towards indigenous production and defense exports is one of the “plus” outcomes of the hard US line.
Gupta also argues that Trump has destroyed the moral high ground of the West by exposing inconvenient truths: the Jeffrey Epstein scandal and the way the elite are compromised; allegations of election manipulation by the FBI, CIA, and elements of the enforcement machinery; And, most recently, official acknowledgment that US funding was used for action research related to the COVID-19 pandemic. He suggests that when a virus that has killed millions emerges from such research, and when Western leaders will not name its origins even after Trump called it the “Chinese virus”, old certainties about Western virtues are upended.
According to Gupta, this erosion coincides with a hardening of realism in Delhi, Washington and Jerusalem alike. Both Modi and Trump are unquestionably “nation-first” leaders; Netanyahu operates on a similar calculation for Israel’s survival. Be it the US demanding Iranian nuclear withdrawal, Israel attacking Hezbollah and the Houthis in response to proxy attacks, or India buying Russian crude at discounted rates, the pattern is the same: major powers acting on narrow national interests, not abstract alignment.
For India, the implication is clear. Its place in the “community of nations” will be secured not by picking a camp but by building enough economic and military strength to say no – to tariffs that undercut its exporters, to expeditions that kill its sailors, and to narratives that ask it to be a supporter of anyone other than itself. Gupta argues that in a world where everyone has given up on pretense, the time has come for Delhi to be boldly, systematically and strategically pro-India.
