Space has been an active military domain since the Cold War. Today more than 70 countries operate satellites and developing capabilities with both civil and military applications is growing. Two nuclear armed states, India and Pakistan, are part of this global expansion. Their space programs are moving beyond regional competition to investing in space-related capabilities. And due to the presence of external actors such as China and the US, a South Asia-centric space governance will have limited impact on the region.
Operation Vermillion in May 2025 exposed significant limitations in India’s space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) architecture. During the operation, India was using older Cartosat satellites along with commercial imagery from Maxar Technologies to aid in targeting, which was a resource consuming process. The absence of adequate real-time satellite imagery meant that targets had to be verified through secondary intelligence channels slowing the decision-making process, thus highlighting gaps in India’s ability to support military operations with continuous, real-time space-based surveillance.
The lessons learned from Operation Sindoor strengthened India’s efforts to strengthen its military space architecture. In September 2025, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh released India’s first joint military space doctrine in Kolkata, declaring space as a battlefield after land, sea, air and cyberspace. The doctrine marked a change in the role of satellites from support assets to strategic military capabilities and focused on four operational priorities:
Strong ISR on Indian borders and Indian Ocean region
Secure and jam-resistant military communications
Space domain awareness for monitoring satellites and orbital debris
Development of both defensive and offensive counterspace capabilities.
The Space Based Surveillance (SBS) satellite network is to be equipped with Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), hyperspectral imaging and advanced electro-optical sensors deployed in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and Geostationary Orbit (GEO), a multi-layer architecture designed to eliminate any space technical issues. Of these 52 satellites, ISRO will build 21 satellites and the remaining 31 satellites will be contracted with private companies including Tata Advanced Systems and Anant Technologies, a step towards an Indian-made commercially diversified space-industry.
The constellation will operate in low, intermediate and geostationary orbits, meaning that delays in even one part of the program could impact overall coverage and performance. As a result, the success of SBS-3 will depend not only on its technical aspects but also on whether India’s private space industry can complete such a complex project within the required timeframe.
Managing this with ISRO’s existing civil and commercial launch queue is a logistical task. India’s defense record shows that programs of this scale are usually delayed by one to three years from the estimated timelines and cost overruns are common. Scheduling, technical preparation, and integrating the full constellation of privately built satellites into a joint operational framework will be a complex and time-consuming process. India will need to address these challenges before achieving full operational capability. While India’s priority is to expand and integrate self-built military space architecture, Pakistan has accelerated its program through continued Chinese support. Both countries are addressing similar security concerns through very different approaches.
Pakistan’s recent expansion into space is closely linked to Chinese support. Between January 2025 and April 2026, SUPARCO (The Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission) launches six Earth-observation satellites; PAUSAT-1, PRSC-EO1, PRSC-S1, HS-1, PRSC-EO2 and PRSC-EO3 are using Chinese launch vehicles, satellite platforms and Chinese technical support. The foundation for this acceleration was laid in 2022 through a multi-launch agreement between SUPARCO and China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), the commercial body of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC).
The PRSC-EO1, PRSC-EO2 and PRSC-EO3 provide electro-optical imaging, while the HS-1 adds hyperspectral sensing capable of detecting differences in terrain and materials under camouflage. Operating in sun-synchronous orbits, the satellites provide regular coverage of key areas including Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control, major Indian military installations and parts of the northern Indian Ocean. Pakistan describes these satellites as civilian Earth observation systems for agriculture, disaster management and environmental monitoring, but their dual-use nature gives them a clear military edge by supporting surveillance, target identification and area assessment. Pakistan has expanded its navigation capabilities through the launch of Pak-SBAS in February 2026 by improving positioning accuracy for both civil and military use. Also, SUPARCO’s budget has increased from approximately PKR 6 billion in 2025-26 to PKR 11-12 billion in 2026-27, almost doubling indicating focused support by the government for its space programme.
This partnership has enabled Pakistan to rapidly expand its capabilities, but also shows that military space architecture is dependent on Chinese infrastructure and support. During Operation Sindoor, the Pakistani Army relied on Chinese satellite systems including PRSS-1 and PRSC-EO1 for additional imagery and communications support. China’s role extends beyond satellite access. Pakistan’s space program continues to be dependent on China through Chinese launch services, Beidou navigation, satellite technology, engineer training and bilateral cooperation through the Chinese Academy of Space Technology (CAST).
The India-Pakistan space competition is no longer decided by just the two countries. Commercial satellite companies and strategic partnerships are becoming increasingly important in shaping the future of the subcontinent. The increasing use of commercial imagery raises new governance questions. There are no agreed rules on whether private companies should continue to provide imagery to both sides during a conflict, how governments can influence access to such data, or how commercially supplied intelligence should be treated during a military crisis. To reduce this dependence, India has started investing in domestic companies like Pixxel, while Pakistan is largely dependent on Chinese infrastructure.
Along with commercial actors, strategic partnerships are also reshaping the regional space landscape. India has expanded cooperation with the US and France through initiatives such as the Trust, NASA-ISRO NISAR mission and the upcoming Trishna satellite project, while strengthening its technological base and Earth observation capabilities. These partnerships show that military competition in space is no longer limited to just India and Pakistan. External powers and commercial companies are becoming part of the region’s space architecture, making future governance more complex than a purely bilateral issue.
India and Pakistan are rapidly increasing military use of space which needs to be managed. Both countries increasingly rely on satellites for intelligence, surveillance, navigation and military communications, yet there are no bilateral rules and regulations. In nuclear deterrence theory, the sustainability of mutually assured destruction rests on both sides. In space, those red lines don’t exist. There must be an agreed understanding of what constitutes a hostile act against space assets.
This governance gap has become more worrisome as external actors as well as commercial companies play a larger role in the region’s space landscape, increasing the likelihood of future crises involving multiple actors. Furthermore, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit, but provides little guidance on issues that shape military competition today, including dual-use satellites, commercial imagery, and counterspace activities. Without a bilateral or international legal framework underpinned by strong international norms, the risk of misunderstanding and unintended escalation in space will continue to grow.
India’s joint military space doctrine and Pakistan’s recent expansion of its space program show that both countries are making space an important part of their security strategies. This is part of a broader global shift toward military uses of space, but in South Asia it poses a different governance challenge.
Unlike in the nuclear sphere, there are no bilateral mechanisms to manage incidents in space, reduce the risk of escalation, or establish a shared understanding about a hostile act. Existing international law also provides only limited guidance on the issues that are now shaping military competition. The increasing involvement of outside powers and commercial satellite providers makes this challenge even more complex.
Therefore, the issue is not just the expansion of military space capabilities, but also the absence of rules to manage them. A dedicated framework for managing incidents involving military satellites, and mutual understanding of issues such as electronic interference, close satellite approaches and military use of commercial imagery, will help reduce the risk of misunderstandings during a crisis. Such steps will not solve every challenge, but they will provide a starting point while international norms for global space continue to evolve.
(Views expressed are personal)
This article is written by Soumya Awasthi, Fellow, Center for Security Strategy and Technology, and Naman Singh, Intern, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
