This week’s episode of Point Blank paints a picture of a war in the Middle East that has gone far beyond its stated objectives, turning into a systemic confrontation over leverage, prestige and control of a vital maritime chokepoint – the Strait of Hormuz. What began as a campaign to “debilitate a nuclear Iran” is now focused on a narrow waterway, barely 22 miles wide at one point, through which a large portion of the world’s energy supply must pass, according to Washington.
From nuclear Iran to the Strait of Hormuz
according to Executive Editor Shishir GuptaWhen the war began on February 28, the military objective was clear: to neutralize Iran’s nuclear capabilities. They argue that that objective is effectively off the table, replaced by an immediate fight over freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.
For decades, the Strait of Hormuz served as an open international waterway, with unobstructed passage for global shipping. Gupta says Iran identified a structural weakness in US political will under President Donald Trump – limited patience as the midterm elections approached – and decided to pursue negotiations without conceding anything on its fundamental goals vis-à-vis the US or Israel. In that void, Tehran has turned Hormuz itself into a weapon: targeting ships in the southern corridor and pushing all traffic into the northern channel where ships receive calls demanding “tolls” for passage.
By monetizing and militarizing the global chokepoint, Iran has created a leverage mechanism that exerts pressure not only on Washington and the Gulf, but the broader international system, as each fresh disruption contributes to the escalating global energy crisis and rising oil prices.
Washington’s realization and American attacks
Gupta suggests that Washington belatedly realized that the US was being “tormented” not only by Iran, but also by Iran. Mediators like Pakistan and Qatar Seeking side deals and self-interest rather than a real deal. The result was four major US strikes on Iran’s port cities and infrastructure, targeting air defenses, drone systems, and broader military capabilities.
For Trump, it is not just about strategic balance; It is also about domestic political optics. Gupta argues that if the US appears weak in the Middle East, allies and adversaries alike will underestimate US power, and even Trump’s own supporters will see him as a weak president – an outcome he cannot afford. So “elections or no elections,” retaliation becomes inevitable, with US strikes being presented as an effort to hurt Iran so much that it is forced to step back. Hormuz Lever.
Yet Washington’s dilemma is structural. Iran’s fundamentalist regime has maintained hostility towards the US, Israel and their allies for 47 years. Gupta emphasizes that whether one talks about figures like Mojtaba Khomeini or so-called moderates, the direction of the system is unchanged, making incremental diplomatic deals largely cosmetic.
A radical Iran and the politics of martyrdom
The assassination of Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei in joint US-Israeli strikes on February 28 forms the central axis of this narrative. Unlike the Obama administration’s handling of Osama bin Laden – where US forces on the ground retrieved the body and then buried it at sea – Trump’s operation relied on bunker-busting attacks without troops, leaving no remains to recover.
Gupta says Iran deliberately gathered whatever was left and symbolically carried out a huge funeral procession across the country. For Tehran, it was a political tool: a way to stoke passions, further radicalize domestic audiences, and present the US and Israel as enemies who assassinated their supreme leader, making “revenge” a moral obligation.
The regime has reinforced this narrative by publicly listing foreign leaders it wants to target, including European government heads and President Trump himself, with Israeli intelligence reportedly picking up signs of an assassination plot against the US president. In Gupta’s view, this fits perfectly within the framework of “political Islam” expressed by Iran’s leadership, which is rooted in sacrifice and resistance against a superpower.
This domestic structure gives Tehran what it calls “time on its side.” He says that autocratic regimes can endure wars of attrition for a long time; The Iran–Iraq War lasted eight years, after which Iran was widely seen as emerging on top. For Trump, who is facing mid-term elections, time is the only thing he does not have.
Gulf countries are under fire and there is a question of prevention
While the main conflict is US-Iran, the battlefield is the wider Gulf. Gupta estimates that Iran has already fired about 50 ballistic missiles and several drones against targets and targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia. These countries, many of which host US military facilities, have been influenced and humiliated by their concern for the broader Islamic Ummah and their unwillingness to retaliate openly.
Their tendency now is to be defensive: avoiding an explicitly hostile stance toward Iran, while not alienating the American security umbrella on which they rely. The exception, in Gupta’s assessment, is the United Arab Emirates, which has positioned itself firmly under US protection, distanced itself from OPEC, and has visible ties to Israel, including featuring prominently in US ceremonies.
He argues that it is time for Gulf countries to stop tolerating Iranian attacks and consider formal defense arrangements or alliances within the GCC so that Iran will think twice before attacking them. Currently, he describes the situation as a “one-way street” where Iran carries out attacks and the Gulf states tolerate the attacks without a symmetrical response; Only once they retaliate will Tehran be forced to reassess the cost-benefits of continued escalation.
On speculation that India could supply BrahMos or Akashteer systems to the UAE, Gupta is clear: he does not believe the topic is under discussion at this stage.
A ceasefire that collapsed and the mediators to no avail
Interim ceasefire and Trump-Iran understandingAccording to Gupta, it was built on a basic trade-off: Washington would release funds in exchange for concrete Iranian commitments and allow Iranian oil exports. One of the key conditions was freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s insistence on controlling routing and imposing tolls is, in his view, a direct violation of that first condition, undermining America’s image as a security guarantor for its Gulf allies.
Additionally, Iran used Khamenei’s funeral to stoke public anger against the US and Israel, naming leaders and placing bounties on their heads, reinforcing the perception in Washington that it was being “fooled.” In practical terms, Trump’s decision to revoke the ceasefire reflected the realization that while Iran’s regime was enjoying a win-win environment – able to continue negotiations, strike, and keep its narrative alive – the US was in a lose-lose situation, with its power projection questioned in Europe, Asia and, most damagingly, the Gulf itself.
As far as mediators like Pakistan and Qatar are concerned, Gupta is scathing. He says Qatar is primarily known as a “moneybag”, while Pakistan behaves as a busy body without real influence, despite Trump’s personal relationship with army chief Asim Munir. He argues that they bring little concrete benefit: Mediation only works if both sides really want a deal, while Iran is openly talking about killing Trump. In this context, intermediaries have almost no role; Both sides have chosen military involvement, and the US has decided that it must “really hurt” Iran.
Where does the war go from here?
Looking ahead, Gupta believes the struggle is far from over strait of hormuz will continue on a limited scale to the Middle East at large, with Iran unwilling to relinquish its claim to regional leadership and its domestic narrative of deterrence. Tehran will continue to target ships, and the trajectory will resemble a sinusoidal curve: an escalation of attacks, a phase of negotiations, then a renewed escalation.
According to him, the real thing depends on Washington’s choice. If the US allows Iran to dictate its own terms in Hormuz, reputational damage would be huge – not only among Gulf allies, but around the world, undermining Trump’s repeated claims of commanding the “greatest military power”. Therefore, the US has “no choice” but to continue to reduce Iranian military capabilities and, importantly, restore de facto freedom of navigation in the strait. Without it, the global impacts on US military credibility would be severe; Without subduing Iran with nuclear power, the basic strategic objective is incomplete.
Gupta concludes that all this ultimately leads to regime change in Tehran. Unless fundamental changes are made to the fundamentalist system born of the 1979 revolution, neither the nuclear question nor the Hormuz standoff will be truly resolved. In that scenario, Iran could emerge from this crisis perceived as a regional hegemon that stands up to a superpower, while Trump risks being remembered as the president under whom American military prestige was tested and found wanting in the waters of Hormuz.
