Prashant Kishore Bihar approached the elections like an adept chess player stepping onto a kabaddi field: armed with strategy, accuracy, data and design, but facing a game that rewards an entirely different skill set. For a decade, he shaped the victories of others from behind the scenes, with the confidence of a man who understood the machinery of Indian politics better than most.But 2025 was his first attempt to enter the fray himself, not as an architect but as a contender. And this is where the gap between theory and terrain comes into focus.
Kishor believed he could build a political alternative brick-by-brick through a 3,000-kilometre march, carefully crafted policy blueprints, dashboards, survey teams, thematic campaigns and a long-term mission of “Jan Suraj”.Prashant Kishor’s party tried to walk before learning how to stand and this proved disastrous for it in the ‘Mother of All Elections’.
From next Kejriwal to useless in elections
Like Arvind Kejriwal in 2013, Kishor emerged as an outsider armed with policy plans, anti-establishment vocabulary and the promise of a new political grammar. Both supported clean governance, citizen-centric politics and breaking of old caste-aligned formulas. Kishor’s marathon padayatra was often compared to AAP’s mohalla meetings, a slow, deliberate effort to build trust at the street level. Kishor’s reformist pitch only added to the narrative that he was the potential Kejriwal of Bihar: the educated disruptor who was ready to outwit traditional parties.But subsequent comparisons exposed the difference that derailed January SurajKejriwal built a movement that soon became a disciplined party machinery, with volunteers transformed into cadre, Kishore created not a machine but a mission, While AAP’s early politics thrived on decentralized leadership, Jan Suraj had only one face, And where Kejriwal transformed anger into organized energy, Kishor transformed interest into applause.
lonely face paradox
Imagine a beautifully drawn architectural blueprint that promises a magnificent building – but when construction begins, there are virtually no bricks, no workers, no scaffolding. That was Jan Suraj’s campaign in Bihar: very high level planning, but minimal ground strength.Prashant Kishor, once a behind-the-scenes strategist, became the public face, organizer and symbol of this movement. Yet when the JSP released its first list of 51 candidates on October 9, his own name was absent. Even the national president of JSP admitted that, in the end, “people failed to understand us, and we also failed to understand them”. In short, the party lacked a second line of leadership visible to the voters. As one article put it, Kishore was “full of plans, data sets, PowerPoint decks, dashboards and policy road-maps” but was still missing something basic: “a party people can trust.” A structure that terminates speech. A booth-level army that can convert heads into votes.”In a state like Bihar where local ties, booth-level networks and familiar faces matter a lot, the absence of an organizational backbone – trained workers, district coordinators, local veterans – was fatal. The JSP may have taken out massive marches and issued glossy manifestos, but when the voter entered the polling booth, the connection between the candidate and the community was tenuous. ECI data shows that the key ally, the Bharatiya Janata Party-Janata Dal (United) (NDA), has taken the lead in the early trends, leaving little room for newcomers. Without a strong party structure, Jan Suraj was simply overwhelmed.
Candidate’s profile is mismatched
One of the strongest themes of the JSP campaign was “clean” credentials and educated talent. The party’s first list (51 names) included mathematicians, doctors, retired bureaucrats, engineers and social workers. The second list of 65 candidates emphasizes representation of extremely backward classes and minorities. Rationale: Bring in new faces, sideline traditional caste-politics, bring merit to the fore. But the logic misjudged the political situation in Bihar.Electoral sociology in Bihar continues to reward candidates with grassroots connections: local ‘bahubali’, caste influencers, booth-level operators, people who have spent years listening to grievances in the community. In contrast, JSP ticket holders often lacked such roots. A Times of India report said that many voters “do not recognize the candidates’ names, much less their work”. So why did this happen? Because during voting, while the campaign message may register, unless the candidate is known and trusted locally, mobilization lags. For example, in Mokama, JSP candidate Priyadarshi Piyush is trailing far behind both the local JD(U) and RJD candidates in the early rounds of ECI. The mismatch was clear: professional credentials did not translate into votes. Voters rejected the appeal of novelty in favor of the familiar. JSP chose professionals over physicians, causing them to lose seats.
Who was JSP’s choice?
Here is a general overview of the candidates fielded by Jan Suraj:The first list (51 candidates), announced on 9 October, included mathematician KC Sinha, doctors and engineers, “former bureaucrats, retired police officers”.The second list (65 candidates) emphasized social representation: 31 from extremely vulnerable sections, 21 from OBCs and 21 Muslims.The strategy was clear: ticket candidates with high educational and professional credentials, politicians with less careers. But it came with weak local roots.For example, JSP contested from high-profile Raghopur (bastion of Tejashwi Yadav) By fielding Chanchal Singh. This was a bold undertaking, but unrealistic in the absence of effort at the grassroots level.In plain words: JSP chose “imported talent” instead of domestic workers. In the state elections where local networks dominate, this mismatched alliance proved to be a heavy blow against them.
the march that did not appear
Jan Suraj rode a powerful narrative, taking Kishor’s intimate “padayatra” across Bihar, meeting thousands of villagers, collecting grievances and positioning the party as a new age alternative to the old structure. The march (which began on 2 October 2022) sought to reach “17,000 people” and act as the moral backbone of the movement.Yet, when it came to voting, that narrative failed to translate into a meaningful support base. Voter turnout in Bihar reached a record 66.9% in 2025 – indicating strong mobilization overall, but not for the JSP. Early trends from the ECI showed that the JSP itself was “nowhere in sight”.Why did this happen? Three reasons: First, the narrative remained high-level and issue-based (jobs, migration, good governance) which seemed abstract to many rural voters. Second, the march showed a lack of sustained follow-up at the micro level: local committees, recurring visits, booth-level shouting-rows. Without this the pace of the march lost. Third, voters perceived the party as lacking credibility: when initial counts showed the NDA above the majority mark, voters switched decisively.In short, the well-publicized march generated high expectations, but it did not create a resilient voting bloc. Instead of the “wave” that was promised, Jan Suraj approached the election like a marathon runner with no shortage of water – working hard, but without getting stronger.
Overlapping space, weak position: where did JSP stand?
Another major reason for JSP failure is its location. The party tried to occupy the third space: neither the traditional divisional/identity politics of the Rashtriya Janata Dal/Congress block, nor the Hindutva-driven narrative of the BJP-led building. Instead, it talked about good governance, youth employment, migration, new faces. But in the political environment of Bihar, that space was either already filled or vacant.In the initial trends, the NDA alliance with BJP and JDU has captured more than 150 seats. Meanwhile, the opposition grand alliance (RJD + Congress) retained the identity support. It is difficult for any newcomer to break into any group without a mass base. Additionally, Jan Suraj’s message of transcending caste was admirable in theory, but in practice voters asked: Who is the candidate? Which community supports them? Which local workers will they deploy? JSP lacked credible answers.Furthermore, the party’s release of its list of candidates revealed a contradictory message: the first list included 16% Muslims, 17% extremely backward classes, but the campaign emphasized “merit”. This may have alienated some identity-based voters who prefer explicit support by key local communities. Attempts to influence both meritocracy and representation left the JSP in a dilemma. A clear conclusion: In Bihar’s competitive politics, clarity of alignment matters as much as freshness of message. JSP lost both.
Execution Weakness: Great Campaign, Poor Delivery
Ultimately, campaign execution matters. Planning a campaign is one thing and winning the seat is another. In this regard, JSP’s tournament was weak in several areas:Late declaration of candidates: While the JSP publicized its lists, many seats were finalized close to the nomination deadline, leaving little time for ground work. Lack of identity of the candidate: Multiple listing reports suggest that voters cannot name JSP candidates, unlike well-known local leaders from the BJP or RJD. This is a red flag in Indian electoral systems where name-recognition is important.wA booth-level machinery: Without a cadre of trained local workers at each polling station, the efforts remained overwhelming. The campaign’s report emphasizes paid professionals and centralized teams, not local volunteers. Insufficient Vote Conversion: Early trends from the ECI show that JSP candidates are getting some votes even in constituencies where they had seriously contested the elections. For example, in Mokama the JSP candidates were far behind, and in other seats the JSP did not even pose a serious challenge in the initial stages.No fallback alliance: Unlike many parties, which take risks by forming alliances – either through seat-sharing or post-poll understanding – JSP went alone. In a region dominated by the NDA and the Grand Alliance, this isolation increased its weakness.In amount: JSP may have created an attractive campaign, but it lacked the nuances of election campaigning. The party did not train local workers, did not nurture candidate-community relations, did not create fallback strategies. As a result, the votes he might have gained through innovation evaporated.
What’s next for PK?
If the introduction of JSP in Bihar was a case of promises without any basis. Kishor’s style could not solve the basics: local anchor points, community relationships, booth-level mobilization, name recognition and dense organizational networks.Here are five lessons for any future attempts at a “third force” in Bihar:1. Create cadre before the election campaign: Consideration should be given to deployment of local cadre a few months before the elections.2. A candidate’s roots matter: Professionals make headlines; Local Connect wins the vote.3. Turn marches into mechanisms: Padyatras create awareness, but follow-up teams are needed to capture voters.4. Clarity of identity: Trying to sit between two large groups often leads to complete squeezing.5. Infrastructure outweighs innovation: A new party can challenge old parties, but only with strong grassroots infrastructure and local goodwill.
