A ceasefire between the US and Iran would, as Donald Trump calls it, usher in a “golden age” for the Middle East. still the first day that truce It was one of the bloodiest days in the region since the war began on 28 February.
On April 8, when the President backed down from his dire threat to destroy Iranian civilization, everyone heaved a sigh of relief. Mr Trump had spent the past two weeks demanding that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz or face attacks on its power grid. However, less than 90 minutes before his deadline, Mr Trump announced a two-week ceasefire. Negotiators from the US and Iran are to meet to discuss a permanent end to the war. Their first meeting is scheduled to take place on April 10 in Islamabad, the Pakistani capital, which has played a central role in sending messages between the warring sides.
However, relief soon turned to fear: apart from the US, no one immediately stopped firing. The worst violence so far was in Lebanon, where Israel is fighting Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed Shiite militia, which joined the war on March 2 by firing rockets at Israel.
Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif had said that the ceasefire with Iran would also include Lebanon. His Israeli counterpart insisted that did not happen and Mr Trump offered no resistance. A few hours later Israel launched a coordinated wave of more than 100 airstrikes across the country. Hundreds of people were killed and injured; Hospitals were overwhelmed, and there was a shortage of blood.
Meanwhile, Iranian missiles and drones continued to rain across the Gulf. In Saudi Arabia they targeted a vital pipeline that carries 7 million barrels of oil a day to the Red Sea, allowing a portion of the kingdom’s oil exports to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. In Kuwait they targeted electricity and water desalination plants. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) said it was attacked more than 50 times. It was one of the deadliest days of Iranian attacks since the beginning of the war.
Some analysts saw this as a response to Israel’s actions in Lebanon. Others wondered whether this was a result of the decentralized manner in which Iran has fought this war. With its leaders holed up in bunkers and mobile-phone networks infiltrated by Israeli spies, communication is difficult; The regime’s most elite fighting force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has given field commanders the flexibility to launch attacks on their own initiative. Some may be unaware of the armistice, or may even choose to ignore it.
It is too early to know whether the ceasefire will actually be effective, let alone whether talks in Pakistan will be successful. This means it is too early to judge whether Iran or the US won the war (although this has not stopped both from claiming victory). If negotiations lead to an agreement, and Iran agrees to end its regional aggression in exchange for relief from US sanctions, both will certainly win; If they fail and the battle begins again, both may lose.
no safe port
Similarly, how the war ends will depend on how other countries in the region see the future. If the conflict between Iran and the US continues, the Gulf countries will have to steel themselves for further conflict. On the other hand, an agreement could mean that, over time, they would come to view Iran as a commercial competitor rather than a military threat.
However, it is clear that the Gulf countries have suffered the heaviest losses. The economic cost of the war has run into the billions of dollars: lost oil and gas revenues, damage to critical infrastructure, even the bill for air-defense interceptors. The reputational damage could be greater still. The war has exposed two catastrophic vulnerabilities – one geographical, the other geopolitical – for which the Gulf states have no easy solutions.
First, their dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. For most Gulf countries, the waterway is either their primary maritime link to global markets or their only link: they ship hydrocarbons and other commodities, and import everything from grain to cars. Iran’s ability to close the strait poses an existential threat; Its plan to collect toll on ships using the waterway smacks of extortion.
To be fair, it may not be able to implement this plan in peacetime, especially if Oman, which sits on the south side of the strait, does not go along with it. Yet officials across the Gulf are discussing alternatives to the strait. One, proposed under Joe Biden’s administration, would be a corridor of railways and pipelines that would stretch to Israel. Another will end up in Syria – which, remarkably, has been one of the safest places in the region over the past six weeks. They could also expand existing pipelines that terminate at the Red Sea or the Gulf of Oman.
Yet none of these provide a quick or reliable solution. Pipelines will take years to build and are easy targets, as the latest Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia has shown. Furthermore, the main customers for Gulf oil are in Asia, and the largest oil tankers are too heavy to transit the Suez Canal when fully loaded. Transporting crude oil to the Mediterranean Sea would be an expensive, slow solution. The same applies to imports: lorry fleets are a poor substitute for cargo ships.
Another weakness for the Gulf states is their dependence on an increasingly unreliable US. For decades, the presence of American troops on the Arabian Peninsula was meant to deter external attack. Mr Trump’s war has turned that logic upside down: Instead of preventing a conflict, the US started one. Publicly, most Gulf officials insist that the war will not change their relationship with the US. His personal views are more subtle. Some express a kind of buyer’s remorse about Mr. Trump, a president they worked hard to court. Less than a year ago he stood in the Saudi capital and declared an end to “interventionist” wars in the Middle East. Now he is fighting a war.
Yet when it comes to broader relations with the US, the Gulf countries have no clear choice. Britain and France are helping to shoot down drones over Qatar and the UAE, but their reluctance to commit to a post-war maritime mission in the Strait of Hormuz has upset some Gulf governments. In their view, Europe is unwilling and unable to play the role of a serious hard power.
Of course, they have other options too. Qatar will deepen its ties with Türkiye, which has deployed troops to the emirate since 2017. Saudi Arabia will strengthen the defense agreement signed with Pakistan in September. During the war South Korea sent an air-defense system to the United Arab Emirates; The closeness between the two countries has increased rapidly. However, even if such middle powers can help them diversify their relationships, they cannot become a substitute for a superpower.
great powers, little rest
This points to another lesson of the war. Arab states thought they could stay out of the competition between the US and its great-power rivals. When Russia invaded Ukraine, the Middle East sought to remain neutral. Vladimir Putin has not returned the favor. Russia has reportedly provided satellite imagery to Iran to help it attack targets in Arab states. Meanwhile, Volodymyr Zelensky arrives in the Gulf to offer help in shooting down drones: the Iranian Martyr models that have wreaked havoc across the region are, after all, the same ones that Russia is using against Ukraine.
There is also disappointment with China. It helped push Iran to accept Mr Trump’s ceasefire. But a country that imports most of its oil from the Middle East joined Russia in vetoing a UN Security Council resolution sponsored by Bahrain to authorize a military mission in Hormuz. Additionally, Russia and China have also been weak allies for Iran. The former provided targeting assistance but seemingly not much more. Post-war reconstruction is unlikely to help much if the US does not ease sanctions.
A few years ago everyone in the Middle East was eager to talk about the region’s new multipolar era. Now, for better or worse, America is at the center of events and its rivals are marginalized.
Yet one of America’s closest allies is also being viewed with suspicion. Outside the UAE, many Arab officials now consider Israel a destabilizing force in the region. They believe it dragged Mr. Trump into the war by misleading him about how easy it would be to topple the Iranian regime (a charge that unfairly acquits Mr. Trump). He also believes that its brutal bombing of Beirut on April 8 looks like an attempt to sabotage the US ceasefire with Iran.
All this leaves the Gulf countries in a dilemma. Before the war, there had been decades of relative peace in the region. It considered itself an entrepôt immune to the many conflicts of the Middle East. The US will keep it safe, even as it maintains close ties with Russia and China; For some, closer ties with Israel also offered the promise of a staunch ally against their enemy in Tehran. The war has overturned all those notions altogether.
