On November 18th we will know what can happen The final chapter of the decades-long Maoist insurgency.n India. Inside Papikonda National Park in Alluri Sitarama Raju district of Andhra Pradesh, Madvi Hidma killed by security forcesThe elusive commander of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the Maoists’ last hope for military revival. His death six months after the assassination of general secretary Nambala Keshava Rao alias Basavaraju in May signals not only a tactical defeat but also the effective collapse of the armed conflict that once threatened to engulf large parts of India’s forested areas.
Hidma’s murder is significant not just because of who he was – a tribal leader in the leadership of a major Telugu-speaking party and who rapidly rose to the top ranks of the CPI (Maoist) – but also because of where it happened. He fell not in his familiar terrain of the dense forests of Bastar, which he knew “like the back of his hand”, but in unfamiliar Andhra territory, a testament to how far the movement had been pushed from its strongholds. His wife Madakam Raje and four trusted bodyguards were gunned down, seven other cadres including Metturi Joga Rao alias Tech Shankar were eliminated soon after his death and within 24 hours 50 Maoists were arrested across Andhra Pradesh.
the last warrior
Born in Purvati village in Chhattisgarh’s Sukma district in 1981, the Gondi-speaking Hidma joined the movement at the age of 16 and rapidly became what surrendered Maoists describe as a “brilliant fighter” – fierce, inspiring and an excellent strategist. Despite his lack of formal education, he was tech-savvy, always carrying a laptop or tablet, and had great communication skills that helped him get the best out of his cadres. Basavaraju, himself an expert in guerrilla warfare, reportedly trained by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the 1980s, recognized Hidma’s talent early on and gave him command of the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee. He became the only tribal leader from Bastar to reach the Maoist Central Committee.
Following the death of Basavaraju in an encounter, Hidma took control of the CMC and its key fighting unit, Battalion 1 of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA). Their record was disastrous: at least 26 major attacks, including the 2010 Tadmetla attack in which 76 CRPF personnel were killed, the 2013 Jheeram Valley attack in which Congress leaders Mahendra Karma and Nand Kumar Patel were killed, the 2017 Burkapal attack in which 25 CRPF personnel lost their lives, and the Tekulguda attack in which 21 security personnel were killed.
Yet, despite all his might, Hidama led a shrinking force. CPI (Maoist), which had 45 Central Committee members in 2010, now has barely 10-12 left. Since 2024, about 2,120 Maoists have surrendered and more than 560, including top leaders, have been killed. The figures tell a story of steep decline.
final defeat
To understand this conclusion, one has to return to the origins of the movement in the Dandakaranya forests of Chhattisgarh. The Maoist presence there began not as an offensive but as a strategic withdrawal. After the collapse of the Naxalbari movement in the 1970s, leaders concluded that they had made a mistake by not preparing the “back area” for regrouping. In 1980, seven contingents totaling 49 cadres were sent to the “Dandakaranya area”, approximately 100,000 square km spread over four states. Their mission was to establish it as a secure rear sector for the Telangana guerrilla zone.
Cadres won the confidence of tribals by addressing grievances – forcing contractors to raise the prices of tendu leaves, dealing with forest department abuses, and facing sexual harassment by officials. A high-ranking tribal Maoist leader once explained the main issue: Tribal people felt that they were “not treated like human beings”, with a lack of respect for their language, religion and way of life. Despite basic amenities like school buildings and electric poles, teachers and electricity remained missing.
Ironically, state-sponsored counter-insurgency operations proved to be the movement’s best recruiters. The mass awakening campaign of the 1980s, which arrested and killed suspected Naxalite supporters, led tribal leaders to advise youth to join the Maoists for protection. The 2005 Salwa Judum campaign was declared illegal by the Supreme Court, forcing villagers to choose sides – and many chose the Maoists, causing the party to multiply.
As the number of tribal recruits increased, military operations also increased. The first PLGA company was formed in 2001, followed by the formidable Battalion-1 (later led by Hidma) in 2009. This period saw devastating attacks: the Ranibodli attack in 2007 killed 55 personnel and the Mukram attack in 2010 left 75 CRPF personnel dead.
Yet, the movement always brought with it the seeds of its own destruction. As academician Nirmalagshu Mukherjee noted in 2010, instead of organizing tribals into cooperatives or building health and education institutions, the Maoists maintained an exploitative contractor system to impose taxes and collect revenue. Their objective was not socio-economic development but recruitment for armed struggle. This emphasis on armed struggle arose from the Indian state’s flawed understanding and determination to replicate China’s revolutionary path of the 1920s. Former General Secretary Ganapathy warned against getting “trapped in legalism and economicism” and forgetting that “the people have to be prepared to take power.” This strong hold in Abujhmad led to resentment among the tribals, which intensified in the 2010s and 2020s as they became more connected to the outside world.
The state’s comprehensive response strategy combined security operations with developmental outreach. The Union Home Ministry set up a dedicated Left Wing Extremism Division in 2006, which provides financial assistance to strengthen police stations and strengthen state forces. CPI (Maoist) was banned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act in 2009. Importantly, welfare measures – public distribution system shops, Anganwadi centers – were routed through new forward security camps near Maoist areas. By the mid-2010s, the same tribal leaders who had encouraged them to join the Maoists began to exercise caution about their presence. The time of 2024-25 proved to be decisive. More than 50 new forward camps in South Bastar and Narayanpur restricted the PLGA’s movement, while approximately 2,000 local ‘Bastar fighters’ with superior terrain and language knowledge significantly addressed the Maoist threat. ‘Operation Kagar’, launched in April 2025, systematically targeted the leadership – claiming Basavaraju in May and Hidma in November.
In August 2024, the Maoist Politburo acknowledged nationwide setbacks and failure to achieve 2020 goals, recasting its strategy for strategic withdrawal and defense of the party. This reorganized the battalions into smaller units to avoid encirclement. Yet even this could not save Basavaraju or Hidma.
the way forward
Just before Hidma’s death, surrendered Central Committee member Mallojula Venugopal alias Sonu (younger brother of then senior Maoist leader Mallojula Koteswara Rao alias Kishenji) appealed to the remaining Maoists to lay down their arms, clearly stating that the armed struggle was “no longer relevant” and that his forces were “no match for the existing well-trained and well-equipped security forces”.
The party’s Central Committee expelled Venugopal as a “traitor” and pledged in an October 2025 statement that it would “never surrender to the enemy”. Nevertheless, such defiance could not obscure the decline of the movement – ​​the statement itself acknowledged that the enemy had “gained the advantage” and acknowledged the need for reconstruction “while protecting the Party”. The rebel party is now led by Thippiri Tirupati alias Devuji, although its central committee has not yet met to endorse the decision, fearing retribution from security forces.
As guns are becoming quieter, the challenge is changing. Focusing solely on security may create new complaints. Only a welfare-minded approach that allows tribal integration with dignity can prevent resurgence. For the Maoists, the movement is facing its most serious crisis, with the leadership decimating due to age, imprisonment, or death in encounters. The story of their ups and downs should suggest a serious rethinking of their understanding of the Indian state and the futility of armed struggle that rejects mass mobilization and socio-economic organization. It appears that the dream of revolution has finally died in the forests of south-central India.
published – November 23, 2025 02:17 am IST
