Modern land warfare no longer allows unopposed movement: every advance is now monitored, targeted and countered from the air shore.
From the open plains of Ukraine to the dense urban battlefields of Gaza and the mountain corridors of Nagorno-Karabakh, drones and hovering weapons have fundamentally changed the way armies move, survive and fight.
Battles are still decided on the ground, but air coast control – the low-altitude airspace where drones, helicopters and short-range air defenses operate – increasingly determines whether ground forces can maneuver.
The illusion of safe movement has been broken
For much of the 20th century, ground forces assumed that dispersal, camouflage, and speed could provide some degree of protection from observation and attack.
That notion is now obsolete. Inexpensive quadcopters, long-range ISR drones and precision stray ammunition have made the battlefield transparent. The movement itself has become a signature.
In Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian armies have learned that even small-scale military gatherings, vehicle convoys, or logistics nodes are quickly detected and attacked.
Commercial drones modified for military use routinely detect armour, artillery and infantry positions, indicating accurate fire within minutes. What once required air superiority and manned aircraft can now be achieved with systems costing a few thousand dollars.
Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 was an early warning. Azerbaijan’s use of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones and Israeli munitions systematically destroyed Armenian armor and air defenses.
Tanks, artillery and supply vehicles operating without adequate protection were rapidly destroyed, not because the armor had become obsolete, but because it was used without the control of the air coast.
In Gaza, Israel’s extensive use of drones – from persistent surveillance to precision strikes – has reinforced the same lesson in dense urban areas.
Movement is constantly seen above the ground and often below it too. The difference between survival and destruction lies in layered security, electronic warfare, and integration with air and ISR assets.
Drones haven’t replaced armies: they’ve exposed them
Despite dramatic footage and viral narratives, drones have not replaced armies. Infantry still clears ground, armor still provides shock and protection, and logistics still maintains combat power. What drones have done is eliminate the margin for error.
Unprotected infantry columns, static armor, and exposed logistics are now liabilities. The battlefield punishes forces that fail to adapt quickly, rather than rewarding those with sheer numbers.
Professional military assessments increasingly emphasize that drones exacerbate existing vulnerabilities rather than create entirely new vulnerabilities.
This difference matters for India. The lesson is not that tanks are dead or infantry obsolete, but rather that survivability now depends on how well land forces are integrated into the broader air-shore ecosystem: including drones, counter-drones, electronic warfare and short-range air defense.
Air Littoral: The Most Contested Layer of Modern Warfare
The air coastal zone – roughly from ground level to a few thousand feet – became the most deadly and crowded area of ​​the war.
This is where drones scout, hunt with weapons, helicopters operate, and air defense forces attempt to deny access. Unlike traditional air superiority at high altitudes, control of this layer is local, temporary, and constantly contested.
In Ukraine, both sides maintain dense drone coverage but struggle to protect their own movement. Electronic warfare systems jam GPS signals, forcing drone operators to adapt with inertial navigation or manual guidance.
Short-range air defense systems shoot down drones, but due to numbers they are either overwhelmed by low-cost alternatives or ignored.
Think-tank studies on counter-UAS consistently highlight that no single solution works. Guns, missiles, jammers and cyber equipment must be layered and integrated. Yet, success is measured not in eliminating the threat, but in reducing vulnerability.
For the Indian Army operating along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) or the Western Front, this is particularly relevant. High altitude terrain, limited road networks and unpredictable logistics routes increase vulnerability.
A drone monitoring a convoy or forward post could launch an attack with precision fire, live ammunition or artillery.
Infantry, armor and logistics under drone shadow
Infantry now fight under constant air surveillance. Simple actions – disassembling, resupply, evacuating casualties – identifying hazards.
This has revived interest in deception, rapid dispersion, and subtle maneuvering. Small units must rotate frequently, avoid patterns, and integrate organic counter-drone measures.
Kavach faces a double challenge. Top-attack weapons exploit weak rooftop protection, while drones direct artillery strikes with devastating accuracy.
Yet armor is indispensable for firepower and protection, provided it operates with air-littoral cover. Active protection systems, electronic warfare suites and dedicated short-range air defense are no longer optional add-ons.
Logistics, traditionally the soft underpinning of armies, is now a major target. Fuel trucks, ammunition depots and bridging equipment could be easily seen from the air.
Ukraine’s experience shows that disrupting logistics can prevent aggression without directly involving front-line units. Survivable logistics now required dispersal, camouflage, hardened shelters and, crucially, air-to-shore denial.
Counter-UAS and the race to adapt
The anti-drone war is evolving as fast as drones are evolving. Professional military assessments warn against over-reliance on expensive interceptors to defeat cheap drones. Instead, layered systems combining kinetic weapons, electronic warfare, and passive measures provide the best balance.
India has started moving in this direction with indigenous counter-UAS systems, laser-based solutions and improved short-range air defence.
However, integration remains the major challenge. Counter-drone assets should be tied into a common sensor network that spans the Army, Air Force and, in some theaters, paramilitary forces.
Organizational adaptation is equally important. Units should train to operate under the drone threat as an ongoing situation, not an exceptional situation.
This includes discipline in electromagnetic emissions, intense camouflage, decoy use and coordination with high-level air defense assets.
Implications for Indian military doctrine
For the Indian armed forces, drones and hovering weapons reinforce a central truth: survival on land now depends on control of the air coast. This has implications for theory, procurement and training.
First, drones should be fully integrated into combined arms operations, and not treated as specific ISR tools. Second, counter-UAS capabilities must be embedded across multiple sectors, from battalion-level security to theater-wide air defense.
Third, unity cannot be compromised. The military cannot protect the Hawaiian coast alone; This requires seamless coordination with the Air Force’s sensors, fighter aircraft and air defense networks.
Finally, India’s emphasis on self-reliance in defense technology makes strategic sense. Indigenous drones, munitions and counter-UAS systems reduce dependence on foreign suppliers and allow rapid adaptation based on battlefield response, which is a decisive advantage in a rapidly evolving domain like air littoral.
The movement is now a controversial act
Drones have not eliminated maneuver, but rather replaced it. Movement itself has become a contested act, inviting detection and attack unless carefully preserved.
The armies that succeed will not be those with the most drones alone, but rather those that understand air warfare as an extension of land warfare.
Wars are still decided on the ground. But in modern warfare, control of the air coast determines whether ground forces can advance, survive, and ultimately win.
