The Constitution of India, while federal in structure, was designed with a clear centralization bias. Taking heavy inspiration from the Government of India Act, 1935, it centralized significant authority in New Delhi while ceding comparatively minor areas to the states. This architecture was shaped by the circumstances of its birth – the trauma of partition, the unification of 14 provinces and more than 500 princely states, and widespread fears that centrifugal forces might threaten national unity. In that environment, centralization was not only prudent but also inevitable.
Yet, even in those curious discussions, there were voices of rare clarity. Of. Santhanam cautioned the Constituent Assembly that the strength of the Union lay not in the indiscriminate accumulation of functions, but in the disciplined refusal of responsibilities that did not properly belong to the national level. He said, “It is in this positive and negative delimitation of powers that the real federal system rests….”
Implicit in that single formulation are two enduring principles: first, authority is most effective when exercised closest to knowledge and accountability; And second, excessive centralization creates weakness by overloading a single authority with tasks which it cannot perform efficiently. A government that attempts to monitor everything – from space exploration to rural sanitation – may expand its reach but it inevitably reduces its effectiveness.
reinforcement of dominance
History shows that power taken in the name of necessity is rarely withheld when the necessity ceases. In the decades that followed, centralizing tendencies were strengthened by the dominance of a single national party at the union and state levels, leading to a “high command” culture that reduced the autonomy of state leadership. Later, the emergence of coalition governments in the Union and the rise of regional parties in the states led to a more balanced federal arrangement without jeopardizing unity. One can reasonably speculate that if today’s politically mature and linguistically consolidated states had existed in 1950, constitutional design might have evolved along a more decentralized path.
Just as an individual cannot remain forever bound by the distractions of childhood, so too a nation cannot always toil under the anxieties of its formative years. The unity of India is no longer fragile, and the idea of India now rests on firm and permanent foundations. Yet, 76 years later, constitutional practice continues to reflect the reactions of the late 1940s. Centralization, once defended as a necessity, has now turned into habit.
Through successive constitutional amendments, comprehensive Union legislation in concurrent list subjects, conditional Finance Commission transfers and centrally sponsored schemes with rigid templates, the balance of power has tilted even more towards the Union. Large ministries exist in New Delhi that mimic state functions and often attempt to drive state priorities through micromanagement and procedural oversight. Contrary to the democratic hierarchy, the Central Executive is attempting to override absolute state laws in concurrent list subjects through subordinate legislation.
it’s a theory
Such deviations create discomfort with constitutional principle. In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court of India declared federalism to be part of the basic structure of the Constitution and affirmed that the states are not mere appendages of the Centre, but supreme in their allotted territories. The Court said that federalism is a principle rooted in the history and diversity of India; Not a matter of administrative convenience. Despite this judicial affirmation, state autonomy continues to be eroded – through legislative overreach, executive overreach and certain other judicial interpretations that privilege uniform national solutions over contextual diversity.
There is a persistent fallacy behind this trajectory – that reducing states makes the Union stronger. In reality, the Union and the States are not competitors in a zero-sum competition; They are partners in a common constitutional enterprise. India’s size and diversity make centralized policy design inherently limited. No authority in New Delhi, no matter how enlightened, can formulate policy with equal sensitivity for every linguistic region, agro-ecology, industrial cluster or labor market.
Decentralization addresses this limitation by enabling parallel experimentation. States can design and test policies on a manageable scale, handle failures without national disruption, and allow successful innovations to spread horizontally or be adopted nationally. Many of India’s most effective programs followed exactly this path. Tamil Nadu’s midday meal scheme, Kerala’s achievements in public health and literacy, and Maharashtra’s employment guarantee initiative all began as state experiments before coming to inform national policy. Over-centralization stifles the diversity of strategies that generate innovation and discovery.
Centralists often argue that states lack administrative or technical capacity and, therefore, require federal intervention. Yet, such intervention blocks the very capacity it claims to address, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of dependency. Parents who do not delegate responsibility to their children, and leaders who refuse to cede authority, inevitably lead to dependency. Governments are no exception.
Capability arises from responsibility, accountability, and freedom to make mistakes and improve. To suggest that India’s states – many of which are equivalent in scale to sovereign nations – are inherently inefficient and, therefore, should be subjected to intrusive central control is inconsistent with national self-respect.
It could still be defended if centralization had produced better results. But compared with decentralized federations, global benchmarks or India’s own aspirations, the record is unimpressive. The centralized model has struggled to provide universal access, consistent quality, real equity or global competitiveness. Instead, it has generated regulatory complexity, chronic underfunding as resources are stretched due to increasing mandates, blurred accountability, and the gradual erosion of state capacity.
Tamil Nadu recognized these threats at an early stage. In 1967, CN Annadurai said that the Union should indeed be strong enough to maintain the sovereignty and integrity of India. But this did not mean that it should take control over every subject, such as health or education, which has no direct connection with national defence.
His successor, Kalaignar M. Karunanidhi carried forward this philosophy through “autonomy to the states, federalism at the Centre” and established the first Independent Committee on Union-State Relations in 1969 under Justice PV Rajamannar. The committee’s 1971 report became a milestone in India’s federal debate. Subsequent national commissions – Sarkaria (1983–88) and Punchhi (2007–10) – acknowledged the need for rebalancing, although they stopped short of recommending fundamental structural reform.
time to shape
India now stands at a constitutional juncture where recalibration is needed rather than complacency. The objective is not to weaken the Union, but to right-size it, allowing it to focus on genuine national responsibilities while restoring to states the autonomy necessary for effective governance. Such recalibration will not undermine national unity; This will deepen it by linking authority with responsibility.
In this spirit, the Tamil Nadu government constituted a high-level committee on Centre-State relations in April 2025 under the chairmanship of Justice Kurian Joseph (a retired Supreme Court judge), with K. Ashok Vardhan Shetty (a retired IAS officer) and Dr. M. Naganathan (former State Planning Commission Deputy Chairman) were the members. Considered a non-partisan exercise, the Committee conducted a comprehensive review of contemporary federal challenges.
Part I of its report, which was submitted on February 16, 2026, addresses issues ranging from the role of governors and language policy to delimitation, elections, education, health and goods and services tax.
The Government of Tamil Nadu presents this Report to the public in the hope that it will encourage informed debate, restore balance in Union-State relations, and contribute to a constitutional solution in which the Union is strong because it is centered, and the States are strong because they are trusted.
MK Stalin is the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu
