As the Indigo Airlines crisis winds down, there is increasing curiosity about the unfolding events and actions (or lack thereof) by the government and the airline.
It makes sense to revisit the causes of the crisis that brought India’s aviation sector to its knees in early December – especially since many are still unclear about it. Based on information received from IndiGo, other airlines and government people, this has actually happened.
IndiGo prepared its plan for the winter schedule with a total of 301 A320 aircraft and 44 ATRs available for use. Total available crew for the A320 was 2357 command pilots (and 2194 first officers) and for the ATR it was 284 (and 275). No cancellations on ATR. The total crew divided by aircraft gives an availability of 15.1% for IndiGo’s A320 fleet.
This is compared to AIX (Air India Express)’s 17.4, Akasa’s 25.3 (the airline has pre-leased as it is adding aircraft every month and needs ready-to-fly-off crew) and SpiceJet’s 19.04. The numbers show that while IndiGo’s expectations from its crew are certainly higher than others, they are not much different. Additionally, the carrier is inducting over 1000 pilots in 2026, most of whom have already been shortlisted. Therefore, the crisis was not primarily due to a severe shortage of crew (although the airline was cutting back) but due to other factors.
According to people across all airlines, pilots at IndiGo’s nearest rival Air India Express were flying an average of about 60 hours per month, which has come down to about 58 hours with the new comfort norms. Akasa’s pilots are flying between 55 to 70 hours per month on an average (the airline has a large number of trainees who fly around 20 hours a month) and SpiceJet’s pilots (400 for 21 dry lease aircraft) are actually currently flying max. 65 hours a month. IndiGo pilots were working an average of about 58 hours a month (although duty hours which also include travel time to the airport make this higher) and by increasing this to about 60, the airline was hoping that it could manage the proposed winter schedule.
With the benefit of hindsight, a senior airline official admits that the staff count could have been planned a little better, taking into account the new rest and flight duty hours arrangements, but there was also no “obvious” shortfall. Indigo was just keeping it tough like she always does. This also means that it is not appropriate to hold the Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) responsible for approving the winter schedule: as the situation stood, there was no apparent shortage of crew.
On 1 November, the remaining sections of the new flight tariff deadline (FDTL) came into force. IndiGo could have prepared for this by making some reductions in the system, but this is against the DNA of the airline. But there were other factors at play, errors of both omission and commission.
According to people familiar with the situation, the airline reconfigured its rostering software late and did not adequately test it with the new rest guidelines. While some disruptions were noticeable during November, a domino effect was created and by 4–5 December the entire system collapsed. Pilots who were not available at their home bases were assigned to fly from there. The situation became worse due to cancellation of flights as pilots who were supposed to go from one base to another could not because their flights were also cancelled. Remedial action was not taken in time to shift them to other carriers.
Making matters worse was a leadership vacuum. Three key personnel – Senior Vice President of Operations Control Center Jason Herter, Chief Operating Officer, Isidre Porqueras, and CEO, Peter Albers, were all out of the country at the same time. Had the airline’s founder, Rahul Bhatia, been in India, things might have been different, but he was also out of the country and his absence remains conspicuous during this crisis. By the time the key decision makers and people in charge returned, the situation had fallen apart and the airline had collapsed.
This embarrassing incident came as the Indian government was hosting the Russian President, making headlines for the visit as well as highlighting the flaws in the developed India story. In what can only be understood as an emotional outburst, India’s Aviation Minister K. Ram Mohan Naidu made two statements: one, he said he would remove the airline’s CEO if needed (actually, this is beyond his scope) and second, he said he had lost seven days of sleep because of the IndiGo crisis, raising the question whether he was in a similar situation after the AI171 crash in June when 260 people lost their lives!
In the absence of any other target, public anger was once again directed at the safety regulator DGCA, which was appointed to deal with the crisis created by the delays and cancellations, even though it posed no direct threat to the lives and safety of passengers. A thought worth considering is that if this episode had unfolded simultaneously with the horrific tragedy witnessed in June, the DGCA would have had to display superhuman abilities in dealing with both simultaneously.
Faced with an untenable situation of maintaining the entire building intact while once again shifting blame and appeasing angry fliers, the DGCA in an unprecedented action set up a dedicated inspection team at IndiGo’s corporate office in Gurugram to monitor key operational areas including fleet strength, crew availability, hours of utilization, unplanned leaves and standby crew for both cockpit and cabin staff. Two members were to be deployed at the airline’s office on a daily rotation basis and the other two would keep track of daily cancellations, refund processing, on-time performance, passenger compensation and baggage delivery.
Additionally, the DGCA suspended four flight operations inspectors (FOIs) who were in charge of keeping an eye on IndiGo at the regulator’s end, who it claimed were unaware that they were required to monitor crew availability and rostering practices even though their duty manual stipulates it.
The investigation will reveal whether these FOIs were in collusion or negligent in their duties – or whether, as some posts on social media have claimed, they are scapegoats. There are demands for the removal of outgoing DGCA chief Faiz Ahmed Kidwai – he took charge this January and has already dealt with two major crises, the June crash and now this one too, though some analysts believe this is unwarranted. After all, it is the institution and the system that need to be fixed, not individuals.
Meanwhile, the “harsh and insensitive” (as described by many) apology issued on video by airline CEO Peter Albers fell on deaf and unforgiving ears and failed to garner any goodwill for the company, whose true rebuke came in the form of a sharp decline in its stock. The crisis exposed the inadequacies of the board which immediately sprang into action and brought in an independent expert to review the operational disruption and contributing factors, raising questions in the industry about what an outside expert would tell the board that top management could not.
Some analysts described the move as a “strategic deception” aimed at appeasing observers, shareholders and investors rather than taking concrete action to apportion blame and hold those responsible accountable. The radio silence of its founder Rahul Bhatia at the company’s time of need has also not gone down well with sector and market observers. Comparisons with now estranged co-founder Rakesh Gangwal and the demand for its inclusion have gained momentum among all stakeholders.
As in all such crises, the most overlooked aspect was the hapless passengers. Indigo offered a nominal amount The affected people were given Rs 10,000, which most people dismissed as a joke. The crew and even other employees, fliers and industry officials expressed the view that stiff financial penalties are the only language the company understands and the authorities should not shy away from charging an amount that actually causes losses. While weddings, functions and other leisure travelers may have lost huge sums in monetary terms, many people who could not make it in time for a loved one’s funeral or a prayer meeting in another city suffered irreparable losses. This is the price paid for living with a system that has been compromised.
At a broader level, the minister and his cabinet colleagues need to apply their collective minds to find ways to break IndiGo’s dominance in a critical sector like aviation. There are lessons available from examples not only in India but globally. With the crashes and collapse, 2025 has indeed been very scary for Indian aviation. Maybe 2026 will be better.
