The United States and Iran are once again on the brink, with a balanced military buildup and delicate back-channel diplomacy unfolding in parallel. In a wide-ranging conversation on Hindustan Times’ Point Blank, Executive Editor Shishir Gupta and Senior Anchor Ayesha Verma explain how close the region is to a potential attack, why this moment is uniquely dangerous, and where India fits into the rapidly changing equation.
10 day window – or 24 hours?
US President Donald Trump has publicly declared that the world will know within 10 days whether Washington reaches a deal with Tehran or “takes things forward” – a deliberately vague formulation that puts both diplomacy and force on the table. Gupta argues that this timeline is not mere rhetoric; This aligns with a solid military window as the US Navy’s largest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. The ford leads from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, the North Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
By the end of the month, Ford will be deployed with the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group, Los Angeles-class submarines equipped with Tomahawk missiles, jamming platforms and layered anti-ballistic missile defense. In Gupta’s assessment, this intensity of firepower is comparable to the preparations the US made before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, creating a moment when Washington could actually choose between a diplomatic settlement and a limited but devastating attack. Gupta says Trump may have talked about 10 days, but if he had to decide that Iran was crossing the red line on its nuclear ambitions, nothing could stop him from taking action within 24 hours.
an area at the edge
While Washington talks about timelines and options, the region is already behaving as if conflict could erupt any day. Gupta revealed that Israeli national security experts are preparing in very concrete ways – from cleaning and stocking bomb shelters to maintaining a general state of alert. He says similar alerts are being seen in Iran and parts of the Middle East as governments and populations prepare for a potential surge amid the ongoing crises in Gaza and Houthi-inspired instability.
This accumulation of flashpoints, coupled with the US armada offshore and Iran’s disputed nuclear and missile programs, creates what Gupta calls an “unstable” and “dangerous” environment that could “explode at any time”. He believes neither Tehran nor Washington are particularly willing to listen to outside advice, further increasing the risk that miscalculations or domestic political pressure could tilt the balance toward confrontation.
Negotiations in ambiguity: Washington, Tehran and domestic audiences
Yet even when carriers move and submarines deploy, diplomacy doesn’t end. Gupta points to indirect talks involving US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi as evidence that both sides still want a negotiated outcome, at least as a first measure. The fact that Iran sent a senior representative indicates that Tehran wants to find a diplomatic solution before the situation worsens.
However, Gupta emphasizes that US-Iran engagements have historically been shaped by a clash of political cultures and domestic compulsions. He says US officials tend to be “straightforward and clear”, while Iranian negotiators, following civilizational tradition, prefer “ambiguity” and modulation – a style that can easily create confusion and mistrust. Domestically, Iran should show defiance while continuing the narrative it has cultivated since the 1979 Islamic Revolution that it is standing up to American pressure. Washington, for its part, must reassure its public and allies that it will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons capability or deploy ballistic missiles capable of reaching Europe – a limitation that Gupta describes as “very, very serious.”
Iran’s weaknesses – and its proxies
From a military point of view, Gupta believes that Iran is extremely vulnerable at the moment. He argues that Iran’s air defenses have been severely weakened by past US and Israeli actions, leaving Tehran with “hardly any air defenses left” to intercept incoming American or Israeli missiles. In such a scenario, Iran’s primary option would be to absorb the attacks and retaliate with what it has: ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones, weapons it has already used in previous confrontations.
Further complicating the picture is Iran’s network of proxies in the Middle East – from Hamas and Hezbollah to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Kata’ib Hezbollah and other Shia-Sunni terrorist organizations supplied and supported by Tehran, whose primary targets are Israel, the US and US bases. Gupta argues that many of these groups have been “neutralized” by Israeli operations, with Hamas in Gaza “destroyed” and Hezbollah weakened, making this a moment when proxies are less able to mount decisive countermeasures. For hawks in Washington, that combination – weak Iranian air defenses and weak proxies – makes it “the best time to go to Iran” if a military option is chosen.
Sunni powers: public distance, private relief
Gupta underlined that major Sunni powers such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are unlikely to openly support or facilitate a US attack on Iran. Publicly, he is expected to deny US use of its air bases for offensive operations, forcing Washington to rely on facilities in Jordan and Qatar. Yet, he suggests that under the public stance, these states may quietly welcome decisive checks on Iran’s regional ambitions, nuclear aspirations and ballistic missile arsenal, given how much of the unrest on their streets is due to Tehran-inspired radicalism.
Interestingly, Gupta says Iran’s own ballistic missile development also carries inherent risks for Tehran’s allies, as some of these missiles may not reach intended targets and may explode prematurely at short ranges, adding another layer of chaos to any escalation cycle.
balancing act of india
Amidst this churning, India’s stance is thoughtful and cautious. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to visit Israel for a day and hold talks with his “friend” Benjamin Netanyahu, a visit that naturally raises questions about New Delhi’s role as tensions escalate. Gupta is clear that India’s stance is “clear” rather than vague: New Delhi will stay out of the conflict militarily and avoid taking sides.
India has long-standing civilizational ties with Iran, deep strategic and defense cooperation with Israel, and a comprehensive partnership with the United States. Given these overlapping relationships, Gupta says, India will insist on “restraint and peace” and favor diplomatic avenues over any resort to military action while protecting its interests and civilians in the wider region.
Limited strikes, regime survival and Iraq lessons
Can Iran survive if conflict breaks out? Gupta’s answer is subtle and conditional. In a scenario of a limited US strike focused on nuclear facilities and ballistic missile assets, Washington could set back Iran’s nuclear program by a decade without necessarily toppling the regime. However, an all-out offensive would raise the question of regime change, and here Gupta is skeptical about the current Iranian leadership’s ability to survive given the widespread protests, thousands reportedly killed in the streets, and the regime’s eroding legitimacy.
At the same time, he cites the example of Iraq: the removal of Saddam Hussein created a power vacuum that fueled the rise of ISIS, underscoring how little control external powers ultimately have after the fall of a regime. He warned that without clarity on “next steps” and who will rule Iran after the conflict, attempted regime change could unleash unpredictable and potentially more dangerous forces across the region.
For now, Gupta expects that if any US action is ordered, it would focus on “specific precision strikes” on nuclear sites and missile capabilities rather than full-scale war. He also rejected the possibility of an all-out nuclear exchange, arguing that any conflict would more likely involve ballistic missiles, drones, and precision strikes rather than nuclear weapons.
Russia, China and the limitations of signaling
Gupta suggests that even Russia and China, often seen as Iran’s geopolitical supporters, are unlikely to decisively shift the military balance in this immediate crisis. Their ships are deployed primarily as part of anti-piracy escort forces in the Gulf of Aden, and while planned joint naval exercises with Iran send a political signal, they do not meaningfully compete with the scale of the US armada already in the theater. He does not envision a “battle on the high seas” between the great powers; Instead, any conflict will be dominated by missiles, drones, and interdiction capabilities.
Ultimately, Gupta presented this moment as one of narrowing down options. If Washington intends to use military force to halt Iran’s nuclear and missile trajectories and degrade its proxies, he believes “there could not be a better time” given the current configuration of American power and Iranian vulnerability. If it chooses not to act, Iran will likely continue to enrich uranium, expand its ballistic missile reach, and re-weaponize its networks – ensuring that the question of war and peace in the Gulf remains deferred, not resolved.
