The central government has come under attack from opposition parties for its silence on the killing of Iran’s supreme leader Khamenei and five of his family members, including his newborn granddaughter, as well as his top advisers at the start of the conflict on February 28. Although External Affairs Minister (EAM) S Jaishankar spoke to his Iranian counterpart Syed Abbas Araghchi that day, there was no mention of any readout of the condolence message or condemnation of the US-Israeli attacks. Of Tehran.
Joint US-Israeli missile strikes bombed a girls’ primary school in Minab, southern Iran, killing about 150 and injuring about 100, according to UN estimates. The strikes on Sunday (March 1, 2026) damaged hospitals, including Gandhi Hospital in northern Tehran, which was located on Gandhi Street. At a media tour, officials showed broken glass windows of the hospital, right in front of a state TV tower, in a series of such attacks that World Health Organization chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus called “deeply worrying.” Nevertheless, New Delhi did not comment on the issue, leading to questions even from former Indian diplomats.
“The trend of assassinating or kidnapping leaders of sovereign countries needs to be countered if we are to live in a civilized world and not a jungle. If countries do not come together to resist this trend, they may find themselves ‘on the menu,'” said a former ambassador familiar with international law, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Opposition parties have criticized the Narendra Modi government for its lack of comment and compared the silence to India’s historical positions against violations of territorial sovereignty and unilateral actions. However, New Delhi’s position also differs from recent events in Iran. In January 2020, when the US carried out a targeted strike on Iran’s top general Qassem Soleimani, India called the tension “alarming”.
“We have learned that the US has assassinated a senior Iranian leader,” the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said in a statement. “The rise in tensions has alarmed the world. Peace, stability and security in the region is of utmost importance to India. It is important that the situation does not escalate further,” the statement said. A few days later, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif traveled to Delhi to attend the Raisina Dialogue, and openly criticized US President Donald Trump for ordering the assassination.
In May 2024, India ordered a day of mourning over the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Amir Abdullahian in a helicopter crash and sent then Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar to attend the last rites. “He will always be remembered as friends of India who contributed greatly to the development of India-Iran relations. The Government of India stands in solidarity with the people of Iran in this difficult time,” EAM Jaishankar wrote in a condolence book at the Iranian Embassy.
Within hours of the US attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities on June 22, 2025, Prime Minister Modi called Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian and expressed “deep concern” over the escalation. After initial hesitation, India also signed the year-end SCO and BRICS statements condemning unilateral attacks by the US and Israel.
During the crisis, Iran made a special exception for India, opening its airspace only to allow planes carrying hundreds of Indian students back home safely.
What then explains the absence of any comment from India on the assassination of Iran’s leader, or the deadly attacks on schools and hospitals? The Foreign Ministry did not respond to requests for clarification on its statements. Officials pointed to a February 28 Foreign Ministry statement that said India was “deeply concerned over recent developments in Iran and the Gulf region”, urging all sides to avoid escalation, and that a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security chaired by Mr Modi discussed options for Indians caught up in the conflict in the region. On Tuesday (March 3, 2026), the Ministry of External Affairs issued a fresh statement expressing “serious concern” over the continued increase in India’s closeness.
When asked, experts said there were several factors behind India’s decision not to comment directly on the killings in Iran.
Former ambassador to Iran Rakesh Sood said, “First, the challenge of dealing with today’s complex geopolitics. Second, a limited relationship with Iran in recent decades despite the Chabahar port. And third, Khamenei’s criticism of India on Kashmir issues and treatment of minorities.” The Hindu.
These are the five key considerations for New Delhi:
1. Israel: India has had a close security relationship with Israel for decades, but this has improved rapidly over the past few years, as Mr Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel (in 2017), and then hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (in 2018). With Mr Modi’s visit to Jerusalem last week and his address in the Knesset, where he declared that India stands with Israel “firmly, with full confidence, at this moment and beyond”, New Delhi appears to be abandoning its traditional regional balance in favor of Israel. It is significant that after Israel’s initial attacks and Iran’s counter-attacks across the region, Mr Modi spoke to Mr Netanyahu and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders, but not to his Iranian counterpart. Mr Netanyahu, who praised the killing of Mr Khamenei, whom he called a “tyrant”, thanked Mr Modi for his support “for Israel and the Jewish people” during the conflict.
2. Iran-India Relations: India’s relations with Iran have simultaneously weakened, not so much because of ties with Israel, but because of the tightening of US sanctions on Iran. As a result, after reducing oil imports from Iran to zero in 2018, India-Iran trade is projected to decline from about $17 billion in 2018 to about $1.68 billion in 2025, and investment in Iranian oil and gas fields has stalled. In April, the US will expire its sanctions waiver for the Chabahar port, and by all indications, India will stop operating the Shahid Beheshti terminal it was developing at the time, unless the waiver is extended. According to reports, the Modi government has “brought forward” its commitment of $120 million to the port as a one-time payment in November 2025, and most of the personnel have pulled out. In the latest escalation, Israeli missiles targeted the Konark air base in Chabahar and may have also destroyed other infrastructure there.
3. Concern over Khamenei’s statements: India–Iran relations had weathered several political storms in earlier decades, when Khamenei was President of Iran from 1981–1989, and supreme leader after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1994, after India’s support, Iran decided not to join Pakistan and several Arab countries on a resolution on Kashmir in the UN Human Rights Council. However, more recently, New Delhi has drawn ire over his comments regarding internal developments in India, including his criticism of the Centre’s Kashmir policy in 2017 and again in 2019 after the Article 370 amendment, as well as his statement in March 2020 in which he referred to the Delhi riots as evidence of a “genocide of Muslims” in India.
4. India-Gulf Relations: India’s silence may also be explained by its desire not to spoil relations in the Gulf region, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, where Iran has targeted US bases, oil facilities and infrastructure. Notably, India’s ties with the UAE have been strengthened by the defense partnership announced during UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed’s two-hour visit to Delhi in January this year. Government officials told The Hindu It is not possible to take any step which would jeopardize the security of 10 million Indians living and working in the Gulf countries. In comparison, there are about 4,000-5,000 Indians in Iran, and about 20,000 Indians in Israel. With India cutting imports of Russian oil, imports from the Gulf have increased in the last few months, and much of India’s trade with GCC countries is also at stake.
5. India-US relations: The Modi government has started to restore ties with the Trump administration after the US announced a deal on tariff cuts and trade in February 2026. Additionally, the US has included India in its Pax Silica critical technology supply chain, and several US officials are now visiting India for the Raisina Dialogue this week. Given the volatile nature of the Trump administration and its threats of sanctions on any deal with Iran, New Delhi may prefer to play safe.
However, New Delhi faces some more difficult choices, as Mr Trump has indicated that the US campaign against Iran could continue for several weeks, and he is prepared to launch a “ground strike” or send US troops into Iran. Apart from travel, trade, connectivity and energy disruptions, India must also consider its position in the global South if it wants to side with the US-led coalition against Iran. Moreover, New Delhi is scheduled to host the BRICS summit this year, and the war and its outcome will have a lasting impact on the grouping that now includes Iran and the United Arab Emirates, now rivals in the conflict.
