A five-judge Constitution bench of the Supreme Court on Thursday ruled that the Governor and the President cannot be bound by judicially imposed deadlines for giving assent to the state law, opining on a presidential reference that any such attempt would violate the separation of powers and violate constitutional limits.
The judgment overrules the April 8 judgment by a two-judge bench in the Tamil Nadu case, where strict timelines were laid down for the Governor’s consent, besides introducing the concept of “deemed consent” in cases of excessive delay. The bench said the previous judgment had created a “situation of confusion and doubt”, which required the “authoritative opinion” of a larger bench.
Also, the bench clarified that while the discharge of functions under Articles 200 and 201 is “non-justiciable”, courts, where there is prolonged, deliberate inaction, can issue a limited direction requiring the Governor to use one of the three constitutionally prescribed options, without dictating which option to choose.
By setting aside the April 8 judgment and reaffirming the limits on judicial intervention, the Constitution Bench may have reiterated the principle of separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive, but it has left the federalism debate open, especially in a highly politicized environment where some states claim that governors act like agents of the central government.
Delivering its advisory opinion under Article 143, a bench comprising Chief Justice of India Bhushan R Gavai and Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, PS Narasimha and Atul S Chandurkar said the Constitution envisages a carefully balanced structure for processing state legislation, which does not permit courts to impose procedural timelines on constitutional authorities.
The court emphasized that Articles 200 and 201 provide a defined, literally vested discretion to the Governor and the President, and importing an externally designed time-bound mandate would not only distort this structure but effectively rewrite the Constitution. The words “as soon as possible” in the provision of Article 200, the bench clarified, apply only in the narrow context of returning the Bill for reconsideration, and cannot be expanded into a general timeline for all types of consents.
The bench further underlined that while the Governor generally acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, the Constitution also contemplates situations where the discretion should be exercised independently. Article 200, it held, is one such provision, particularly because the Governor’s decision may ultimately trigger the President’s consideration under Article 201. The court argued that reading Article 200 as binding the Governor solely on ministerial advice would eliminate the power of reservation in many situations and contradict the constitutional architecture, which has always envisioned the Governor as more than a ceremonial figurehead based on the British Crown. The court cautioned that the Governor’s discretion is not autocratic, but it cannot be limited to an entirely “impartial” role.
With this opinion that lays down the law for all courts in the country, the Supreme Court has restored clarity to a contentious constitutional debate at a time when disagreements between state governments and governors are often reaching the courts.
However, the judgment provides limited relief to states including West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Telangana and Karnataka that had complained about the Governor’s inaction. While the Constitution Bench declined to impose time limits or judicially monitor the substance of consent decisions, it acknowledged that bills cannot be allowed to be stalled indefinitely to defeat democratic governance. Where the will of the people expressed through the legislature is frustrated in the absence of a decision, the courts can intervene in a limited manner. But beyond preventing constitutional impasse, the court made clear, the judiciary has no role.
The decision responded to issues raised in a reference made by President Draupadi Murmu under Article 143 in May, seeking clarity on whether the Supreme Court can set a binding timeline for the consent of the Governor or the President. The context poses 14 important questions before the Court, including whether the silence in Articles 200 and 201 can be judicially filled by imposing procedural time limits; whether consent-related actions are reviewable; And whether Article 142 can override clear constitutional provisions. It also asks whether “deemed consent”, as ordered in April, is constitutionally sustainable.
Outlining that discretion, the Constitution Bench reiterated that a Governor, when a Bill is presented, has three constitutionally authorized options – to give assent, to withhold assent and return the Bill (unless it is a Money Bill), or to reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President. It said returning the bill with comments is part of a “constitutional dialogue” aimed at promoting discussion rather than confrontation. But while putting a stay on this interactive step of returning the Bill, the bench made it clear that the Governor “cannot simply withhold assent” without invoking this process.
Even after a bill is re-enacted after reconsideration by the legislature, the Governor still has two options – to give assent or to reserve it for the President. The bench said that the notion that reconsideration eliminates these options is contrary to the text and structure of Article 200.
While recounting the scope of judicial review, the bench drew a firm line. The courts cannot test the merits of a decision of the Governor or the President under Articles 200 and 201, nor can they examine the validity of bills before they become law. The power of judicial review extends only to cases where a Bill is kept in abeyance due to prolonged and deliberate inaction, in which case the court can direct the Governor to take action.
Even in those circumstances, the role of the Court is extremely limited. This may require the Governor to choose one among three constitutional options, but he cannot direct as to who should be chosen. This preserves the minimum judicial scrutiny required to prevent constitutional paralysis without interfering with the constitutional design of the discretion, the bench said.
The Constitution Bench paid significant attention to explaining why the April 8 decision could not stand. That judgment, which set a one-month deadline for governors to act on re-enacted bills and created a three-month deadline for bills reserved for the President, was found to be inconsistent with earlier Constitution bench rulings as well as the constitutional text.
By introducing “deemed consent” in cases where its deadlines were not met, the April bench had effectively usurped the constitutional role of the Governor and the President and entered into the domain exclusively reserved for the executive, it noted. The Constitution Bench held that such judicial action violated the basic feature of separation of powers and risked destabilizing the federal balance. It thus declared that the President’s decision to invoke Article 143 was justified because several key findings in the April decision conflicted with established precedent and created uncertainty in the legislative process.
Analyzing the larger constitutional scheme, the bench said that Articles 168 (constitution of legislature in the State), 200 and 201 together reflect a dialogic model of federal functioning, which envisages deliberations between the Governor, the President and the legislature, rather than a mechanical process of support or veto.
According to the Court, returning a Bill with comments and reserving it for the consideration of the President are integral features of this design, intended to ensure that due attention is given to questions of constitutional validity, federal implications or inter-State effects. The court said that imposing judicial deadlines disregards this deliberate planning and risks reducing complex constitutional tasks to an inflexible administrative timetable.
It stressed that while judicial review remains a cornerstone of the constitutional order, courts must respect the domain-specific limits set by the Constitution. Discretionary powers under Articles 200 and 201 fall within the protected domain of high constitutional offices, which are free from judicial direction except in cases of deliberate inaction. Even in such cases, courts cannot step into the shoes of these officials by setting time limits, substituting their decisions, or creating legal fictions such as deemed consent. The bench cautioned that Article 142 is not a license to rewrite constitutional provisions.
Of the 14 questions in the reference, the bench refused to answer three questions, holding that they were outside the “functional” scope of examining the constitutional roles of the Governors and the President.
It declined to answer a question which related to Article 145(3) and the composition of benches in the Supreme Court, noting that determining whether a case raises an important constitutional question and deciding the number of benches to hear it falls exclusively within the judicial domain and administrative prerogative of the Chief Justice of India.
The bench similarly refused to answer another question on whether it could adjudicate Centre-State disputes outside Article 131 (fundamental litigation), terming it irrelevant to the functional focus of the reference. It also left another question unanswered, noting that the question over the powers of the court under Article 142 was framed so broadly that it could not be addressed in any comprehensive or definite manner within the scope of advisory jurisdiction.
