Pre-biden official questions in US arbitration and Message in Indo-Pak struggle. Latest News India

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Pre-biden official questions in US arbitration and Message in Indo-Pak struggle. Latest News India


Amidst a controversy over the role of the Trump administration in the brokerage of an India-Pakistan ceasefire, HT ORF sat for an interview with the US senior partner Lindsay Ford. Ford – who had previously served as one of the top officials of the President Joe Biden in South Asia – talked about the need for the Trump administration to provide more clarity to partners like India in the US foreign policy. Ford also talked about the role of America in India-Pakistan crisis and future management of Indo-American relations.

Lindsay W. Ford. (AI)

Can you tell us a little about how you have seen the recent crisis between India and Pakistan? Was it unprecedented?

Some things were standing for me in this most recent crisis. There was a geographical scope of cross -border attacks on both sides which were very deep in Pakistan and India, as much as we saw in previous attacks. This certainly increases the risk of broader conflict or growth. And the second, the comment on which has been commented is the new techniques in this crisis. The use of unmanned systems can certainly reduce the risk of immediate loss of life for military personnel, I think it also increases the risks of greater increase, as life capacity can be reduced and because you can check that sometimes it can also increase the risk. So I think I am looking closely, just we look at the use of unmanned systems in Loc (Line of Control) and what it means for stability in both India and Pakistan.

The Trump administration has spoken a lot about the exact role of the exact role of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan. Can you give us your understanding of how important the United States has played?

I am not going to talk to Trump Administration or Government of India. But in general, in diplomacy, and especially when you are a friend, I think it not only matters what you say, it matters how and when you say it. And I think there were some unfortunate examples in this crisis in terms of American message. So certainly the comments at the beginning of the crisis of the Vice President Vance that are essentially, I hope they work, it is none of our business, it is not that the United States has generally handled these issues.

And the reason for this is clear. There was a huge traditional conflict, even a nuclear conflict in South Asia, for the United States, matters to citizens who are on the ground with us and it clearly matters to the rest of the region. And so when I don’t think the American role is to mediate, I think the United States, as a friend, is interested in interacting with India, and also what we can get to Islamabad to take a phone.

Now, at the end of it, which is particularly important, again, it matters when you say things. And I do not think it is an American place, essentially, after such a crisis, spike football, as we like to say in the United States, and put ourselves to the center of the story. Because this is a story between India and Pakistan. And I think it depends on India what they want to say about how the crisis was resolved.

We have seen a growing political controversy about the role we have played by the Trump administration, including the declaration of ceasefire before the Indian and Pakistani governments. Opposition parties have also raised the issue. Do you see it as a thing that damages the trust between India and the United States?

I think it certainly does not help bilateral relations, as the United States has made a lot of efforts in the last several years, especially when we look at our defense and safety relations, to create confidence in many fronts, whether it is signing the founding agreements, or some defense sales that are going on. And so something like this, where it probably means that the United States is not ready to understand when it is a friend when India wants to lead. It is being said, we have a big and long -running relationship, and I believe that we can move forward through this moment.

There is a legend that is making the Trump administration in India. We saw a lot of controversy on the exile of illegal Indian migrants from America about the role of Trump administration in the mediation of ceasefire between the US and Pakistan. Many people are asking if it is actually a administration that can partner with India. Can you address those concerns?

I think one of the things that makes the US-India relationship unique and amazing, but also complicated to manage incredibly, is just the width of issues we work with each other.

And it produces more ability on day-to-day basis for things that may feel disappointed. And I think that certainly in the first few months of the Trump administration, it has been a more uncertain approach to foreign policy as a whole. There is no doubt about it. And it has created bumps and hiccups in the US-India relationship. I think if the administration can be more regulated about their message, and is more consistent in their approach, then there is still an opportunity on issues such as trade and foreign policy for the United States and India over the next few years. But again, I think the main issue here is discipline, on both policy making and messages. This is something that President Trump has not always done well. I hope that they can turn on the corner on it in the coming months.

There is a question of re -hyphene to America and Pakistan after the latest crisis between the two countries. Does Washington now intend to treat India and Pakistan?

We saw President Trump about the idea of ​​mediation about Kashmir in his first term. And then the people around him explained why it was not a wise idea. And he went away from that idea. I think you will see again. My response to this is that it is more of shooting from hip, as it necessarily reflects a well thought out change in the US foreign policy. The reality is that the number one issue of the United States Government is still focused on our foreign policy on how to treat China. And in this sense, I think there are lots of common interests in the United States and India and a lot to work together. And because of this, it is difficult for me to imagine back shifting like a hypled approach that we have used in the past in South Asia.

After Operation Sindoor, you have argued for close defense cooperation between India and the US. What did you have especially?

I think there are many questions from the defense perspective for both the United States and India. One, more and more use of both manned aircraft, but with unmanned systems -what India’s military principle looks and how it may need to be developed, raises real questions about how it may need to be developed. You know, a struggle against Pakistan is one thing, but whether for the United States, for India, with Beijing, it will be far more complicated. And so, the real conversation is about how we can be about the way to fight the 21st century battle on both sides, this means what you need for your soldiers for training, and how can America and India work together on that training. I also think, quite clearly, of course there has been a debate within India about modernization of the Air Force. While I am not going to tell the Indian Air Force where they need to go, how do you create a collaborative system among fifth-jewelery technologies, sixth-jewelery fighters as well as unmanned systems and advanced stealth technologies. This is something that I think may have a lot of conversation in the United States and India.

You mentioned that China is actually a pessing challenge for India and America in India and America. But then, there are some concerns in India that we have not really been able to see what is going to happen to Washington’s policy with this administration on China. Can you shed some light on it?

I think the reality, message is coming back to its point again on discipline, have we seen some mixed signals from the Trump administration. Of course, it is still the early day. I think first in Trump Term, it took him some time to see what his China strategy was visible. At least, the interim defense strategy of the Trump administration has been reported in the press that it is very squarely focused on how to compete in a military. I think we are likely to look at some new export controls that will affect that can be technically exported and shared with Beijing. All this is very consistent where the Trump administration was in its first term. But then, the talk on business has been a bit misleading. I think many of us are waiting to see if they come back to the place that looks like Trump’s first administration, which I think we would be similar to where we were in Biden administration, or if they go in a different direction.

I was wondering if you could help us tell us what Donald Trump said to Tim Cook, apple CEO in Qatar, where he originally asked Apple not to expand so much in India.

For the Biden administration, in search of opportunities to increase domestic manufacturing, and in some cases the foreign home which was back, was exactly something that we were focused on. But you also have to be realistic about the economics of all this. And it does not really work for all the components and all technologies we are talking about.

And iPhone is a great example of this, because if iPhones were built in the United States, they have to spend so much money that anyone will buy them. And so I think in Biden administration, that’s why we really tried to think about both of them. It was about increasing domestic manufacturing and where we cannot understand and where it does not understand to make it in the United States, we want people to make it in equal ideology countries and not in China. And so, for us, the increase of iPhone in manufacturing in India is directly taking away from a large amount of manufacturing in Beijing. And strategically, it created a good understanding. And it was not a zero-zero environment which meant that it was urgent the United States deprived of the US.

Q. My last question. Under the Biden administration, in India it was understood where it stood in Washington when it came about big questions like China, trade and technology. With the Trump administration, it seems less clear. Your view?

In Biden administration, we were not only incredibly clear about our Indo-Pacific strategy, but the role India played within that strategy. We made it very clear that we thought it was a partnership that we wanted to do Indo-Pacific and globally. We thought that for the United States and India, it was going to be one of the most important partnership for both of us over the next 50 years, and matched to correct it.

So we spent so much time to invest in this partnership. Sometimes it meant that we disagree on things, but we could talk about it as friends. But not more often, we saw a lot of opportunities to make this partnership in the future. I think there is unfortunate, to be honest, where we are, and clearly, there is much of what we are talking about in this conversation, it is that the Trump administration was actually stronger from the gate when India came into the relationship. PM Modi came to America very quickly, you held a quad meeting on the first day of administration, and right with the bat, he started working on a business agreement. They are all very positive things. I think what reflects it is just beyond the President or Executive Branch. This shows the support that this partnership is still among the Congress and among the American people. I think this is still true. I think this administration is going to do much better about articulating this administration clearly, so our companions don’t wonder where they are standing.


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