To become a developed nation by 2047, simultaneous elections are necessary: ​​Chaudhary

The JPC on holding simultaneous elections has met 16 times, consulting a wide range of witnesses, including six former Chief Justices of India. You have made your support for the law very clear. Why do you believe India needs to synchronize its election cycle?

This reform is necessary from the economic point of view to prevent wastage of manpower and avoid disruption in investment. ‘One Nation, One Election’ is important for ‘Developed India’. For example, in Uttarakhand, tourism accounts for 43% of the state’s revenue and operates effectively for only four months. Elections in April–May severely disrupt the economy during this period. Nationwide, separate voter lists for Panchayat, Municipal, Assembly and Lok Sabha elections should be prepared again and again, mainly by government school teachers. Their frequent deployment for training and election duties disrupts teaching, causing harm to students, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds. A paper presented to the Ramnath Kovind Committee (8-member high-level panel on simultaneous elections) by (former Finance Commissioner) NK Singh and Prachi Mishra (economics professor) estimated that frequent elections would result in a recurring loss of 1.6% of GDP, about ₹7 lakh crore, a cost that could otherwise fund housing, infrastructure and development. (Former IMF Chief Economist) Gita Gopinath has also acknowledged the economic impact. Elections cause delays in investment, including FDI, as investors wait for political clarity at both the state and central levels. Without at least four and a half years of stable governance, meaningful results cannot be delivered. If India aspires to become a developed nation by 2047, electoral reforms are essential. To calculate the loss more accurately, the panel has asked chief secretaries of all states and union territories to study the impact of repeated elections.

There are two main criticisms of this law. First of all, it violates the basic structure of the Indian Constitution. Secondly, it is against the federal structure of the Constitution. After all, elections are the only way to hold the government accountable. What are your thoughts?

I have a question for those critics. From 1951 to 1967, simultaneous elections were held for the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assemblies of all the states. Were those elections against the basic structure of the Constitution? Was he against federalism? Even the Congress had attempted to hold simultaneous elections by dissolving seven state assemblies around 1968. Even today, elections are held simultaneously in many states. Are democracy, federalism and fundamental rights not completely safe in those states? This law is essentially about fixing the date of elections in such a way that they are held simultaneously. It does not attempt to change the federal structure or the basic structure of the Constitution. The only caveat, with which we also agree, was that the formulation of the Bill may require some changes in the drafting. That is why Parliament sent a JPC to examine the bill and make changes in its formulation.

How will national elections and state elections be coordinated?

The two main objectives of the Bill are to conduct all elections simultaneously and to ensure that coordination is maintained even after that. Under the proposed framework, if the Bill is enacted in 2028 and general elections are held in 2029, the date of the first meeting of the new Parliament, say May 30, 2029, becomes the permanent “appointed date”. By 2034, all state legislatures will align their election cycles so that elections end by this fixed date.

To achieve synchronization, some assemblies may require smaller initialization words. This is constitutionally defensible: if a no-confidence motion could legitimately topple the government within a year, resulting in a reduced tenure, Parliament could similarly legislate a one-time adjustment in the public interest.

Maintaining coordination will then need to address scenarios where governments collapse in the medium term. The panel is examining the ‘remaining tenure’ principle, which is already used in Panchayati Raj institutions, where no-confidence motions are restricted to a fixed period and any subsequent fresh elections are only for the remaining tenure. Applying the same principles to state legislatures and Parliament could prevent political instability as representatives would risk returning to office for only two or three years.

The panel is also exploring options for rare cases of legislative deadlock such as enabling the national government or electing the Prime Minister or Chief Minister on the floor of the House for the remaining term. Another question under consideration is whether the no-confidence motion should be put on hold during the last year of the five-year cycle as it is impractical to hold elections for a one-year period. We are actively considering introducing a provision that would prohibit bringing a no-confidence motion when there is only one year left in the tenure of the current government. These are ultimately political decisions, although legally practical ones.

The bill is currently silent on these provisions, and the committee will consult political parties before recommending any changes.

This law provides excessive powers to the Election Commission, which many members of your panel have expressed concern about.

This is an important point. Section 82A(5) of the new bill states that “If the Election Commission is of opinion that elections to any Legislative Assembly cannot be held simultaneously with a general election to the House of the People, it may recommend to the President by an order declaring that elections to that Legislative Assembly may be held at a later date”. The term used is “opinion”, which some members believe cannot necessarily be based on objective criteria unless safeguards are in place. Some experts have suggested that such opinions should be guided by clear, objective standards and considerations rather than being entirely discretionary. And, there must be a reason for it to be recorded and open to judicial review. We have to think about this. Even some former Chief Justices have expressed their apprehensions. We may decide to recommend removing this provision or amending it to implement safeguards. But it is the job of the committee to take a unanimous decision on this. Prima facie I also believe that this apprehension is correct. However, another counter-view expressed by some members is that this power should be vested in some body. After all, the Election Commission is a constitutional institution, there is no reason to distrust it.

G Sampath: When you are saying that no-confidence motion will be discouraged in this system, especially in state assemblies, especially when there is a year or two left in the date of the next election cycle. In this sense, are you not bringing in the presidential system of government through the back door?

Let us look at the Panchayats. We have been seeing this system working successfully for the last 25 to 30 years. Its validity was challenged in the Supreme Court on the grounds that restricting no-confidence motions to a fixed period is undemocratic. The argument was that if a no-confidence motion is brought and the term remains for two years, then stopping fresh elections for that period is anti-democratic. But the Supreme Court held that restricting no-confidence motions to a fixed period is not undemocratic because otherwise there would be repeated elections for shorter periods. Therefore, we must strike a good balance between democratic principles and public interest. The public elects the government for five years. Yes, no-confidence motions are part of democratic principles. But at the same time we should also consider public interest and administrative stability. There must be a balance between the needs of the democratic system and governance. There are certain deficiencies in the scheme and objective of the present Bill. Under Sections 14 and 15 of the Representation of the People Act, the Election Commission has the power to initiate elections up to six months before the end of the term. But the Bill is silent on what happens if the government falls – how soon should elections be held? That gap needs to be examined by the committee.

We can consider the provisions. For example, what should happen if three years of a term are completed and then a no-confidence motion is brought? If only one year is left, should elections be held for one year only? Also, no public representative would want to take the risk of going to elections just for one year. This may very well act as a deterrent. If representatives know that they may have to face elections within a very short time after the government is toppled, they may think twice. At the same time, if a government cannot function if bills are not being passed and governance is paralyzed, Parliament must decide how to ensure majority support. There is a discussion going on whether in such a situation the CM or PM can be elected on the floor of the House. I am not saying this will happen, but these issues are being debated. Our job is to deliberate with all political parties and stakeholders and then make recommendations.

Varghese K. George: Ultimately, this legislation is advancing a political argument. Your party’s position on this has completely changed in the last 50 years. During the JP movement (1974–1977), the idea was that if the public was dissatisfied, the majority government should also be held accountable and prepared to step down. Now you are advocating something else.

The executive is answerable to the Parliament and the Parliament is answerable to the people. This accountability does not end with elections alone. If the public is against a government, then that government can be forcibly removed on moral grounds. In such cases the ‘remaining term’ principle will apply. However, this is an extraordinary scenario. And exceptions cannot be the rule. We have to strike a good balance between democratic principles and national interest.

Sandeep Phukan: To amend the Constitution you need a two-thirds majority. Can the government succeed in pushing this bill with its current strength in Parliament?

This is an issue of national interest. For this, political ideologies will have to be kept separate. This is not a reform that the BJP alone is pushing for. I have many friends in the Congress and other regional parties who also believe that this bill should be brought as soon as possible.

Vijeta Singh: Have you figured out the logistics like the number of EVMs required to hold the elections simultaneously, or will it be conducted in phases? Will votes be cast on the same day to elect the Chief Ministers and Prime Minister of all states and Union Territories?

‘One country, one election’ does not mean that elections will be held in a single day. This is not possible. It will be conducted in phases. The only important detail related to the law is that elections must be held before the “appointed date”. It is the job of the Election Commission to look after the law and order situation, logistics like police personnel, EVM machines. For the panel, these are not issues that deserve attention. I don’t think it should be a challenge to buy two EVMs, one for national elections and one for state elections. When our government came to power in 2014, the budget was Rs 18 lakh crore and today the recently passed budget is Rs 55 lakh crore. Buying EVMs worth ₹10,000 or ₹15,000 crore should not be an issue.