Lisa Curtis served in Donald Trump’s first administration as the senior director for South and Central Asia in the National Security Council between 2017 and 2021. In that capacity in the White House, Curtis played a central role in the first Trump administration’s approach towards India, participated in meetings between the top leaders, shaped US policy during crises from Balakot to Galwan, deepened US-India defence ties, played a key role in reviving Quad, and was among the most valued interlocutors for Indian officials.
Now the head of the Indo-Pacific Security Programme at the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS), a DC think-tank, Curtis has also served in the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the US embassies in Pakistan and India and worked in the Heritage Foundation. With her three-decade-long stint in almost all key US government departments and agencies, she is a respected Republican national security voice on the region.
In a conversation with HT in her office next to the White House, Curtis spoke about the second Trump administration’s China posture, trade, and foreign assistance policies, her sense of how the relationship with India may evolve, the specifics of defence, trade and immigration issues and Trump’s possible approach to Pakistan and Bangladesh:
Let us begin with a few big picture questions from the administration’s China posture. On one hand, the national security appointees are China hawks and there have been tariffs imposed on China. But, on the other hand, Trump has spoken to Xi Jinping and claimed they can keep the world safe together, he has gone against the US Congress and Supreme Court on TikTok, and there are key State Department appointees who have said Taiwan doesn’t matter. What do you make of it?
I think we will see a very nuanced policy toward China. Trump’s instinct is to reach out, to try to build on the personal relationship that he made with Xi during his first term, and to try to make a deal with China. It’s clear that Trump himself is focused on trying to get a good deal from China that serves the American people — a trade deal.
But you also have hawks in the administration like Secretary (Marco) Rubio, like National Security Advisor (Michael) Waltz, who have put forth legislation and policy ideas that very much take the China threat seriously, that want to position US foreign policy so that the US is competing effectively with China. These two leaders in the Trump administration will support more export controls on China, restricting certain US investments in China, and building up US defence capabilities to meet potential threats from China, which is something that frankly Trump supports as well as part of his “peace through strength” ideology.
But you will see a tussle between those leaders in the Trump administration that support a very tough policy toward China and see China as a serious competitor to the US, and even a threat at some level, versus the economic team, leaders like Secretary (of the Treasury) Scott Bessent and others, who are going to focus on the economic relationship. And, let’s face it, the US-China economic relationship is still very important. These people will be listening to US companies that invest in China, and they will want to see the economic relationship stabilised and secure. So you will have two different camps coming at the US-China relationship from very different angles and how that ends up playing out, we will have to see.
But I do want to remind you that we had similar dynamics in the first Trump term. In the first few years of the Trump administration, there were a lot of visits and discussions between Trump and Xi. You even had the completion of the first phase trade deal in January 2020. It was only after Covid kicked in a little bit later in 2020 that we really saw the US-China relationship deteriorate in significant ways. We must remember that in the first couple of years of the Trump one administration, there were generally cordial relations between the US and China, and I think a lot of people forget that.
We are seeing that now, with Trump reaching out to Xi and inviting him to his inauguration and indicating that he wants to visit China. I think all signals are that Trump himself wants to try to build that relationship with China and have a more peaceful trade-focused relationship with China.
Beyond the bilateral frame, are you concerned about the implications of the US withdrawal from WHO, the Paris Climate Agreement, the suspension of foreign assistance, and now the de facto shutting down of USAID as leaving the space open for China in various domains?
Absolutely. I think we are seeing one contradiction within the Trump administration. On the one hand, Trump recognises that the US is a global leader. He wants to keep the US as a global leader and be in a position to determine what happens on the global stage. He wants the US to have a great deal of influence. However, all the things that you just named — pulling out of WHO, shutting down US assistance — go against this goal of maintaining US global leadership.
Right now, US foreign assistance is under review. A review makes sense, but one didn’t have to suspend and issue stop work orders on all US assistance while reviewing it. The problem now is a lot of these programmes will not survive. If you pause a foreign assistance programme for 90 days, the contractors, the people carrying out the assistance, will not be able to survive. So, you are killing the US assistance programmes and that is only going to pave the way for China to increase its economic, technological, and technical influence throughout the globe. So, in a way, this is a gift to China. China will take advantage of this situation and unfortunately, the suspension of US assistance has only helped China achieve what it wants to do, which is to be the major influencer on global affairs.
Foreign aid is a tool of foreign policy, and we are throwing away that very important tool. Foreign aid is soft power. Soft power is very important in influencing global relationships. It’s not just about military power. Military power is important, and Trump understands that and that’s why he wants to invest in the US military. But what he should also understand is that soft power is very important and a lot less expensive. The US spends about $70 billion, less than 1% of its total budget, on foreign assistance, whereas our military budget is over $800 billion. Hopefully, the people who are focused on US national security and foreign policy will understand that foreign aid is one of the most important foreign policy tools that we have and reinstate these important programs.
Would you extend the same logic to climate? The US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and Trump’s energy policies leaves space open for China to continue to dominate the green tech space in the global south as well; isn’t it?
The climate question is a bit different. The US did pull out of the Paris Accords during the first Trump administration, but some of the programming on climate issues continued, including on infrastructure. This issue is a niche or unique part of US foreign assistance and it doesn’t necessarily impact the overall influence of the US. Everybody was clear that the Trump administration was not going to be committed to the same climate agenda that the Biden administration was. Everybody was aware that Trump wanted to be able to drill freely in the US for oil and gas, and we will see oil and gas exports increase from the US. This is an energy independence issue as well. The US, in the past, has been overly dependent on other countries for its energy needs. So I think what Trump is trying to do is make sure that the US can be energy independent and, be an energy exporter, and I think that’s a good thing for America.
This has been paused for a month now. But if Canada, America’s closest ally with which it shares a military command, isn’t spared of American economic wrath as we saw last weekend, what levels of trust should the world have in the US as a dependable trade partner and what does it mean for the international economic architecture?
It doesn’t make much sense to threaten Canada — a stalwart ally of the United States — with high tariffs that could send its economy into recession. It is a bit inexplicable why the US would want to get into a trade war with one of its best allies. Canada has fought with the US in almost every war. We have been able to support each other. They share our interests and democratic values, and they are not responsible for the fentanyl and illegal immigration problem in the US. From what I understand, less than 1% of the fentanyl coming into the US comes from Canada. I also understand that Canada has invested over $1 billion in strengthening the border to prevent illegal immigration. So, the US must put its resources into preventing illegal immigration as well. This cannot be put only on the Canadian government. Let’s hope that wisdom prevails, and our two countries do not enter into a trade war. Perhaps we do need to get a better deal with Canada when it comes to trade, but slapping 25% tariffs across the board, except on energy, doesn’t make sense.
You worked in President Trump’s NSC in the first term on India. Could you give us a sense of how he thinks about India and a flavour of what it was like to work on the relationship in those years?
I am very proud of what the first Trump administration did for the US-India relationship. Trump was responsible for elevating that bilateral relationship to a degree that it had never been before. He removed a lot of technology controls, enabling India to import more when it came to defence technologies. Trump supported India during the India-China border crisis in 2020. He made a trip to India in February 2020, which was extremely successful. He addressed a crowd of 100,000 Indians at the stadium in Ahmedabad. So, I think by the time Trump left office in early 2021, it was clear that he had invested a great deal in the US-India relationship, and it had paid off. He left that relationship in very good shape. I expect that he will pick up where he left off.
And in fact, I think we are already seeing that. The fact that Prime Minister (Narendra) Modi is visiting the White House this month is extraordinary, just one month into the new US administration. This shows how important India is to the Trump administration. I think the two leaders will build on the relationship, whether it be on technology cooperation, or defence and security ties. I am sure they will discuss all of the global hotspots — Russia, Ukraine, the Middle East, and China. China will be a big topic of the discussion, I am sure. We can expect positive things from the US-India relationship.
Now, of course, there will be some friction when it comes to the trade issue. Trump has made no secret about his view that India has one of the highest tariff rates in the world, and he would like to see those come down. He wants access to American goods. But there have also been some signs that the Indian government may be willing to reduce some tariffs now that they weren’t willing to in previous years. So, we may see some more access to US agricultural goods and other items. India has already signaled it will reduce tariffs on Harley-Davidson motorcycles, for example. India is playing its cards very smartly. Modi understands who Trump is and how to manage the relationship, and I think that will pay off for India.
Let me just break down a few things that you mentioned there. The first is defence. In the readout of the call that the president had with the Prime Minister, it was quite clearly mentioned that Trump wants India to buy more made-in-America security equipment. India has increasingly focused on domestic production. Do you see a contradiction here between the need for India to acquire more US equipment and India’s desire for co-production and co-development initiatives at home? Or can there be a meeting ground on this?
I think there is some tension between India’s make-in-India drive and Trump’s America First ideology. And that will come out when it comes to defence trade.
I will point out that during the first Trump administration, the President cleared the way for India to be able to receive armed drone technology. This facilitated the General Atomics deal for the MQ9B predator drones. However, it took nearly seven years for that deal to be completed. I don’t think that kind of timeline is what Trump is looking for. He is looking for a much more efficient and faster timeline for defence deals. This might be a challenge for India.
There are items that India would like to import from the US, whether it’s the P8s or more C-130s. I think there is interest in India on some of these major defence platforms, but whether India can take decisive action and cut through some of the red tape of its bureaucracy to ensure that these deals are completed in a timely fashion is the question. But it’s clear that this is something that Trump is looking for. He wants to see India buy more American made equipment. Yes, we can talk about some co-production— the jet engine technology agreement, for example. I’m sure that the Trump administration will push forward on that deal, but Trump will also expect that India will purchase American-made equipment as well.
This then goes into the wider question of onshoring versus friendshoring. If Trump’s focus is going to be onshoring, what happens to the broader idea of supply chain diversification? We did see the previous administration encourage US industry to go to India. Do you see that continuing or do you see a more inward turn in US affecting this economic trajectory of the relationship as well?
I think the drive to diversify supply chains will continue, and I think it will involve India. We have already seen this start to happen on technology, including in the semiconductor industry, with the Micron investment into India. And I expect that the Trump administration will want to continue those kinds of efforts. The US wants to see India as more of a manufacturing hub. But again, it comes back to India. Is India willing to take those steps to open up its manufacturing industry and put into place the reforms that are necessary to start seeing that happen? You won’t find the Trump administration lacking in its support for India becoming an alternative supplier.
Do you see the initiative on critical and emerging technologies (iCET) surviving? Or, to put it differently, which elements of it do you think will survive or be the areas of focus?
I think iCET will largely survive. It may be under a different terminology or a different brand, but I think the idea of the US and India mutually benefiting by more technology cooperation is very strong. If you look at some of the personnel going into the key technology positions in the Trump administration, these are people that have been very supportive of strong US-India technology cooperation. And they are also people that understand the threat from China dominating in some of these emerging and critical technologies. There will be a strong impetus to work closely with India when it comes to technology, when it comes to the technology race with China.
One of the issues that has come up in this term more acutely than it existed during your time in the White House is immigration, sparked by the spike in illegal Indian immigrants. India has already said it will take back those who had come illegally after they are identified as Indians. Do you see this as a manageable issue or do you see this as escalating into a potential political storm because of sensitivities on both sides?
Both countries need to take care and ensure that the immigration issue is managed in a very delicate way. If you go back to the first Trump administration, there were illegal Indians that were deported back to India and it was handled very quietly, very carefully. It did not cause any major disruptions in the overall bilateral relationship. But you are right to say there are more illegal Indians now in the US that came in during the Biden administration, and this issue will need to be addressed. India has signaled that it wants to cooperate with the Trump administration. And Trump himself has said he thinks India is willing to cooperate. So that’s a good initial sign about the way the issue will be handled.
The other major issue is the H-1B visa issue. And what’s interesting is we see differences within the Trump world on what should happen with H-1B visas. You have, on the hand, the technology leaders who very much support the H-1B visa programme and say it’s important to have Indian talent come into the US and contribute to business. You have another camp, the more populist camp, that is saying, these H-1B visas take away jobs from Americans. And this hasn’t completely been resolved as of yet. Trump is coming down on the side of the technology companies, acknowledging that the H-1B visas are used in a positive way for the American economy and he seems to be relatively supportive of continuing the program. These are issues that are going to come up.
But I believe that the overall strategic partnership is important for both countries in order to counter a rising China. The US wants to see India play its rightful role as a counter to China’s power and influence in the region. And because of that, India and the US will be able to manage these other issues, such as immigration and trade, in a way that doesn’t upend the overall strategic relationship.
Let me just ask you to wear your wider South Asia policy hat. On Pakistan, we have seen the president’s special envoy Ric Grenell take a public position in favour of Imran Khan. That’s a position that would not be music to the Pakistani army’s ears. Do you see the administration weighing in and pressuring the Pakistani army to open up the Pakistani political space?
I have seen the tweets by Ric Grenell to free Imran Khan, but I also know that Trump is not the type of leader to wants to get too involved in the internal politics of another country. I think the way this plays out is that there will be a more strategic view of the overall US-Pakistan relationship. Maybe there will be a review on how the US should move forward with Pakistan. We are in a different stage of the US-Pakistan relationship than we were four years ago when Trump was last in power. During that time, the US still had troops in Afghanistan. It was still pressing Pakistan to stop its support for the Taliban and Haqqani network. And of course, Trump cut off military aid to Pakistan because of Pakistan’s support to the Taliban. Trump also had a meeting with Imran Khan in 2019 and liked him and felt they had a good relationship. But I think his instinct to not get involved in another country’s political dynamics may restrain him from basing US policy toward Pakistan on this one issue. The detention of Imran Khan may be a part of the discussions between the two countries, but I don’t think it’s going to be the central policy of the Trump administration.
In the final months of the Biden administration, the differences between India and the US on Bangladesh became quite obvious, with segments in Delhi blaming DC for Sheikh Hasina’s ouster. Irrespective of whether that was accurate or not, the situation in Bangladesh remains unstable and India seems to have some expectations from US, based on its assessment of US influence there. Do you see the US and India cooperating and in what ways on Bangladesh?
I was very disappointed to see the Indian media blaming of the US for Hasina’s departure from Bangladesh because anyone who was really watching the situation saw how unpopular she had become. And we now have seen the reports about how corrupt her government was, how she was running secret prisons against the political opposition, giving no space at all to the political opposition, and severely damaging the country’s democratic institutions.
My hope is that India and the US can move forward in a way where they are working more closely together and can agree on the future of Bangladesh. We need a stable, prosperous Bangladesh. We certainly don’t want extremist elements that we have seen in Bangladesh in the past. We all remember the Holy Bakery attack. We remember the murders of liberal bloggers by extremists. Neither India nor the US want to see these elements come to the fore in Bangladesh.
My hope is that our two countries could work together to ensure a stable transition, a democratic transition, in Bangladesh that limits the influence of these extremist elements and allows Bangladesh to continue to be a tolerant country where women are active in the sociopolitical activity of the country. So I think there is a strong basis for India and the US to work on similar goals together.
You were in the room when Trump and Modi met several times in the first term. Could you give us a flavour of what it was like in the room between the two leaders?
Well, I think you could sense a real respect between the two gentlemen. They both understood that they were leaders of large important countries, and they respected each other’s leadership style, and they got along quite well. Their personalities gelled, which seems unusual because they are from very different backgrounds and different cultures. But their leadership styles were similar. And this allowed them to connect on a very personal level.
And the conversations were quite open?
Yes, the conversations were open. They were candid. They were not always smooth. But, for the most part, they were friendly and respectful. And I think they talked about a host of global issues, whatever was happening at the given time. They had very productive meetings and one got the sense they both enjoyed each other’s company.
