The Supreme Court’s refusal to grant bail to student activists Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the 2020 Delhi riots conspiracy case is based on a key judicial finding that the prosecution material, taken at face value, places the two at a “qualitatively different level” from other accused, attributing them to a “central”, “constructive” and “strategic” role in the alleged conspiracy rather than local or episodic involvement.
In a detailed 142-page judgment, the bench of Justices Arvind Kumar and NV Anjaria drew a principled line between ideological organizing and grassroots execution, saying bail under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) should include role differentiation, hierarchy of participation and statutory limits, and not just on equality or length of imprisonment.
central vs supporting roles
At the core of the judgment is the court’s acceptance of the prosecution’s structured story of conspiracy to decide bail under UAPA. According to the bench, the FIR and successive charge sheets consistently portray Khalid and Imam as the ideological drivers and coordinators of the alleged conspiracy, who were working at the level of planning, mobilization and strategic direction since December 2019, soon after the passage of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA).
In contrast, the remaining accused were described as local level facilitators, whose alleged role was limited to specific protest sites like Seelampur, Jaffrabad, Chand Bagh, Jamia and Shaheen Bagh, involving logistical arrangements, crowd mobilization and execution of instructions received from above.
The court emphasized that this discrimination is not accidental, but embedded in the structure of the prosecution’s own case, which reveals what it called a vertical chain of command, with decisions flowing downwards and implementation through intermediaries such as protest coordinators and site organizers.
Refusing to grant bail to Imam, the court said, “The prosecution material, taken at face value, does not portray the appellant as an incidental or peripheral participant. It depicts him as a coordinator and mobilizer in the beginning and at the first stage… The court accordingly finds that the prosecution material, read cumulatively and taken at face value, discloses reasonable grounds for believing that the allegations against the appellant are in the first The visions are true.”
Similarly, for Khalid, the court said, “The role assigned to Umar Khalid is neither that of a late entrant nor that of a peripheral sympathizer. It is that of an organizer and coordinator who, according to the prosecution, supplied the ‘method’, ‘timing’ and ‘linkages’ between scattered sites and actors.”
Planning, not attendance, is important
Another major reason for denying bail was the court’s rejection of the argument that absence from riot sites or lack of direct involvement in violence is determinative in a conspiracy prosecution. Neither Khalid nor Imam are accused of arson or assault. But the court held that this does not weaken the case of the prosecution at the bail stage, as the alleged role assigned to them is fundamental rather than operational.
The court said, “In a staged conspiracy, physical presence at the scene of violence is not a prerequisite for criminal liability.” What matters is whether the accused is prima facie connected with the design, preparation and organization which allegedly resulted in the violence.
The bench said, “The law does not require the prosecution at the bail stage to demonstrate that the accused personally caused the death or destruction, or personally stored the explosives… The court is required to see whether the material discloses a prima facie case of involvement in the alleged unlawful activity.”
Referring to the prosecution’s contention that the increase in violence was not accidental but was premeditated, the bench said the absence of the appellant from the riot site does not end the investigation, but the focus of the investigation is whether the prosecution material prima facie links him with the strategy that was executed when the “right time” came.
“At this stage, the narrative of the charge sheet and the statements of the protected witnesses have been pressed to show that the Appellant was engaged at earlier stages in shaping the method and expanding the sites, and that the initial discussions in January (2020) contained alleged instructions for storage and preparation for enhancement. The Court cannot adjudicate on their truth. However, it can record that such material, if admitted as per the prosecution, would have put the Appellant at risk from the alleged design and timing of Combines climax,” it said.
According to the bench, the argument of absence cannot be considered as acquittal at the present stage. It said, “This is a matter to be tested at the trial in the light of the entire evidence. The bail stage investigation cannot be transformed into a determination that once the appellant is no longer physically present during the February riots, his already attributed role becomes legally irrelevant.”
Strategy from protests to ‘Chakka Jam’
The court placed considerable emphasis on the prosecution’s claim that the agitation evolved from traditional sit-ins to a deliberate strategy of sustained “chakka jam” – blocking main roads, paralyzing civic life and disrupting essential services.
In Imam’s case, the court noted material alleging his participation in mobilization platforms, pamphleteering, meetings, WhatsApp groups and speeches, tracing his continuous course of conduct from early December 2019 to January 2020. The statement of a protected witness relied upon by the prosecution credits Khalid with explaining the difference between ‘dharna’ and ‘chakka jam’ and issuing instructions to launch a round-the-clock blockade at Shaheen Bagh with plans to expand it to other locations. “At the Right Time”.
Taking it at face value, as the law requires at the bail stage, the court held that this material supported a charge of planned and differentiated disruption, not spontaneous protest.
“The prosecution’s case, taken cumulatively, pleads precisely this: that the blockade tactics were designed not merely to cause inconvenience, but to instigate, polarize and break communal peace. Where such an allegation is supported, at least prima facie, by the statements, chronology and alleged coordination, the court cannot trivialize it as an inevitable by-product of the protests,” it said.
It noted that the prosecution material, read cumulatively and taken at face value, reveals reasonable grounds to believe that the allegations against Imam are prima facie true. The material relied upon is not limited to abstract ideology. “This includes digital coordination, attribution of planning and mobilization, presence supported by location records, a protected witness statement describing different chakka jam tactics, and speech material promoting disruption and disruption of essential services,” it held.
Speech was not examined separately
While acknowledging that most of the material against the two accused pertains to speeches and protest-related activity, the court declined to examine the speeches separately. It held that the prosecution’s case is not based on ideological disagreement or criticism of the state, but on an alleged series of conduct, including coordination, mobilisation, planning and public incitement, aimed at paralyzing civilian life.
The Court explained that whether speech ultimately crosses the line from protected expression to criminal conduct is a matter of trial. At the bail stage, the question is narrow: whether the prosecution’s explanation is prima facie plausible when read cumulatively with the other material.
It also rejected Imam’s contention that the prosecution’s case was based solely on a few speeches given by him in Delhi, West Bengal and Bihar. “The prosecution material, as presently placed, alleges a combination of organizational acts, coordination through digital groups, meetings and differentiated tactics of chakka jam and blockade… At the bail stage, the court is concerned with whether this series, taken at face value, is coherent and whether it reflects actual nexus for the alleged crimes,” it said.
Similarly, it rejected Khalid’s argument that the only overt act attributable to him was a public speech given in Amravati on February 17, 2020, although it did not promote violence, destruction of property or unlawful action.
But the bench said that the matter cannot be decided on speech alone. “Equally, the speech cannot be plucked from the timeline and used as a complete answer to the allegations of alleged meetings, instructions and preparatory work over the months. The Court therefore treats the speech as one circumstance in a series, which must be evaluated in conjunction with other material, and not as a standalone verdict of innocence or guilt.”
Why didn’t parity and delay help?
The plea of similarity with the co-accused who were granted bail was rejected on the grounds that similarity is role-specific and not numerical. The court said, bail jurisprudence under UAPA does not allow mechanical comparison where the prosecution alleges different degrees of control and involvement.
On prolonged imprisonment, the Court acknowledged the constitutional concern, but held that delay cannot serve as a “trump card” to override the statutory restriction under Section 43(d)(5) of the UAPA once the prima facie limit has been crossed. It added that the solution lies in judicial supervision and carrying forward the trial, and not in weakening the statutory standard at the bail stage.
Unlike normal cases, UAPA requires courts to refuse bail without examining the evidence when allegations appear prima facie credible. This provision effectively puts the burden on the accused to prove the prosecution’s prima facie case. This is in sharp contrast to regular bail provisions where the accused is considered innocent until proven guilty.
In the present case, ultimately, the denial of bail resulted from the Court finding that the prosecution material disclosed reasonable grounds to believe that the allegations were prima facie true, thereby raising the statutory hurdle under Section 43(d)(5).
Once that threshold is crossed, the Court held, bail ceases to be a matter of discretionary balance and becomes legally unacceptable, unless continued imprisonment reaches the level of constitutional breakdown – a threshold the Court found was not crossed in the present case.
At the same time, the court emphasized that statutory detention cannot translate into indefinite detention. Recognizing the dependence on protected witnesses and the scale of the trial, it allowed Khalid and Imam to renew their bail pleas after the examination of protected witnesses or a year, whichever is earlier. The court clarified that all the comments are limited to the bail stage only and will not affect the trial on merits.
