TL;DR: running the newsA new narrative about the upcoming geopolitical upheaval is taking shape among a section of strategic analysts. According to: China is destined for the top spot, while the United States and India are in a “battle for second place.”,This argument is gaining ground among Chinese strategists and analysts, including Kejriwal Mao, who say Washington’s long bet on India has soured and concerns about America’s decline are reshaping alliances.Why it matters: No more US “strategic altruism” for India
- Mao, an analyst at the China Center for International Cooperation and founder of South Asia Research Brief, whose main claim begins with history. He argues that since the late 1990s, Washington has practiced what many China scholars call “strategic altruism” toward India, absorbing the real diplomatic costs of integrating New Delhi into the global system. The most obvious example was the civil nuclear agreement that created an exception to global nonproliferation norms. Rationale: An emerging democratic India will ultimately help balance China in Asia.
- That logic, says Mao, has broken down. During Donald Trump’s second term, the US imposed heavy tariffs on Indian goods, raised visa fees, tightened outsourcing rules and adopted rhetoric toward New Delhi that often seemed dismissive. Mao says that many Western observers dismiss this as the “Trump anomaly”. He rejects that view.
- For Mao, the driver is structural. “The fundamental driver is America’s concern over its declining power, which is now outweighed by concerns about external geopolitical threats.” In this frame, Washington is wary of harsh retaliators like China and Russia, but is tougher on allies. His most telling line reflects the shift: Allies become “bloodbags,” with the US preferring to squeeze partners for immediate profits rather than pay the uncertain costs of long-term strategic competitions.
- Mao argues that India is particularly exposed. It “has enjoyed American favors, but lacks the industrial/economic strength of Japan, Europe or Korea to make major concessions – and is less willing to bend – so it is considered ‘patently ungrateful’.” They suggest that over time, this friction could reduce tensions between Beijing and both Washington and New Delhi, paving the way for a China-friendly realignment.
big pictureMao’s logic is consistent and comfortable for Beijing. This fits China’s long-held belief that US decline is certain and China’s rise is inevitable and sustainable. But it is based on assumptions that are more fragile than they appear.However, the nature of power in the twenty-first century is not one-dimensional. It is a mosaic of capabilities—technological, financial, military, demographic, institutional—spanning domains and regions. China will take the lead in some. In others, the US remains dominant. India is creating a different pole that neither reflects China nor is completely in sync with Washington.Framing the future as a simple race for first and second place flattens hierarchies but obscures how influence actually accumulates – and how the barriers intersect.Zoom in: American decline, exaggeratedThe first weak link in Mao’s thesis is his linear view of America’s decline. History suggests a more cyclical pattern.From the Sputnik shock of the 1950s to Vietnam, from the rise of Japan in the 1980s to the financial crisis of 2008, predictions of American eclipses have been regular. Each time, internal dysfunction and polarization produced dire predictions. Each time, scale, innovation, institutions and alliances enabled adaptation.Trump can be read less as evidence of final decline and not as a reaction phase – an ugly but familiar spasm in democratic systems under stress. Democracies and market economies are messy, but they self-correct in ways that centralized systems struggle to replicate.Nor does current evidence suggest a US retreat from Asia. Even amid trade disputes, Washington has deepened security cooperation with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines; Strong ties with South Korea; The expanded technology controls are aimed squarely at China; and maintained a strong Indo-Pacific military posture. These are not acts of any entity abandoning itself to another place.China’s numbersMao’s beliefs also depended heavily on assumptions about China’s economic trajectory. Recent data complicates that story.
As Bloomberg reported, China’s economy looked resilient on the surface in 2025. Exports increased, growth moved closer to official targets, and Beijing avoided “bazooka” stimulus. Producers moved up the value chain and the trade surplus increased.However, under the spotlight, momentum has softened. Investment is heading for annual contraction for the first time since 1998. Retail sales growth has slowed to its weakest pace outside the pandemic. New home prices continue to fall, exacerbating a property crisis with no clear end in sight. To stabilize growth, Beijing has pledged extensive financial support through 2026, targeting advanced manufacturing, technology innovation and human capital.None of these signals are lost. But it questions the assumption of a smooth, linear climb and highlights the difficulty of rebalancing the economy while demographics worsen and political controls tighten.Between the lines: political turmoil in BeijingPolitical anxiety further increases economic stress. Bloomberg reports that Xi Jinping will investigate a record number of senior officials for corruption in 2025, following the earlier removal of top generals. As lobbying intensifies ahead of the next Communist Party Congress, questions are emerging about the quality of governance and elite cohesion.As Alfred Wu of the National University of Singapore told Bloomberg, “For China, there is a lot of unrest domestically.” Anti-corruption campaigns strengthen controls, but they also raise uncomfortable questions about military readiness and decision-making in a system centered on a single leader.These internal tensions matter because they constrain how aggressively China can pursue its ambitions abroad.Geography still mattersGDP is not destiny. Geography and geopolitics remain powerful obstacles – and here, China faces a permanent disadvantage.China shares land borders with 14 countries and maritime borders with several others. It has unresolved disputes or strained relations with many of them, from India and Japan to the Philippines and Vietnam. This creates a neighborhood that is defined less by respect than by safety and quiet balance.Former Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan reflects this reality in foreign policy: “No country will ever abandon China. Every country wants to have as good relations as possible with China. “But China’s overall geopolitical situation is not favourable.” He asks which states “will meekly accept China occupying the top of the regional hierarchy.”For Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, national identity has long been defined in opposition to the civilizational pull of China. Making almost any alternative to subjugation more attractive would require a massive redefinition of identity.This limited Beijing’s ability to translate economic weight into political dominance, a lesson the Soviet Union learned at great cost.
Why will India not live under the shadow of China?Mao is right when he says that India is still not China in terms of manufacturing. But that observation’s leap to a future of permanent second place misses the dynamics of India’s rise.India’s strengths lie in demography, services, digital public infrastructure and strategic geography. Unlike China, India does not face the same pace of demographic ageing. The size of its market and political pluralism make it attractive to companies and governments seeking diversification away from China.India’s geography also matters. Being adjacent to major sea lanes of the Indian Ocean and bordering China, it cannot be sidelined by Washington or easily coerced by Beijing. This benefits New Delhi – even if relations with the US are strained.The differences between the US and India under Trump are real. But friction does not cause breakage. Structural interests—balancing China, securing supply chains, cooperation on defense and technology—continue to bring the relationship back together. India’s rise is not dependent on American kindness alone; This depends on domestic reforms, market scale and a global environment eager for alternatives to China. what nextFor Beijing, the danger lies in mistaking temporary US-India tensions for a permanent realignment. Overconfidence risks miscalculation—especially at a time when domestic headwinds are rising and neighbors are wary.Then again, as the Economist wrote, “The Communist Party is starved of pride and Mr Xi will be tempted to more aggressively assert China’s interests in 2026. This risks dangerous overreach in three areas: trade, Taiwan and new Chinese-driven global rules.” If Xi decides to invade Taiwan, whether in 2026 or 2027, China could be drawn into a protracted and unwinnable war. According to some calculations, a blockade of Taiwan would also reduce Chinese GDP by 7-9%. This could have a serious impact on China’s aspirations of becoming a superpower.The road ahead will be uneven for Washington and New Delhi. Trade disputes, immigration politics and industrial competition will create friction. But shared strategic interests and mutual leverage argue against a clean break.The more likely future is one of long-term, conflicted coexistence: China growing but constrained; America is adapting rather than disappearing; India is playing a bigger, more independent role.ground levelAmerican decline is not destiny. India’s borders are not permanent. And China’s rise—while real—is neither frictionless nor unopposed. The world they live in is too complex, too crowded, and too dynamic for any single power to conduct the orchestra alone.
