Voting in Bangladesh will not be considered genuine unless all parties are allowed to participate: Former envoy | Special india news

Bangladesh is in one of its most chaotic political moments in decades, with the once-dominant Awami League now barred from contesting upcoming elections. Roads are tense, institutions appear shaken, and uncertainty has spread across every level of society.

Speaking to CNN-News18, former Indian Ambassador to Bangladesh Veena Sikri explains what the unrest really means, candidly explaining why the elections already appear to be rigged, how minority groups in Dhaka are dealing with the unrest, what is the real burden on the Bangladesh Army now, and whether Washington’s shadow is flickering behind the movement.

Since former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is in India, Sikri also pointed out how her presence could redefine the long-term arc of Delhi-Dhaka relations.

Edited excerpts:

How do you assess the legitimacy and stability of the Yunus-led interim government, especially given its wide-ranging actions against the previous government?

The interim government lacks full constitutional legitimacy. The Bangladeshi Constitution does not allow this type of interim administration, and the caretaker model is supposed to be a short 90-day arrangement run by non-political experts whose sole job is to maintain order and prepare for elections. Instead, this government is filled with openly political Islamist actors, including members of the Islamic Movement Bangladesh, Hefazat-e-Islam, and even individuals associated with banned groups.

Dr. Younes himself publicly described the transition of power as “carefully designed” and identified his associate Mahfouz Alam, who has ties to Hizb ut-Tahrir, as the architect. This alone raises questions about intentions, transparency and legality.

The change of power was also accompanied by violence: hundreds of policemen were killed, more than 400 police stations were attacked or looted, and weapons that did not belong to the police arsenal were used in the unrest. None of these incidents were addressed, compensated for, or even acknowledged by those in power. The families of the slain officers have been left without answers. Also, the government has banned the activities of the Awami League, which is unheard of in functioning democracies. Even in Sri Lanka or Nepal, where governments fell under public pressure, ruling parties were not banned from contesting new elections. In the case of Bangladesh, the ban directly undermines the credibility of any democratic process.

The interim administration shaped the mandate of the UN human rights investigation to cover only a short period, leaving a wave of attacks on minorities.

Overall, these decisions raise serious doubts about the constitutional basis, democratic intent and overall stability of the interim government. Ultimately, the real test will be whether Bangladesh can now hold free, fair, inclusive elections, and whether all major political forces, including the Awami League, are truly allowed to participate.

So, given the recent protests by minority groups, what is the current situation of Hindus in Bangladesh, and do you see their vulnerability increasing in this period of political uncertainty?

Unfortunately, yes, minorities are much more vulnerable today. Violence broke out almost immediately after Sheikh Hasina’s departure, with Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and even Sufi communities facing targeted attacks. Rights groups documented nearly 2,000 incidents in just two weeks, most of which were aimed at driving minorities out of their homes and livelihoods.

What is different this time is that many young Hindus are adamant that they are citizens and will not be thrown out. Yet the state’s response has been deeply worrying. Community organizers like Chinmoy Das remain in jail without charge. Many Awami League activists and journalists are also behind bars, trials have stalled or are non-existent, and the media space has been brought under tight control.

On top of the violence, there is economic exclusion. Hindu teachers, civil servants and police officers are being forced to resign under mob pressure. Suddenly the entire family became without income. And all this is happening with almost no international scrutiny, even as global outlets loudly question democratic norms in other countries in the region.

Institutionally, Bangladesh is in a vacuum. Parliament has been dissolved, the judiciary is being used as a political tool and the media has been silenced. The so-called July National Charter barely has support among political parties, yet the government is pushing ahead with elections that exclude most of the key players. It’s hard to call it anything other than an authoritarian system, and minorities inevitably pay the highest price.

You highlighted the decline of democratic norms and increasing threats to minorities. With the political landscape so fluid, what does a realistic election roadmap look like now, and who really benefits from pursuing legal cases?

For now, the roadmap looks bleak. For months, the interim government showed no real interest in holding elections and kept pointing to endless “reform committees” as a reason to delay the process indefinitely. Even the BNP, which should have been the natural choice after the Awami League’s exit, is being ousted, and recent student-body elections have made it clear that the field is tilting towards Jamaat-linked groups.

There is still no election date, even though the window is already open. The fear is that the system is being designed not to deliver truly competitive votes, but to deliver Jamaat-friendly results.

Unless all parties are allowed to participate, unless observers are allowed in, and unless the process is credible, it will not count as a genuine election. Right now, the president and the army chief are the only stable constitutional figures left, and much will depend on whether they move things back toward a proper democratic process.

With the sudden change of power in Dhaka, how much influence is the Bangladesh Army really wielding behind the facade of the interim government?

From what we have seen, the military is maintaining a careful distance, at least publicly, but it is clear that there is tension within the institution. The army chief has largely stuck to the constitutional line and refused to drag the force into political street battles, be it during student protests or after the recent verdict against Sheikh Hasina. But there are some disturbing exceptions – such as the Tungipara incident where a local commander opened fire and a civilian was killed. That episode shocked people and exposed cracks within the ranks.

There have also been moments when parts of the armed forces division appeared to be working directly under Yunus’s interim setup, including around negotiations with Myanmar around the so-called humanitarian corridor. Each time, the army chief had to step in and step back, assert sovereignty and keep the institution away from political adventurism. So yes, the military’s influence is real, but it is not unified. There is a clear internal division, even as top officials are trying to put power above political in-fighting.

So, do you believe Washington has played a covert role in the Bangladesh unrest, especially after Sheikh Hasina’s son, now in the US, claimed the Biden administration funded groups involved in anti-government riots?

His son’s claims are not coming out of nowhere. Even Donald Trump once questioned why millions were being spent on “training” in South Asia through USAID. This fueled long-standing allegations of US-backed “color revolutions” in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh.

Sri Lanka and Nepal have since returned to open, competitive politics. Bangladesh is at the forefront. The interim leadership is moving away from democratic norms, talking reforms, referendums, committees, anything that will delay real elections. Even his attempt at a July charter referendum has been blocked by the president, who insists that it must coincide with national elections, meaning no election, no referendum.

At this point, the only real solution is simple: free, fair, inclusive elections. If that happens, the result could go to anyone – BNP, Awami League, an alliance – whoever people trust after the last one and a half years. But without that credibility, instability will persist, no matter who wins on paper.

If Hasina stays in India, how could it reshape the long-term India-Bangladesh equation, especially when China is waiting to expand its footprint in Dhaka?

Sending back Sheikh Hasina will not end the crisis; This will trigger a major event. A large section of Bangladesh still believes in the spirit of the liberation struggle and wants a secular, democratic, economically progressive country. They may be religious, but they don’t want a Pakistan-style model. And India cannot ignore this, because the ideology of Jamaat-e-Islami is fundamentally contrary to India’s interests.

If Bangladesh returns to that position, India will eventually have to face the same terrorism debate again. Will we call terrorism coming from Pakistan an act of war but pretend it is different when it comes from Bangladesh? The truth is that most Bangladeshis do not support Jamaat-e-Islami or Muhammad Yunus. If they had done so, the government could have easily conducted free, inclusive elections and even won. But they know they can’t do that, which is why they are postponing, diverting attention and talking about extradition instead of democracy. And extradition is not a quick political move. This is a legal process bound by treaty. Handle it wrong, and India risks international implications.

More importantly, ousting Hasina without a political solution will increase tensions as ordinary Bangladeshis expect India to stand by the values ​​of 1971. They hope that India will protect the principles for which they fought. Therefore this moment is bigger than one leader. It is about what kind of Bangladesh its people want – and what India wants to support.