In a move that could reset the delicate balance of power in South Asia, the United States has included Pakistan in its list of buyers for the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). This amendment to the existing US arms contract with Raytheon represents more than just a defense transaction – it signals the potential rearmament of Pakistan’s air power at a time when the security situation in the region remains uncertain.
Pakistan’s inclusion in the program worth more than $2.5 billion has revived a defense partnership that had largely stagnated after years of strained relations with Washington. For Pakistan, whose air force is still heavily dependent on its fleet of American F-16 fighter jets, the acquisition of these advanced BVR (beyond visual-range) missiles marks a major technological boost. However, for the region, it raises troubling questions about stability, deterrence, and the risk of escalating tensions between nuclear-armed rivals.
AMRAAM, capable of engaging targets at ranges over 150 kilometers, offers accuracy, speed and “fire and forget” capability that allows pilots to disengage immediately after launch. In purely technical terms, it is a tremendous addition to any air force. But in the context of Pakistan, such a system has far-reaching strategic implications.
Despite huge economic differences and persistent domestic crises, the country’s military establishment has long been striving for parity with India. Its historical record of aggressive stances, coupled with its military’s disproportionate influence on foreign policy, makes the AMRAAM deal much more than a routine upgrade. What appears to be an innocuous arms agreement may actually change the regional deterrence equation.
South Asia’s airspace has always been sensitive – every technological advance on one side forces the other side to take retaliatory measures.
When India showcased its indigenous Astra BVR missile system, it underlined its growing self-reliance and capability to defend its airspace. However, Pakistan’s response has been to seek external suppliers to maintain parity rather than pursue domestic innovation. The AMRAAM deal thus reflects a continuation of dependence – and a willingness by Washington to overlook the destabilizing consequences of arming a military whose strategic ambitions have often undermined peace.
This renewed US-Pakistan relationship has also revived old concerns about the nature of their security relations.
Historically, US arms transfers to Pakistan have been justified on the basis of counter-terrorism or defense cooperation, only for the weapons to be later used against India. The F-16 fleet, originally supplied under a similar complex, became a central tool of Pakistan’s conventional deterrent against its eastern neighbor. The reintroduction of AMRAAM into this equation risks encouraging the same behavior – a new belief in coercive diplomacy backed by advanced weapons.
The timing of this deal is particularly worrying. Coupled with an unstable political environment and a military establishment struggling to maintain control over internal security, Pakistan is facing the most severe economic crisis in its history. Instead of focusing on domestic reforms and stability, the country’s leadership appears intent on modernizing its military arsenal. This suggests a misalignment of priorities – a pattern familiar to observers of Pakistan’s civil-military dynamics, where the pursuit of military parity often overrides social and economic needs. From a regional security perspective, this missile deal could reintroduce an element of uncertainty into the South Asian deterrence environment.
India and Pakistan have fought several wars, experienced countless border skirmishes, and tensions nearly escalated following the Balakot air strikes in 2019 – an episode where Pakistan’s F-16s, equipped with older versions of the AMRAAM, were already involved. The introduction of more advanced missile variants, such as the C8 and D3, only increases the lethality of potential confrontations.
Critics of the deal in policy circles argue that the US risks repeating historical mistakes. For decades, US support for Pakistan’s military has produced short-term strategic cooperation but long-term instability. Each wave of arms aid has internally strengthened the military’s hand, often at the expense of democratic governance. It also encourages the institution to function as an independent power center – a center that makes foreign policy and national security decisions without civilian oversight.
By promoting Pakistan under the guise of modernization, Washington may inadvertently empower an institution that has repeatedly destabilized both its society and the broader region. For India, this development underlines the enduring asymmetry of US policy in South Asia.
While Washington describes New Delhi as a “strategic partner”, continued military aid to Pakistan contradicts that narrative. This complicates India’s strategic calculations, forcing it to divert resources to countering Pakistan’s enhanced air capabilities while focusing on its maritime and northern borders. The US, in an effort to maintain influence over both South Asian powers, is running the risk of playing both sides – a balancing act that history shows is not sustainable.
Beyond the India-Pakistan situation, broader concerns lie in this example. If Pakistan’s purchase of advanced missiles is seen as a reward for engagement with Washington, it may encourage other regional actors to make similar deals to maintain the balance. This could intensify an arms race in one of the world’s most militarized regions. At a time when global powers are pushing for restraint and dialogue in conflict-ridden regions, the decision to expand missile sales to South Asia sends the opposite signal.
There is also the issue of technology security. Pakistan’s track record in securing advanced military systems has been repeatedly questioned with concerns about unauthorized access and proliferation. Given the country’s history of nuclear proliferation through networks linked to AK Khan, Western analysts have often urged caution in transferring sensitive defense technologies. The AMRAAM deal, despite its conventional nature, revives those concerns – especially as Pakistan continues to develop military partnerships with China and Turkey.
If history is any guide, such arms transfers rarely provide stability. Instead, they create new dependencies and promote military adventurism. Pakistan’s leadership has often leveraged its geostrategic position to secure Western military aid, and subsequently pursue policies contrary to American interests. Whether during the Cold War, the Afghan jihad, or the post-9/11 era, the pattern has been consistent: strategic alignment followed by strategic divergence. The AMRAAM deal risks perpetuating that cycle under a new label of “modernization.”
The ultimate loss of this system can only be peace. South Asia remains the epicenter of nuclear crisis, with a long history of crises arising from miscalculations. In such an environment, the addition of more advanced air-to-air missiles does not increase deterrence – it reduces decision-making time and increases the risk of escalation. Each side, perceiving the other as an adventurer, responded with extreme vigilance and counter-measures. In that sense, the AMRAAM sale is not just an arms deal; This is a strategic signal that could highlight years of cautious restraint.
Washington’s rationale may be to maintain dominance in Islamabad, but its cost may be high. By strengthening the Pakistani military’s capabilities at a moment of internal weakness, the US risks enabling a security apparatus that has historically prioritized confrontation over cooperation. The world has seen how easily tactical weapons superiority can turn into strategic recklessness – and in a region where two nuclear-armed neighbors share a disputed border, that is a gamble no one can afford.
Ultimately, the AMRAAM deal represents a missed opportunity. Instead of encouraging Pakistan to invest in stability, reform and regional confidence-building, it reinforces old patterns of militarization. For a country that has yet to resolve its internal political divisions or economic weakness, the pursuit of sophisticated missiles is not a sign of strength but of misplaced priorities.
As South Asia teeters on the brink of renewed tension, the world must understand that peace cannot be built on gunfire. True stability will come only when states are discouraged from pursuing arms superiority and encouraged to pursue transparency, restraint and dialogue. The sale of AMRAAM to Pakistan does the opposite – it arms an unstable region and emboldens forces that thrive on instability. And in doing so, it risks turning South Asia once again into one of the most dangerous theaters of modern geopolitics.
