Over the past few decades, India has witnessed a transformational change in its foreign policy-making. Ever since India moved away from bloc politics in the Cold War era and opened a new frontier of diplomatic engagement with like-minded newly independent countries of the Global South, many realist and neo-realist scholars like Leo E. Rose and Baldev Raj Nair have called India a ‘pragmatic state’ for choosing ‘strategic autonomy’ in foreign policy-making. Since India had emerged from colonial oppression after many years of struggle against British imperialism, it could not afford to become a victim of the politics of another great power; Therefore, it decided to stay away from it. The formation of NAM under the leadership of the then Prime Minister (PM) Jawaharlal Nehru was based entirely on a strategic and political framework; Its founding was primarily oriented towards collective opposition to the prevailing imperialism, colonialism and Cold War politics. Therefore, the then Indian leadership chose peace rather than conflict. Since the internal challenges of newly independent India were not so conducive to taking any side, China, on the other hand, taking its side with the Soviet bloc, strengthened itself remarkably and established itself very well in Asia. With China’s rapid rise in Asia in the late 1990s and early 2000s, challenges to US hegemony in the region gradually shifted India to the category of a swing state, as the US always tried to play the India card to balance China to maintain its hegemonic image in Asia as well as the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, many international scholars, such as John Mearsheimer and Christopher LayneArgues that India’s growing ties with the US in the early 2000s were a well-planned offshore balancing strategy by the US to position India diplomatically against a rising China.
Today, transformational changes in India’s foreign policy have pushed India towards becoming a leading power or order builder in Asia. It has been argued in several scholarly works that at the beginning of the first quarter of the 21st century, after years of regional challenges, India now somehow managed to become a leading power in Asia. However, scholars such as Ashley J. Tellis write in his book “Understanding Greatness: Making India a Leading Power” That India still has a long way to go. Although India has become a leading power in recent times, it still does not fall into the category of great power for which it seems destined. A leading power can be called a system shaper. This means that a leading power cannot write the new rules of the world order; At best, such a power can only change some rules, because it is not a real pole of international politics. However, the rapidly changing power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific is an opportunity for India to achieve what it is destined to do. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar argues that in recent times, changes in globalization, rebalancing in the international system and increasing multipolarity have left India with no other option but to maintain give-and-take relations with the international community. As economic diplomacy has become a defining feature of India’s foreign policy in recent times, energy diplomacy is one of its most important aspects, where India aggressively pursues its strategic autonomy, keeping national interest the highest priority of diplomatic commitments.
For example, as the focus of India’s foreign policy objectives has largely shifted from political to economic diplomacy, Indian foreign policy makers are still not abandoning Russia in the Ukraine war crisis and Iran in the Hormuz crisis; Now the question arises that how will India fill the void created by America’s partial withdrawal from the Indo-Pacific region?
The US has recently reversed its nearly decade-old decision to rename US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) to its original name, US Pacific Command (USPACOM), which President Trump himself named during his first presidential term as part of the Asia Pivot policy. Jim Mattis, then Secretary of Defense, said that renaming Asia Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command was intended to recognize the growing importance of the Indian Ocean and the Indian subcontinent, while also acknowledging India’s emerging role in the region. Although not officially stated, it could be interpreted that the reversal of its name by removing the word Indo shows that its importance has diminished in the US, as its addition indicates its greater importance in 2018. However, the US military has categorically denied any ulterior motive behind reversing its decision to rename the Pacific Command. It reiterated that returning to the old name of Pacific Command will not change the US Navy’s work in the Indo-Pacific. But the question arises that if its addition had any meaning and was made keeping in mind the growing influence of the Indian Ocean region, then how can it be possible that its removal does not make any sense? Yet, its hidden message perhaps lies in the fact that there was not a single mention of the Indo-Pacific articulation during US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s recent address to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.
Since the US is already tired of the Iran and Ukraine wars, where China is often accused of indirectly playing a key role in supporting these parties, President Trump is looking for a viable solution, which is obviously not possible without taking China into confidence. There is speculation that, ahead of Chinese President Xi’s visit to the US on September 24, President Trump may set the stage for him in an effort to reach a concrete solution to the ongoing conflicts between the two countries. Since it has been seen recently that President Trump has already kept his tone low on the Taiwan issue, he has given another chance to China by indicating his partial withdrawal from the Indian Ocean. The way things are changing rapidly in Asian geopolitics reminds us of Trump’s recent and surprising comment, referring to China, that ‘G2 will be convened soon.’ After years of tariff wars and rivalry, the US and China appear to be getting closer. This may be because America has realized that it is possible to deal with the challenge of China not through enmity or hostility, but through cooperation and friendship. Therefore, given China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean region, President Trump may be trying to appease his counterpart ahead of Xi’s diplomatic visit to the US in September, in order to prevent their differences from weakening their bilateral ties.
Although it is not certain whether this could be a strategic move by the Trump administration to deal with the China challenge, it can definitely be said that the so-called partial withdrawal of the US from the Indian Ocean (removal of INDO from USINDOPACOM) has created a feeling of geopolitical void in the region which India has immediately filled.
In the wake of this episode, the Indian Prime Minister paid a strategic state visit to Seychelles and signed several agreements ranging from maritime security to defense cooperation. Within a week, PM Modi hosted the Japanese PM and signed over a hundred agreements, including a joint defense hardware co-development project and several other frameworks for supply chain resilience in critical minerals and semiconductors. After concluding a historic meeting with his Japanese counterpart, Modi made another strategic visit to three coastal countries of the Indian Ocean: Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. This is probably the first time that an Indian Prime Minister has made a series of state visits to Indian Ocean countries. Given that the Quad, established by the Trump administration during its previous tenure to counter China, is not mentioned in the US’s recently released National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025, this again gives a clear indication that the US’s foreign policy priorities may be away from the Indian Ocean. In this context, India’s recent strategic engagement with the above mentioned littoral countries of the Indian Ocean hopes to create an alternative maritime alliance. As China’s debt-trap diplomacy gradually expands across Asia and Central Asia, it is also expanding its reach in the Indian Ocean region. In this context, it would not be wrong to assume that, after the partial withdrawal of the US from the region, there could be a race between India and China to establish a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific.
It is widely argued by scholars that in the context of the Indus Water Treaty, China plays a balancing role for Pakistan against India by weaponizing the waters of the Brahmaputra River. Therefore, China’s growing footprint in the Indian Ocean can only be matched by India’s strategic presence in the Strait of Malacca, through which more than 60% of China’s total seaborne trade and 80% of its crude oil passes. Additionally, India’s strategic presence in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and its recent active diplomatic engagement with Indonesia are very important to balance China’s Malacca dilemma. Given that the US is losing interest in the Quad and may disengage from the Indo-Pacific region, India will now have to explore options to balance China through various diplomatic engagements with like-minded countries in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, Modi’s recent diplomatic engagement with some of the Indian Ocean littoral countries is a step towards filling the gap created by the US’s partial withdrawal from the region. Although it will remain a challenging task for India to become a shaping power in the Indo-Pacific, India, widely recognized as a balancing power in Asia, is now becoming a shaping power not only in Asia but also in the Indo-Pacific region.
(Views expressed are personal)
This article is written by Sanjay Turi, Doctoral Candidate, Center for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Bhimmaya Tamang, Independent Researcher, IR, Sikkim Manipal University, Sikkim.
