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From LeT’s Usman to JeM’s Haider, and from key executors of the Pahalgam attack to foreign terrorists, the security forces have maintained sustained pressure on high-value targets.
Jammu and Kashmir Police officials stand at a barricade in Srinagar. (IMAGE: PTI FILE/REPRESENTATIVE)
“You can run, but you cannot hide.”
The message from Jammu and Kashmir Police is short, blunt, and increasingly becoming a defining line of the security forces’ counter-terror operations in Jammu and Kashmir.
The phrase first drew wider attention after the killing of Lashkar-e-Taiba commander Zakir Ganie in a prolonged operation in Shopian in July 2026. After the terrorist was tracked down and eliminated following a multi-day operation, J&K Police posted the message: “You can run, but you cannot hide.”
It is more than a social-media line.
For a security establishment operating under DGP Nalin Prabhat, the phrase captures an operational philosophy that has become increasingly visible over the last two years: terrorists may change locations, disappear into forests, move across districts or attempt to establish new hideouts — but the security forces will continue to track them.
And the record of Prabhat’s tenure provides several examples.
From Lashkar commander Usman in Srinagar to Jaish-e-Mohammed commander Haider in the forests of Udhampur, and from the Pakistani terrorists identified by Indian authorities as key conspirators and executors of the Pahalgam attack to foreign terrorists hunted down in the Jammu forests, the security forces have maintained sustained pressure on high-value targets.
At A Glance
DGP Nalin Prabhat took charge as Director General of Police, Jammu and Kashmir, in October 2024.
Local terrorist recruitment fell from around 194 in 2020 to one in 2025, with no local recruitment reported in 2026.
NITI Aayog figures showed youth recruitment into terrorism fell by about 99% between 2018 and 2025, from 199 cases to two.
Terrorist incidents decreased from 228 in 2018 to 12 in 2025.
Key eliminations during Prabhat’s tenure include Usman (November 2024), Haider (June 2025), three Pahalgam attackers (July 2025), and Saddam and Mustafa (September 2026).
Now, with the killing of senior Lashkar-e-Taiba commander Musa alias Asif Fauji in Budgam on September 30, 2026, the government says an entire group of four senior Lashkar commanders that had been operating in Jammu and Kashmir since 2022 has been neutralised.
But there is another important feature running through these operations: they have been joint operations, built around intelligence and involving the Jammu and Kashmir Police, the Army and the Central Armed Police Forces.
The Ministry of Home Affairs, in its statement on Musa’s killing, specifically said that security agencies including the Jammu and Kashmir Police, the Indian Army and the CAPFs have been conducting counter-terror operations in close coordination over the past few years.
That coordination has increasingly become central to the security forces’ strategy.
AN INTELLIGENCE-LED CAMPAIGN
The latest operation against Musa provides perhaps the clearest example of how that system works.
According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, security forces had been pursuing Musa for a long time. A specific, all-stakeholder plan for his neutralisation was recently put in place after technical and human intelligence was received about his movement and presence.
Musa was subsequently neutralised at Gurwatkalan in the Khansahib police station area of Budgam district in what the government described as an intelligence-led joint security forces operation.
The operation was part of a long-sustained campaign called Operation Sheruwali, which began in May 2026.
The MHA described Musa’s elimination as a serious blow to the Lashkar-e-Taiba ecosystem in Jammu and Kashmir.
The significance goes beyond the killing of one commander.
According to the government, Musa was the last surviving member of a group of four senior Lashkar-e-Taiba commanders who had been operating in the Union Territory since 2022 and were responsible for several sensational attacks.
The other three — Junaid Bhat, Suleman and Yasir — were neutralised in separate encounters.
Junaid Bhat was killed in Dachigam on December 3, 2024. Suleman was killed during Operation Mahadev on July 28, 2025. Yasir was killed during Operation Asdhar on September 4, 2026.
With Musa’s killing, the MHA says the entire group stands neutralised.
THE ATTACKS LINKED TO THE FOUR-MEMBER GROUP
The Ministry of Home Affairs has linked the group to a series of major attacks in Jammu and Kashmir.
These include the Halan attack in August 2023, Kandi attack in May 2023, DKG attack in December 2023, Shahsitar attack in May 2024, Shiv Khori attack in June 2024, Gagangir attack in October 2024, Bootapathri attack in October 2024 and Baisaran attack in April 2025.
The list illustrates the operational significance of the group and explains why the security forces had been pursuing its members over an extended period.
Musa’s elimination therefore represents the culmination of a multi-year effort to dismantle a senior Lashkar leadership group operating in the Union Territory.
FROM USMAN TO MUSA
When Nalin Prabhat took charge as Director General of Police, Jammu and Kashmir, in October 2024, the security challenge in the Union Territory was already changing.
Terrorist activity in Kashmir had declined significantly, but Pakistan-based groups were attempting to establish new networks and hideouts in the forests and mountains of the Jammu region.
Nearly two years into his tenure, Prabhat’s record is increasingly defined by sustained pressure on the leadership of terrorist organisations and an effort to prevent those organisations from rebuilding their networks.
From the killing of Lashkar-e-Taiba commander Usman alias Chota Waleed in Srinagar to the elimination of Jaish-e-Mohammed commander Haider alias Maulvi in the Basantgarh forests, and from Operation Mahadev to the latest operation against Musa, the security forces have pursued foreign terrorist commanders across vastly different terrains.
The geography has changed.
The operational challenge has changed.
But the underlying strategy has remained focused on intelligence, coordination and sustained pressure.
USMAN: AN EARLY MAJOR SUCCESS
One of the first major operations after Prabhat took charge came in November 2024, when Usman alias Chota Waleed, identified by police as a Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba commander, was killed in an encounter in Srinagar’s Khanyar area.
Police said Usman had been active in the Valley for a considerable period and was involved in several terror crimes, including the killing of police inspector Masroor Wani.
The Khanyar operation was conducted jointly by J&K Police and the CRPF, with four security personnel injured during the prolonged encounter.
The elimination of Usman was significant because he was not a newly recruited militant but an experienced foreign commander who had operated in Kashmir for years.
It also demonstrated the importance of sustained intelligence development and coordinated ground operations in tracking foreign terrorists who had managed to evade security forces for extended periods.
HAIDER: THE COMMANDER HIDING IN JAMMU’S FORESTS
The next major leadership blow came in the Jammu region.
On June 26, 2025, security forces killed Haider alias Maulvi, a Pakistani terrorist identified by DGP Nalin Prabhat as a top commander of Jaish-e-Mohammed.
Haider had reportedly been operating in the Dudu-Basantgarh area of Udhampur for around four years.
Prabhat described the operation as a “very big success” and said the anti-terror campaign in the area was continuing.
The significance of Haider’s elimination went beyond the loss of another terrorist.
It demonstrated that a senior foreign commander who had managed to survive for years in the forests of Jammu could still be tracked and eliminated.
The operation also highlighted the changing geography of terrorism in J&K — and the response of the security forces.
THE PAHALGAM MANHUNT
The most high-profile elimination during Prabhat’s tenure before the latest operation came after the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack.
The attack triggered a major manhunt for the perpetrators and their associates.
The hunt culminated in Operation Mahadev in July 2025, when three terrorists were killed in the Dachigam-Lidwas area in a joint operation involving the Army, CRPF and Jammu and Kashmir Police.
Among those killed was Suleman, who the MHA has now identified as one of the four senior Lashkar-e-Taiba commanders operating in J&K since 2022.
The government’s latest statement places the Mahadev operation within a larger counter-terror campaign against the Lashkar leadership structure operating in the Union Territory.
The significance of Operation Mahadev therefore extends beyond the Pahalgam investigation. It was one of the operations that dismantled a key component of the Lashkar network that the security forces had been pursuing for years.
THE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK BEHIND THE OPERATIONS
While encounters are the visible end of counter-terror operations, the intelligence-gathering process often begins much earlier.
Information about a terrorist’s movement, shelter, associates and support network has to be developed, corroborated and converted into actionable intelligence.
This is where the Jammu and Kashmir Police’s local intelligence network assumes particular importance.
Army officials have on several occasions publicly acknowledged that human intelligence generated by J&K Police on the ground has played a critical role in successful counter-terror operations.
The latest MHA statement on Musa reinforces the broader intelligence-led character of these operations, explicitly referring to both technical and human intelligence about his movement and presence.
In Musa’s case, the government said security forces had been pursuing him for a long time before a specific all-stakeholder plan was put in place.
This is significant.
The operation was not simply a response to a terrorist being spotted.
It was the culmination of a sustained intelligence effort followed by coordination between multiple security agencies.
J&K Police’s local intelligence network, the Army’s operational capabilities and surveillance resources, CRPF and CAPF deployment, and the capabilities of other agencies all form parts of the larger security architecture.
The exact contribution of each agency varies from operation to operation.
But the common denominator is increasingly clear: intelligence is converted into coordinated operations involving multiple forces.
THE FIGHT MOVES DEEPER INTO JAMMU
If Usman represented the hunt for an established commander in the Valley and the Pahalgam-linked operations represented the pursuit of terrorists responsible for a major attack, Haider represented another emerging challenge — the attempt by foreign terrorists to establish themselves in Jammu’s forests.
That challenge has remained central to the counter-terror strategy.
The Udhampur-Kathua belt, along with the forests and higher reaches of neighbouring districts, has become an important operational theatre.
Security forces have responded with sustained searches, intelligence-based operations, joint posts, area domination and greater deployment of specialised police units.
The Army’s extensive counter-insurgency experience and ability to operate in difficult mountainous terrain remains important in these operations, while the CRPF and J&K Police provide sustained ground presence and local operational capabilities.
The aim is to ensure that forests do not become permanent safe havens for foreign terrorists.
OPERATION SOAN AND THE PRESSURE ON FOREIGN TERRORISTS
The campaign has continued into September 2026.
Two Pakistani Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists — Saddam and Mustafa — were killed in Operation Soan in the Brattal-Sohan and Khubban forests of Udhampur’s Majalta area.
The operation was conducted jointly by the Army, J&K Police and CRPF following intelligence inputs about terrorist movement.
Weapons recovered included an AK assault rifle, an M4 carbine, a Glock pistol and grenades.
Days later, Prabhat visited Udhampur and reviewed ongoing counter-terror operations along the Udhampur-Kathua belt.
The operation demonstrated that the security forces continue to maintain pressure on foreign terrorist groups attempting to establish themselves in the Jammu forests.
MUSA: THE LATEST LINK IN THE CHAIN
The killing of Musa on September 30 adds another significant entry to this record.
Unlike a short-duration operation triggered by an immediate sighting, the MHA describes Musa’s pursuit as a long-sustained intelligence-led campaign.
Operation Sheruwali began in May 2026.
Security forces continued to pursue Musa for months, eventually receiving technical and human intelligence regarding his movement and presence.
A specific all-stakeholder plan was then put in place.
Musa was finally neutralised at Gurwatkalan in Budgam.
For the security establishment, the operation represents the culmination of a long effort to dismantle a Lashkar leadership group that had remained active in Jammu and Kashmir since 2022.
For J&K Police, it is another example of the intelligence-to-operation model that has become central to counter-terrorism in the Union Territory.
And for the wider security grid, it is another example of the Army, police and Central Armed Police Forces operating together against a common target.
THE NUMBERS TELL ANOTHER PART OF THE STORY
The record of Prabhat’s tenure is not limited to individual encounters.
Local recruitment had fallen from around 194 in 2020 to one in 2025, with no local recruitment reported so far in 2026. Agencies believe only five local terrorists were operating in the Union Territory, with the remaining active terrorists being Pakistanis.
Separately, NITI Aayog figures reported in September 2026 showed that youth recruitment into terrorism had fallen by about 99 per cent between 2018 and 2025, from 199 cases to two. The same dataset showed terrorist incidents falling from 228 in 2018 to 12 in 2025.
The figures provide another measure of the changing security environment.
From killing terrorists to preventing regeneration, the counter-terror campaign has increasingly focused on more than encounters.
J&K Police has simultaneously targeted terrorist associates, support networks and terror financing.
Prabhat has said that properties belonging to handlers, senior ideologues and commanders operating from across the border have been attached at significant levels.
He has also repeatedly highlighted the link between narcotics and terrorism, making the fight against narco-terror networks another component of the broader counter-terror campaign.
The objective is to make it harder for terrorist organisations to replace the commanders and cadres they lose.
A COMMANDER WITH AN OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND
Prabhat’s approach is also shaped by his own operational career.
Before becoming J&K Police chief, he served in counter-insurgency roles in Jammu and Kashmir and with the CRPF.
He also headed the Greyhounds, the specialised anti-Naxal force, and served as Director General of the National Security Guard.
That experience is reflected in the operational emphasis visible in J&K today — intelligence-led operations, specialised units, inter-agency coordination and sustained pressure on terrorist leadership.
But the larger story is one of institutional coordination.
J&K Police brings its local intelligence and policing network.
The Army brings extensive counter-insurgency experience, surveillance, area domination and combat capabilities.
The CRPF and other CAPFs provide sustained deployment and operational support.
Other specialised agencies contribute intelligence and technical capabilities.
Together, these capabilities form the security grid within which individual counter-terror operations are conducted.
THE PRABHAT RECORD
Nearly two years into his tenure, the major counter-terror successes associated with the period include:
Usman alias Chota Waleed — Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba commander, killed in Khanyar, Srinagar, November 2024.
Haider alias Maulvi — Pakistani Jaish-e-Mohammed top commander, active in the Basantgarh area for around four years, killed in June 2025.
Suleman — senior Lashkar-e-Taiba commander and one of the four-member group identified by the MHA, killed during Operation Mahadev in July 2025.
Yasir — another member of the four-member Lashkar group, killed during Operation Asdhar on September 4, 2026.
Musa alias Asif Fauji — senior Lashkar-e-Taiba commander and final surviving member of the four-member group, killed during Operation Sheruwali at Gurwatkalan, Budgam, on September 30, 2026.
Saddam and Mustafa — Pakistani Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists killed during Operation Soan in Udhampur in September 2026.
The significance of the record is not simply the number of terrorists killed.
It is the profile of the targets — and the system used to locate them.
Experienced foreign commanders have been eliminated. Terrorists linked by authorities to major attacks have been hunted down. Foreign cadres attempting to establish themselves in the Jammu forests have faced sustained operations.
And behind many of these operations has been an intelligence-led security architecture involving the Jammu and Kashmir Police, Army, CRPF and other Central Armed Police Forces.
The MHA’s latest statement on Musa perhaps sums up that model most clearly: a long pursuit, technical and human intelligence, an all-stakeholder plan and a joint operation.
The threat has not disappeared.
Pakistan-based terrorist organisations continue to attempt to maintain a presence in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly through foreign terrorists operating in difficult terrain.
But the security response under Prabhat has increasingly centred on several interconnected objectives: hit the leadership, hunt the foreign terrorists, deny them safe havens, disrupt their support networks, strengthen intelligence gathering and prevent the generation of a new pool of local recruits.
For the J&K Police chief, the elimination of high-value terrorist commanders has become one of the defining features of his tenure.
But those successes are ultimately the product of a much larger security grid — one in which human intelligence developed on the ground, technical intelligence, Army capabilities, police resources, CRPF and CAPF deployment and inter-agency coordination come together to track terrorists who attempt to disappear.
They can run.
But, as the J&K Police message says: they cannot hide.
Quick Answers
The killing of senior Lashkar-e-Taiba commander Musa, also known as Asif Fauji, on September 30, 2026, successfully neutralised the final surviving member of a four-member Lashkar group operating in Jammu and Kashmir since 2022. The Ministry of Home Affairs noted that Musa’s elimination dealt a serious blow to the Lashkar-e-Taiba ecosystem after an intelligence-led operation under Operation Sheruwali.
About the Author
A defence journalist, Tejinder Singh Sodhi has the distinction of being the only Indian civilian to have studied at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
In his c…Read More
Srinagar, India, India
September 30, 2026, 17:18 IST
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