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India’s preferred outcome is complicated: a world in which it is important enough to have a seat at every table and independent enough not to belong exclusively to any of them
New Delhi’s immediate challenge right now is to prevent the grouping from becoming a China-centric platform while using it to advance India’s larger Global South agenda. (Reuters)
Two photographs are likely to define India’s diplomatic balancing act this September.
The first is already here: Prime Minister Narendra Modi standing alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek. The second could come in New Delhi next week, when leaders of the expanded BRICS grouping gather for the 18th summit under India’s chairmanship.
On the face of it, this looks like a perfect showcase for India’s long-standing doctrine of strategic autonomy: talking to everyone, joining no camp and keeping India’s options open.
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But the geopolitical backdrop has made that balancing act considerably harder.
The US remains an important partner for India in trade, technology, defence and investment. Russia remains crucial for energy and defence supplies. China is simultaneously India’s largest strategic challenge and an important economic power that New Delhi cannot simply ignore.
To add to it, BRICS itself has changed.
The grouping that began with Brazil, Russia, India and China, later adding South Africa, has expanded into a much larger Global South platform. India is now preparing to host a grouping whose members have very different relationships with Washington, Moscow and Beijing.
New Delhi’s immediate challenge right now is to prevent the grouping from becoming a China-centric platform while using it to advance India’s larger Global South agenda.
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So, what exactly is India trying to balance?
Russia: The Old Friend India Can’t Afford To Lose
Russia remains one of India’s most important strategic relationships that goes well beyond nostalgia from the Cold War era. Russia remains a major supplier of defence equipment and, more recently, has become India’s most important source of crude oil.
According to India Today, Russia now accounts for roughly two out of every five dollars India spends on petroleum, making Moscow difficult to replace overnight.
There is also a financial dimension. Reuters reported on Tuesday that India and Russia have developed a rupee-rouble payment mechanism that now facilitates 96 per cent of bilateral trade, helping both countries work around some of the payment difficulties created by Western sanctions.
For India, therefore, maintaining the Moscow relationship is not simply about keeping Vladimir Putin happy. It is about energy security, defence supplies, payments and strategic leverage.
On the other hand is a complication one can’t ignore: Russia’s increasingly close relationship with China.
Moscow’s dependence on Beijing has grown since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent Western sanctions. India does not want Russia to become exclusively embedded in a China-led strategic ecosystem.
China: The Neighbour India Can’t Ignore
If Russia is India’s old strategic partner, China is its most complicated one.
The two countries remain competitors along the disputed Himalayan border. The 2020 Galwan clash fundamentally altered bilateral relations, and mistrust has not disappeared.
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However, diplomacy has resumed. PM Modi’s recent interaction with Xi Jinping in Bishkek comes amid a gradual effort to stabilise ties. Yet, even as political engagement improves, India’s concerns about Chinese strategic influence remain.
A telling example came on Thursday, when Reuters reported that India had stalled a proposed link between UPI and China’s Alipay+ over security, data-privacy and other concerns.
In other words, engagement with China does not mean trust with China. And BRICS presents India with precisely that dilemma.
China has enormous economic weight within the grouping. Beijing is also one of the strongest advocates of a more multipolar international order and reduced dependence on Western-dominated institutions. India broadly supports a more representative global order.
But New Delhi does not want that argument to become shorthand for China setting the rules.
And Then There Is America
This is where India’s BRICS balancing act becomes particularly interesting.
India is part of the Quad with the US, Japan and Australia. It has dramatically deepened defence and technology cooperation with Washington over the past decade. American companies are major investors in India, while the US is one of India’s most important export markets.
At the same time, Washington has repeatedly objected to India’s continued purchase of Russian oil, even as India’s position has essentially been that its energy requirements cannot be dictated by geopolitical blocs.
That logic is becoming increasingly important as the international system itself becomes more fragmented.
The US is pushing its own alliances and economic priorities. China is promoting a larger role for the Global South and alternative institutions. And Russia is attempting to maintain its influence despite Western sanctions.
India wants relationships with all three.
Why BRICS Matters To India
India’s BRICS presidency comes at a particularly important moment because the organisation is no longer the relatively small five-member grouping it once was.
The expanded BRICS now brings together major economies, energy producers and countries representing large parts of the Global South.
The combined economic output of the 10-member BRICS grouping, measured using purchasing-power parity, was about $88 trillion, compared with around $62 trillion for the G7, based on IMF data.
That does not mean BRICS has become a replacement for the G7. But it does demonstrate why India sees value in the platform.
New Delhi can use BRICS to push issues such as development finance, energy security, technology, trade, reform of global institutions and greater representation for developing countries.
India’s own 2026 BRICS theme is “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.” The government says the chair-ship is focused on practical cooperation rather than merely geopolitical rhetoric.
Over 350 BRICS meetings and high-level engagements have been held across more than 25 Indian cities during India’s chair-ship, according to the Indian government. The agenda has included agriculture, industry, science and technology, culture, energy and finance.
That is important because India has an interest in making BRICS useful, not simply anti-Western.
The China Conundrum
This may be India’s biggest challenge.
The larger BRICS becomes, the greater the possibility that its agenda could be shaped by the countries with the greatest economic and diplomatic weight. China is clearly one of them.
India therefore has to walk a narrow line: Support a stronger Global South without allowing BRICS to become an instrument of Chinese strategic influence.
This is also why India is likely to favour practical areas of cooperation—development, technology, connectivity, health, food security and energy—rather than turning BRICS into a military or ideological alliance.
The distinction matters as India can support a multipolar world without becoming part of a China-Russia geopolitical bloc.
The West Is Watching Too
The optics of the New Delhi summit will matter. A Modi-Xi-Putin photograph at an Indian-hosted BRICS summit will inevitably be interpreted in Washington and European capitals.
But India is unlikely to see the photograph in those terms.
New Delhi’s argument is that maintaining dialogue with Russia and China is not evidence of abandoning the West. In fact, India’s recent diplomatic outreach suggests the opposite.
Ahead of the BRICS summit, India has been simultaneously engaging major partners on different fronts. The Economic Times reported that India’s senior leadership has been conducting parallel outreach on trade, technology, energy, investment and security, including visits involving the US, Russia, China and Japan.
The message is fairly straightforward: India does not want to choose a camp when it can negotiate with several camps.
Can India Really Have It Both Ways?
To an extent, yes.
India’s strength is precisely that it is not dependent on a single geopolitical partner. It needs Russian energy but also Western technology. It competes with China but needs stable relations with Beijing. It works with the US on defence and Indo-Pacific security but does not want American foreign policy to dictate its relationship with Moscow. It champions the Global South but also wants access to Western capital and markets.
That creates friction, but it also creates leverage.
The danger is that strategic autonomy can become harder to maintain when the major powers themselves increasingly demand clearer alignment.
The Russia-Ukraine war demonstrated this. The Iran-US confrontation has added another layer. US-China competition is reshaping trade and technology. And the global economy is increasingly being divided along strategic lines.
India’s answer has so far been multi-alignment rather than non-alignment—cooperate with different powers on different issues, depending on India’s interests.
What To Watch At The Delhi Summit
The 18th BRICS Summit, scheduled for September 12-13 at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi, will therefore be about more than the usual declaration and family photograph.
Three things will be particularly important.
China: Will India and China use the summit to push their recent diplomatic thaw further, or will their strategic differences remain visible?
Russia: Will India use BRICS to deepen energy, trade, payments and technology cooperation with Moscow while avoiding the impression that it is endorsing Russia’s confrontation with the West?
BRICS Agenda Itself: Will India manage to keep the grouping focused on development and Global South priorities rather than allowing it to become primarily an anti-US platform?
That last question may ultimately determine the success of India’s presidency.
India does not need BRICS to become stronger at the expense of the West. Nor does it need the West to weaken BRICS. Its preferred outcome is considerably more complicated: a world in which India is important enough to have a seat at every table and independent enough not to belong exclusively to any of them.
That is the diplomatic balancing act awaiting New Delhi when BRICS leaders arrive next week.
Quick Answers
India balances its ties by pursuing a policy of multi-alignment, engaging simultaneously with multiple power centres to maintain its strategic autonomy. This approach allows India to work with different countries on energy, defence, trade, and security without committing to any single geopolitical camp. Specifically, India is maintaining close ties with Russia and working to stabilise its relationship with China, while simultaneously deepening its strategic partnership with the US and the West.
About the Author
Apoorva Misra is an Associate Editor at News18.com with a keen interest in politics and current affairs. She loves uncovering fresh angles and telling stories through long-form features and explainers…Read More
September 04, 2026, 07:41 IST
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