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New Delhi wants a multipolar world. But it also needs to ensure that multipolarity does not become a euphemism for a world run by three major powers
The ‘G3’ refers to the possibility of the US, China and Russia emerging as the three principal powers negotiating the shape of the international order. (Reuters)
The idea of a new Trump-Xi-Putin ‘G3’ may sound premature, but the possibility of the three leaders coordinating directly is already raising a strategic question for India: What happens if the world’s biggest powers begin negotiating major global issues in a smaller circle, outside forums such as BRICS?
The question comes into sharper focus as India hosts the BRICS summit in Delhi, with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin among the key leaders attending. At the same time, US President Donald Trump has shown a preference for leader-to-leader diplomacy with both Moscow and Beijing.
What Is The Trump-Xi-Putin G3?
The ‘G3’ is not an established group or alliance. It refers to the possibility of the US, China and Russia emerging as the three principal powers negotiating the shape of the international order.
The immediate trigger is the possibility of a Trump-Xi-Putin meeting at the APEC summit in Shenzhen in November. The Kremlin has confirmed that Putin and Xi have discussed such a trilateral meeting with Trump.
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Such a meeting would not automatically create a formal bloc. But it would be significant because the three countries collectively possess enormous military, economic, technological and diplomatic weight.
The larger concern is therefore not whether a formal ‘G3’ is created, but whether Washington, Beijing and Moscow increasingly start making big strategic bargains among themselves.
Why Is This Happening Now?
There are separate reasons for all three countries to explore direct engagement.
1. Trump Wants Deals With Both Xi And Putin
Trump has consistently favoured personal diplomacy and has argued that direct relationships with leaders can help resolve major disputes.
With Russia, the immediate issue is the Ukraine war. American diplomatic efforts have reopened channels between Washington, Moscow and Kyiv, although fundamental differences remain and both Russia and Ukraine continue preparing for possible escalation. With China, the agenda is much broader: trade, technology restrictions, Chinese purchases from the US, rare earths, supply chains and Taiwan.
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A Trump-Xi meeting could therefore involve negotiations extending well beyond trade.
2. Putin Wants An Exit From A Costly War
Russia has been fighting in Ukraine for more than four years, with no decisive victory.
For Moscow, a direct relationship with Washington could potentially help reduce pressure, secure a negotiated outcome or improve Russia’s international position.
At the same time, Putin has no interest in surrendering Russia’s relationship with China. Moscow therefore has an incentive to maintain ties with both Washington and Beijing rather than become completely dependent on either.
3. Xi Wants China Recognised As A Global Power
Xi’s recent diplomatic schedule illustrates China’s effort to position itself simultaneously as a leader of the Global South and as a power capable of dealing directly with Washington. His engagements around the SCO, BRICS and other forums culminate in an expected meeting with Trump later this month.
For Beijing, a direct seat at the table with Washington and Moscow would reinforce its argument that China is not simply another major power; it is one of the countries shaping the international system.
But How Does This Challenge BRICS?
This is where the contradiction becomes important.
BRICS is much larger than three countries. It has expanded well beyond its original five members and now includes countries with sharply different interests.
India, China and Russia may cooperate within BRICS, but they do not have identical strategic objectives.
The expansion has actually made consensus more difficult. The divisions between Iran and the UAE over the Iran conflict are one example—Iran wanted stronger condemnation of US-Israeli military action, while the UAE stressed sovereignty, civilian infrastructure and freedom of navigation. The disagreement was serious enough to prevent BRICS foreign ministers from issuing a consensual joint statement in Delhi in May.
That raises an uncomfortable question: Can a large BRICS reach agreement on major geopolitical questions when its members themselves have competing interests?
A three-power conversation may sometimes be far easier.
The G3 would involve three major powers where decisions could be taken through direct leader-to-leader bargaining. US, China and Russia could potentially shape security and strategic bargains and the G3 could represent a concentration of power among three countries.
BRICS, meanwhile, is an expanded grouping of major and emerging economies. It seeks greater influence for emerging economies and institutional reform and the decisions require broader consensus.
The key difference is concentration of power. BRICS represents a broad coalition. A G3 would represent a concentration of power among three countries.
Why Should India Be Worried?
The biggest concern is exclusion. India has invested heavily in the idea of a multipolar world, one in which no single country dominates international affairs.
BRICS is an important part of that strategy. India can sit alongside China and Russia while simultaneously maintaining relationships with the US, Europe, Japan and other powers.
But imagine a world in which the biggest strategic decisions increasingly happen in conversations between Trump, Xi and Putin. India could find itself in the unusual position of being an important BRICS member but outside the most consequential strategic conversations.
C Raja Mohan argues in The Indian Express that this could generate greater anxiety in Delhi than the prospect of a US-China ‘G2’, because India has traditionally seen BRICS and its partnerships with Moscow and Beijing as instruments for advancing multipolarity.
Could Russia, China Actually Abandon BRICS For US?
Not necessarily. A G3 does not mean Russia and China would suddenly become US allies.
Russia and China remain closely aligned and share concerns about American dominance. But both countries also want to retain the freedom to negotiate with Washington. That is precisely what makes the potential G3 significant.
BRICS and engagement with the US are not necessarily alternatives for Moscow and Beijing. They can use BRICS to expand their diplomatic options while simultaneously negotiating directly with Washington.
India may need to adopt the same approach.
What Happens To India’s Russia Strategy?
This could be particularly complicated.
Russia remains important to India’s defence, energy and strategic calculations. Putin’s visit to India for the BRICS summit is expected to include discussions on energy and defence, while the two countries are also exploring cooperation in areas such as rare earth minerals.
But if Moscow begins pursuing a more pragmatic accommodation with Washington, India’s traditional assumption that Russia will remain firmly positioned against the West becomes less useful.
The China Conundrum
This may be the most immediate challenge.
India is simultaneously trying to stabilise its relationship with China and manage its strategic competition with Beijing. Xi’s visit to India for the BRICS summit, his first since 2019, creates an opportunity for PM Modi and Xi Jinping to discuss the border situation and economic ties.
But China’s willingness to engage with India does not mean its strategic rivalry with India has disappeared.
In fact, a stronger China-US relationship could potentially give Beijing greater diplomatic room to deal with India from a position of strength.
For India, therefore, the objective cannot simply be to improve ties with Beijing. It has to preserve enough strategic and economic leverage to ensure that improving India-China relations does not come at India’s expense.
The same applies to China. India cannot assume that because China and Russia cooperate closely with each other, they will necessarily coordinate their policies in ways favourable to Indian interests.
Does This Mean BRICS Is Becoming Irrelevant?
No. BRICS remains valuable precisely because it gives India a platform where it can engage simultaneously with China, Russia and other emerging powers.
India is also using its 2026 BRICS presidency to push practical cooperation in areas such as trade, technology, digital finance, resilient supply chains, agriculture and sustainable development.
The more relevant question is whether BRICS can remain useful without turning itself into an anti-Western bloc. That distinction matters enormously for India.
India has little interest in replacing Western dominance with Chinese or Russian dominance. Its preferred model is a multipolar world in which India itself is one of the poles.
So, What Should India Do?
The answer is not to abandon BRICS. It is to avoid becoming dependent on BRICS.
There are three broad challenges for New Delhi.
1. Build Greater National Power: The stronger India’s economy, technology, military capabilities and strategic industries become, the harder it will be to exclude India from major global negotiations.
2. Multipolarity Isn’t Equal To Anti-Americanism: This could be the biggest lesson from the emerging G3 possibility. Russia and China can cooperate through BRICS while simultaneously negotiating with Washington. India should be equally comfortable doing both. It can deepen BRICS cooperation and strengthen ties with the US, Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia and other partners.
3. Build More Partnerships Outside BRICS: India’s strategic space cannot depend on one grouping. Its relationships with Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the US and other middle powers become more important if the world’s biggest powers begin negotiating among themselves. India should intensify bilateral and minilateral cooperation with the Anglosphere, Europe, Japan, Korea, Brazil and other middle powers that have little interest in a G3-driven global order.
New Delhi wants a multipolar world. But it also needs to ensure that multipolarity does not become a euphemism for a world run by three major powers. And that may be the real foreign-policy challenge posed by the emerging Trump-Xi-Putin equation.
Quick Answers
The ‘G3’ refers to the potential for the US, China, and Russia to emerge as the three primary powers negotiating the international order, possibly through direct leader-to-leader meetings. It is significant because these three countries collectively possess enormous military, economic, technological, and diplomatic weight, allowing them to make major strategic bargains among themselves outside of larger forums like BRICS.
About the Author
Apoorva Misra is an Associate Editor at News18.com with a keen interest in politics and current affairs. She loves uncovering fresh angles and telling stories through long-form features and explainers…Read More
September 09, 2026, 16:32 IST
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