The past few days have seen a fresh wave of attacks by the Myanmar army in Rakhine state to regain control of areas under the control of the Arakan Army (AA). The districts directly attacked are Maungdaw and Buthidaung and Rathedaung, which lie directly on the border with Bangladesh, separated by a small section of the Naf River. This has increased concerns over the fresh influx of Rohingyas into Bangladesh. Ironically, as the region grapples with conflict, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi concluded his Naypyidaw visit and signed new agreements to accelerate the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. And during the recent visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister (PM) Tariq Rahman to Beijing, the two sides discussed the prospects of the Bangladesh-China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCMEC) connecting Yunnan province to Chittagong and Mongla ports through Myanmar.
These developments are not coincidental but indicate changing strategic realities in one of Asia’s most important geographies. The Bangladesh–Myanmar border area is strategically located in the Bay of Bengal at the junction of South Asia and Southeast Asia. The border area is no longer just a humanitarian emergency. Within this dense space, multiple structural realities intersect – the domestic civil war in Myanmar, particularly heightened tensions in Rakhine State, a refugee crisis that has pushed millions of Rohingya into Bangladesh, an assertive China with its economic weight and corridor diplomacy, and India’s connectivity and security concerns.
Bangladesh and Myanmar share a relatively short but important and complex border of 271 kilometers. Relations between the two countries have deteriorated from time to time under the burden of the Rohingya crisis. The first major influx of refugees occurred in 1978, when approximately 200,000 Rohingya fled the military campaign in Rakhine. A repatriation agreement was signed, but never implemented. This pattern continued over time and reached its peak in 2017, when the Myanmar military’s brutal clearance operations in Rakhine pushed more than 700,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh. And Cox’s Bazar became home to the world’s largest refugee settlement.
Following the 2021 military takeover in Myanmar, the State Administration Council made no meaningful commitment to creating conditions for Rohingya return. Additionally, the ongoing civil war, especially after Operation 1027, destroyed whatever security existed in the border areas. Even Arakan has been implicated by HRW in abuses against Rohingya Muslims, adding another layer of resistance to Dhaka’s repatriation calculus. The result is that Bangladesh-Myanmar relations are driven by border incidents, refugee flows and periodic diplomacy of necessity rather than any positive bilateral engagement.
In early July 2026, people of Teknaf, the southernmost point of Cox’s Bazar district, separated from Maungdaw township by the narrow Naf River, reported a resurgence in attacks by the Myanmar military to regain control. The military has also deployed naval forces off the Ramree coast, along with at least 30 warships off Hinggi Island. Having captured 14 out of 17 townships, the AA has yet to capture Kyaukphyu, Sittwe and Manoung Island. While Manong is an isolated island, it is unclear why the AA did not capture the other two townships in these months. However recently the AA stated its intention to bring all remaining townships under its control by the end of 2027.
And so, for Bangladesh, the immediate consequence could be another large influx of Rohingya. Bangladesh’s Foreign Ministry said it was closely monitoring the situation and Border Guard Bangladesh had increased patrolling at sensitive crossing points.
On June 26, Xi Jinping and Tariq Rahman proposed an economic corridor linking Yunnan province to Chittagong and Mongla ports through Myanmar, an extension of the existing China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. While Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman has clearly laid down a condition that any overland connectivity through Myanmar must first ensure ‘restoration of peace and stability in Rakhine State’, that seems impossible in the current scenario at least in the near future. The Kyaukphu deep-sea port, vital to the corridor’s western anchor, remains under siege. The Museum-Mandalay Railway has been embroiled in financial disputes and security disruptions.
But it is important to see what the long-term ambition of this corridor is. For Bangladesh, it offers the possibility of establishing Chittagong and Mongla as regional transit hubs. And for China, this goes far beyond economic reasons. Having access to the Arabian Sea through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, this proposed corridor will reduce dependence on the Strait of Malacca and create a shorter overland route to the Bay of Bengal. It should also be noted that BCMEC is not a new idea, it is a revival of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor, which was originally conceived in 1999, from which India backed out due to strategic concerns. And even though China says it is ready for other countries to join, the Indian side certainly has reservations. Interestingly, China also said that the corridor could eventually help facilitate the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, which may not be acceptable to the Myanmar side.
For India, the Bangladesh-Myanmar border crisis represents a threefold challenge. First of all there is lack of connectivity. As China pursues its infrastructure diplomacy with Bangladesh, India’s own projects like Anwara Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone in Chattogram, Teesta river management proposal, cooperation on Mongla port, Bangladesh and Myanmar have stalled. The strategic cost of this delay is far greater. For example, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project which terminates at Sittwe port is now under active siege by the AA. The trilateral highway passes through areas of Rakhine and Chin states that are either under AA control or in active conflict.
Second, there are security concerns in the Northeast. Myanmar’s border states are in active conflict with the military, with the EAO controlling most of the areas in Sagaing, Chin and Rakhine states. This has encouraged Indian insurgent groups to take advantage of the security vacuum. Additionally, these conflict-induced borders have created pathways for arms and drug trafficking as well as the illegal movement of people. Finally, there has been renewed tension in some states in the North-East, although not a result of the Myanmar conflict, but certainly exacerbated by it.
The third challenge is China’s aggressive siege of the Indian Ocean. The BCMEC proposal, if it goes ahead even partially, would establish Chinese-managed logistics and port infrastructure at both ends of the Bangladesh-Myanmar coastline, Kyaukphyu and Chittagong/Mongla. And it is well known how China could potentially use this commercial infrastructure to build a dual-use maritime presence along the Bay of Bengal.
The message for India is clear and uncomfortable. Completing the Kaladan Project and reopening the Sittwe Corridor should be treated as a strategic priority and thus engaging with the AA is now a political necessity. It is also important to strengthen relations with the new government of Bangladesh. Most importantly, India must engage the region as an integrated strategic problem, as a joint maritime-land-connectivity challenge in which Myanmar’s civil war, Bangladesh’s restructuring, China’s geopolitical ambitions and India’s North-East security concerns are all dimensions of the same problem.
While Bangladesh has said that they are currently ‘looking into it’; It is important to reiterate that Bangladesh’s long-term interests are structurally more closely linked with those of India. Water, energy, climate adaptation, trade and people-to-people connectivity all run through India-Bangladesh relations. Additionally, examples from the neighborhood are evidence of how Chinese infrastructure projects create strategic dependencies and economic debt for countries. Therefore, India needs to actively engage with regional stakeholders to secure long-term economic and security interests.
(Views expressed are personal)
This article is written by Chhavi Vashishtha, Associate Fellow, Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi.
