The geopolitics of this century is being written not only in the corridors of diplomacy or the waters of disputed seas, but also in the mines, refineries and processing plants that supply the minerals that underpin the modern economy. Lithium powers electric vehicles, cobalt sustains battery technologies, graphite promotes energy storage, and rare earth elements enable everything from wind turbines to precision-guided defense systems. As the world moves towards clean energy, advanced manufacturing and digital technologies, critical minerals have become the strategic commodities of our era.
India has recognized this reality. National Critical Mineral Mission approved with an outlay of Rs. ₹The Rs 16,300 crore aims to strengthen the country’s capabilities in exploration, mining, processing and recycling while reducing import dependence. Yet India cannot achieve strategic autonomy through domestic extraction alone. In the emerging geo-economic order, ownership of mines matters less than influence in the critical mineral value chain – from processing and refining to technology and market access. This is where India’s next strategic leap should take place.
For decades, the global critical minerals ecosystem was built on a simple division of labor. Resource-rich countries exported raw materials, while industrialized economies processed them and captured high-value segments of the supply chain. That model is now changing. In Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, governments are looking for local value addition rather than simply acting as suppliers of raw ore. Indonesia’s ban on nickel ore exports, which helped stimulate the domestic processing industry, has become a widely discussed example. Similar sentiments are seen in many mineral-rich economies that seek to extract more employment, technology transfer and industrial benefits from their resources.
This shift provides an opportunity for India to secure influence not only as a resource buyer but also as a long-term industrial partner. India’s objective should move beyond acquiring mining concessions to co-investing in refining, processing, research and downstream manufacturing ecosystems in resource-rich partner countries. Such partnerships would be politically more sustainable, in line with the developmental aspirations of resource-rich countries, and provide India with a flexible supply chain in the long term.
The argument is particularly compelling because the real disruption to global critical minerals supply chains is not in mining but in processing. China’s dominance in mineral resources is often discussed, yet its decisive advantage lies in refining capacity. It controls a large share of global processing of many important minerals and rare earth elements. As a result, many countries possessing mineral reserves still rely on Chinese processing infrastructure before materials can enter the global manufacturing supply chain. This is a strategic concern in advanced economies and has intensified efforts to diversify supply networks. Recent export restrictions and geopolitical tensions have further strengthened these concerns.
India’s partnership with the EU is particularly important as the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act seeks to diversify mineral supply chains through trusted partnerships. The challenge for both sides is no longer to identify common interests but to translate political intent into operational outcomes. This requires moving beyond declarations to aligning regulatory, sustainability and certification frameworks while enabling financial institutions to support joint projects in third countries. As global competitiveness increasingly depends on the efficiency of the regulatory ecosystem, strong coordination and implementation capacity will be essential to prevent promising partnerships from remaining aspirational.
The recently unveiled Quad Critical Minerals Initiative is an important step towards building resilient supply chains, mobilizing up to US$20 billion in mining, processing, recycling, project finance, technology and regulatory cooperation. Recognizing that resilience depends on the entire ecosystem rather than extraction alone, this initiative leverages the complementary strengths of Australia’s mineral reserves, Japan’s technological expertise, America’s capital and innovation, and India’s potential as a manufacturing and processing hub for the Indo-Pacific. However, realizing this vision will require greater institutional ambition from India.
A central weakness in India’s current approach is financing. Mining and processing projects are capital-intensive, politically risky and have long construction periods. Private investors are often reluctant to take these risks independently. Strategic competitors understand this reality. Around the world, governments are increasingly deploying sovereign financing, export credit mechanisms, development banks and public guarantees to support critical mineral investments.
Thus, India should set up a sovereign-backed critical minerals investment facility to provide patient capital, de-risk foreign acquisitions and support processing infrastructure in strategically important jurisdictions. Beyond financing projects, such a mechanism would signal a long-term commitment to partner countries, recognizing that resource diplomacy requires the confidence and strategic assurance that sovereign partnerships can provide.
This imperative also points to the need for reforms in Mineral Foreign India Limited (KABIL). Envisioned as India’s principal vehicle for securing critical mineral assets abroad, KABIL has yet to evolve into the proactive strategic institution that contemporary realities demand. This requires greater financial flexibility, professional expertise, international participation and operational autonomy. Its mandate should move beyond acquisitions to integrated participation in mining, processing and downstream industries. A strong KABIL can become the institutional bridge connecting India’s diplomatic, commercial and industrial objectives.
The geography of competition for critical minerals in the future further underlines the importance of Southeast Asia. The region is traversed by major sea routes, has significant mineral resources and is hosting a manufacturing ecosystem linked to increasingly global supply chains. Indonesia has already emerged as a major hub for battery-related investments. Vietnam is expanding its role in electronics and strategic manufacturing. Thailand and Malaysia continue to attract technology-intensive industries.
Myanmar occupies a particularly sensitive position in this scenario. Despite its political instability, the country has significant rare earth resources and is strategically located linking South and Southeast Asia. The recent diplomatic engagement between India and Myanmar reflects not only security considerations but also the growing importance of economic and resource cooperation. As competition over critical minerals intensifies, Myanmar’s importance is likely to grow rather than diminish. India must engage pragmatically while balancing strategic interests, regional stability and developmental concerns.
At the same time, India should avoid viewing critical minerals solely through the prism of extraction, as processing and value-addition partnerships may prove more consequential than mining rights in determining economic and strategic impact. It is equally important to address the neglected human-capital dimension: along with securing assets and building processing capacity, India must develop a specialized workforce of geologists, metallurgists, mineral economists, environmental scientists, supply-chain analysts and resource diplomates through strong collaboration between universities, research institutes and industry. In the coming decades, leadership in critical minerals will depend not only on resources but also on expertise.
The strategic dialogue should also extend to recycling and circular economy practices. The Quad framework emphasizes recovery of critical minerals from electronic waste and industrial scrap. As demand accelerates globally, secondary sources will become increasingly important. India, with its growing industrial base and large consumer market, has significant potential to emerge as a leader in mineral recycling technologies. Such capabilities will reduce import dependence while creating new economic opportunities.
The emerging critical minerals order is often seen as a competition between China and the West. That interpretation is too narrow. What is unfolding is a massive restructuring of global industrial geography. As resource-rich nations seek to add more value, advanced economies seek supply-chain diversification and developing countries prioritize industrialization, new partnerships across sectors and regions are critical.
India’s opportunity lies not only in securing critical minerals, but also in shaping the supply chains that will define future economic and strategic power. Achieving this requires a comprehensive strategy spanning finance, processing, technology, diplomacy, regulation and human capital. The real measure of success will not be the number of overseas mining assets acquired by India, but its political will and refining capacity, technological capabilities, financial instruments and ability to form international partnerships that convert geological resources into strategic advantage. In the age of critical minerals, power will not belong to those who own the resources, but to those who create the greatest value from them.
(Views expressed are personal)
This article is written by political analyst and columnist Amal Chandra.
