India’s emphasis on Indo-Pacific region alerts China

Beijing’s reaction to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s visit to India is very telling. China publicly warned that India-Japan relations should not “target a third country”, a thinly veiled code for itself. Chinese propaganda outlets also resorted to trivial innuendos – such as Takaichi saying he would not drink Indian water – to discredit the visit and downplay relations in the domestic and international media.

Gupta puts this in a broader context: With President Trump With “virtual withdrawal” from broader East and Southeast Asian security management and Washington now focused squarely on China, the first island chain countries—Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia—will increasingly have to take care of their own security. In this backdrop, the India-Japan convergence is very troubling for Beijing, which still sees itself as the hegemon in the South China Sea and interprets almost any Indian move – be it the Quad, ties with Japan or access to Indonesia – as inherently anti-China, even as it quietly uses Pakistan and other neighbors to put pressure on India.

Indonesia is more than a friendly ASEAN partner; It is a close neighbor from geographical and strategic point of view. Indira Point, India’s southernmost tip in Great Nicobar, is located barely 140-145 kilometers from Banda Aceh in Sumatra, connecting the two countries through a narrow sea gap. Indonesia virtually controls the entry routes into the South China Sea through the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Ombai-Vetatar, dominating three of the four major chokepoints for global commercial shipping. For India, building closer defense ties with Jakarta – including the sale of nearly $100 million of BrahMos missile batteries – is about securing these arteries and shaping the rules of access in the theater where China seeks particular influence.

Australia and New Zealand represent a different but complementary axis: resource security and long-term economic integration. Canberra is rich in critical minerals and is a potential uranium supplier, but large-scale Indian access depends on finalizing a comprehensive economic partnership agreement, which is subject to discussion over an existing FTA. New Zealand already has a free trade agreement with India, and New Delhi is eyeing a deeper FTA in the future. Together with Indonesia and Japan, these partners form the backbone of India’s effort to weave independent alternative global supply chains to reduce dependence on any single external guarantor for resources, energy and food.

Japan is located at the northern end, where strategic convergence now dictates relations. The Philippines is already part of this emerging group, having received BrahMos missiles from India. Indonesia is next in line to bridge the Bay of Bengal to the South China Sea. Australia and New Zealand expand into the Pacific, linking defence, trade and resource partnerships.

Importantly, Gupta emphasizes that India is “not targeting any country” through these steps. Instead, New Delhi is focusing on broader security—resources, energy, food—so that it becomes self-reliant and not dependent on any single power or supply chain. The message is that while the US is now engaging directly with China, India cannot and will not outsource it China problem—or its broader maritime security—for a third power.

Teesta is hydrologically and strategically sensitive. This river originates from Sikkim; Most of its course is in India, with only 105–120 kilometers in Bangladesh before emptying into the Yamuna. Inviting China to build infrastructure on this stretch raises red flags in New Delhi as the area is located close to the “chicken neck” – Siliguri Corridor, the narrow land bridge across India’s north-east. Under Sheikh Hasina, India had offered to develop the Teesta infrastructure itself; Rahman’s counterattack in favor of China is read as a serious concern, even though India is currently in a “wait and see” mode.

Gupta argues that the proposed Myanmar-Bangladesh-China corridor is more of an “unrealistic dream” than an imminent reality. Myanmar recently bombed Rohingya militia camps across the Bangladeshi border, highlighting the poor state of bilateral relations. Internally, Myanmar’s eastern regions are effectively fragmented, controlled by the Buddhist Arakanese Army, Chin and Kachin groups and militias such as the Brotherhood Alliance, leaving the state far from exercising absolute authority. Meanwhile, the Rohingyas have been infiltrated by Pakistan-based and Bangladeshi jihadist groups, making the targeted coastal region highly unstable.

Gupta recalls his experience from India: A port project in Sittwe, linked to the Kaladan corridor, has been incomplete for 25 years despite being conceived in the early 2000s. In this backdrop, he believes Rahman will have to rethink both the Teesta plan and the corridor idea, especially when Myanmar is not entirely comfortable with China and has started re-engaging India to get out of the pariah status.

Chinese projects span Cambodia, efforts at facilities in Myanmar and Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, ventures in the Maldives, a base in Djibouti, Gwadar in Pakistan, Jask in Iran, and interests in the United Arab Emirates, as well as ports along the East African coastline. Many of these have performed poorly: Gwadar is still not fully functional as envisioned; Hambantota, with huge infrastructure and even a barely operating airport, is widely cited as a “disaster”. Yet, overall, they represent Beijing’s ambition to secure turnaround points for its warships in the Indian Ocean and extend its reach in the Pacific beyond the first island chain toward Guam and eventually the US west coast.

India’s response has been to quietly build its own maritime grid. New Delhi is pursuing a major project in Great Nicobar and strengthening its strategic position in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which lie on vital sea routes. It is investing in Lakshadweep, taking advantage of the network of about 162 islands, and exploring bases such as Agalega along with Mauritius. Security advisors have been placed in key regional organisations, and India is actively engaging with Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

Gupta cautioned that India cannot afford complacency; The Chinese navy is growing “by leaps and bounds” and pearling must be “carefully monitored” and countered. At the same time, he stressed that India will not succumb to Chinese maneuvers – be it through Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka or Maldives. He argues that India is not just a regional power and deserves respect commensurate with its weight.

China has already formed a defense alliance with the Solomon Islands near Fiji, bolstering a small group of remote Pacific partners. A missile test in this context puts Chinese allies on edge, sends a warning to Australia – now backed by AUKUS with Japan and the US – and reminds Washington of China’s access to Guam, the key US base in the Pacific.

In Gupta’s view this is a classic posture. China’s substantial nuclear and intermediate-range missile arsenal is largely outside any formal arms-control agreement or treaty, giving Beijing wide leeway for such displays. The underlying message is simple: “I’m there and you better pay attention to me before you do anything else.”

Taken together, the ongoing themes during the Point Blank discussion—India-Japan convergence, First Island Chain diplomacy, concerns over Chinese entry through Bangladesh and Myanmar, the String of Pearls response, and Far Pacific missile signaling—sketches an Indo-Pacific where India is becoming increasingly proactive, building its own security architecture rather than simply reacting to China or relying on distant guarantors.