Lessons of 1973: Why Modi did not repeat Indira Gandhi’s West Asia gambit. india news

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Lessons of 1973: Why Modi did not repeat Indira Gandhi’s West Asia gambit. india news


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Proponents of a more realist approach often point to 1973 as evidence that countries protect their own interests first, regardless of political friendship or diplomatic solidarity.

Indira Gandhi and PM Narendra Modi had different views regarding India’s oil security. (AI-generated image)

The bombs and missiles may have quieted down after the US-Iran ceasefire, but the brief conflict has once again exposed a weakness that has long plagued energy importing countries like India – what happens when war threatens the flow of oil through West Asia.

During the crisis, disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz sent markets on edge and revived concerns about a potential energy shock. For India, the episode inevitably drew comparisons with another West Asian conflict from more than five decades earlier – the 1973 Yom Kippur War – when then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi threw her support behind the Arab bloc, but despite diplomatic support India suffered a severe shock in oil prices.

The contrast with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s approach could hardly be more stark. While Indira Gandhi’s government claimed that political solidarity with Arab countries would protect India’s interests, PM Modi’s supporters argue that New Delhi’s response to the recent Israel-Iran crisis was guided by the same principle: protecting India’s energy security no matter which side prevails. Rather than aligning with any camp, the government focused on diversifying oil supplies, consolidating strategic reserves, and maintaining ties across the region.

Indira Gandhi’s pro-Arab position

The Yom Kippur War broke out in October 1973 when Egypt and Syria suddenly attacked Israel. The conflict rapidly escalated into a broader geopolitical confrontation involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and the major Arab oil-producing countries.

For India, which was heavily dependent on imported crude, the stakes were huge. At the time, New Delhi believed that it was strategically and economically prudent to maintain close ties with the Arab countries. Millions of Indians worked or sought opportunities in the Gulf, while India’s energy dependence on the region continued to grow.

Therefore, Indira Gandhi’s government left no ambiguity about where it stood.

During the conflict, Indira Gandhi openly supported the Arab side. His government blamed Israel for the war and argued that Israeli “assertiveness” was the major cause of hostilities. India’s diplomatic posture was the most pro-Arab in the non-aligned world.

The support continued long after the guns fell silent.

India supported the Palestine Liberation Organization’s bid to obtain observer status at the United Nations in 1974. In 1975, India became the first non-Arab country to grant formal diplomatic recognition to the PLO and hosted a PLO office in New Delhi. New Delhi also voted in favor of a controversial UN resolution that equated Zionism with racism.

The expectation among some sections of the Indian establishment was that such unwavering support would ensure goodwill from Arab countries and potentially favorable treatment during the energy crisis.

However, that expectation failed to keep in touch with reality.

After the war, OPEC began a dramatic increase in oil prices. Crude oil prices rose from about $3 a barrel to about $12 a barrel, an increase of nearly 300 percent.

India hoped that Arab producers would recognize its support and provide concessions through dual pricing arrangements or some other preferential mechanism. But this never happened.

OPEC refused to create any special category for India. Despite New Delhi’s strong support for Arab interests, India paid very high prices, like other oil importing countries.

For critics of Indira Gandhi’s approach, this remains the central lesson of 1973: diplomatic loyalty did not translate into economic security.

The consequences were serious.

India’s oil import bill, which stood at about $414 million in 1973, was estimated to increase to about $1.35 billion in 1974. This figure was approximately 40 percent of the country’s potential export earnings and almost double India’s foreign exchange reserves at that time.

Its impact was felt throughout the economy and for many analysts, the episode demonstrated that international relations are ultimately driven by interests rather than emotions.

Proponents of a more realist approach often point to 1973 as evidence that countries protect their own interests first, regardless of political friendship or diplomatic solidarity.

Modi’s test: Israel-Iran conflict of 2026

More than fifty years later, another West Asian conflict poses new threats to India. The Israel-Iran confrontation has raised fears that the Strait of Hormuz could become a battlefield.

For India, the stakes were huge. A large portion of India’s crude oil imports still pass through the Gulf region. Any prolonged disruption could lead to higher fuel prices, inflationary pressures and economic uncertainty.

Yet unlike in 1973, India entered the crisis with a very different strategy. Rather than publicly aligning India with any side, the Modi government has consistently emphasized peace, dialogue, de-escalation and regional stability.

Instead of tying itself to a single camp, New Delhi maintained engagement with multiple actors across West Asia. Supporters of the government describe this as a clear “India First” policy. The objective was not to pick winners and losers in the conflict, but to ensure that India’s interests were protected no matter how the crisis developed.

Perhaps the biggest difference between 1973 and 2026 was in preparation. Rather than wait for a supply shock, the Modi government spent years reducing India’s vulnerability.

India has diversified its crude sourcing network to around 40 countries. This reduced dependence on any one supplier or region. The government also expanded non-Hormuz supply options and strengthened energy partnerships in several geographies.

As a result, India entered the Israel-Iran crisis with far more flexibility than the Yom Kippur War.

One of the most important pillars of the government’s strategy has been the expansion of strategic petroleum reserves. Government supporters point to PM Modi’s outreach to the UAE during the crisis as a prime example.

According to government supporters, discussions with Abu Dhabi National Oil Company resulted in a plan to strengthen India’s strategic reserves by an additional 30 million barrels. The objective was simple: to ensure that India had adequate buffers to withstand temporary disruptions in global supply chains.

Throughout the crisis, Indian refineries continued to operate at high capacity. There was no major shortage of petrol, diesel, LPG, aviation turbine fuel or other essential fuels. The government also maintained diplomatic and commercial channels with countries in West Asia to ensure uninterrupted supplies and to protect Indian shipping interests.

Proponents argue that these measures helped protect Indian consumers from the full impact of global market volatility.

Two leaders, two philosophies

The comparison between Indira Gandhi and Narendra Modi ultimately reflects two different philosophies of foreign policy.

Indira Gandhi’s approach during the Yom Kippur War was rooted in political alignment and diplomatic solidarity with the Arab world. Meanwhile, PM Modi’s approach during the Israel-Iran crisis is built around strategic autonomy, diversification and energy security.

Critics of Indira Gandhi argue that she prioritized ideology and got a 300 percent oil shock in return. On the other hand, supporters of PM Modi argue that his government prioritized India’s interests and entered the crisis prepared for the worst. For him, the answer lies in the contradiction between the two crises. Despite diplomatic allegiance, one caused a catastrophic oil shock. Secondly, India faced a major regional conflict by keeping supplies flowing and preparing for disruptions before they occurred.

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