The latest conversation between HT’s Shishir Gupta and Ayesha Verma paints a picture The Middle East has been closed for a long timeUncomfortable standoffs: low-intensity conflicts, armed chokepoints and proxy wars that are more suitable for the politics of Tehran, Washington and Jerusalem than peace.
Talks in Switzerland, no peace on the horizon
The starting point of the discussions is the first round of US-Tehran talks in Switzerland, held in the shadow of a new memorandum of understanding and Iran’s move to close the Strait of Hormuz for two days. US President Donald Trump The initial bid, as described in the negotiations, was maximalist: “unconditional surrender” by Tehran, as well as a demand for Hezbollah to withdraw. On paper, it looks like diplomacy; In practice, HT executive editor Shishir Gupta argues that little changes on the ground.
His assessment is clear: the region is no closer to peace, and there will be a long period of low-intensity conflict ahead. The structural reasons are political. Iran is presented as an Islamic authoritarian state locked in conflict with two democracies, the US and Israel, each motivated by its own electoral timelines. Trump wants to “get out of this war as quickly as possible,” with the clear Strait of Hormuz and withdrawal of the Iranian nuclear program as his benchmarks. In Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu faces elections on October 27, 2026, with his political fortunes deeply linked to perceptions of security in Gaza, southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights.
Elections, security sector and proxy war
Gupta’s main argument is that domestic politics in Washington and Jerusalem harden strategic positions that were already difficult to reconcile. Israel today maintains security zones in Gaza and southern Lebanon up to the Litani River, as well as in the Golan Heights in Syria. It “has made it very clear” that it cannot evacuate these areas without exposing its northern and southern borders to Hezbollah fire and other threats. If he retreats, Netanyahu’s chances of returning to power will diminish sharply, so a comeback is not an option in the near term.
Across the table, Iran cannot accept the “impotence” of Hezbollah or other clients, as its influence in the Arab world runs through these non-state actors: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Kataib Hezbollah, Hamas, and a broad group of militias stretching from the Levant to the Gulf. According to Gupta, Tehran is comfortable playing with time. The example he cites is telling: the Iran–Iraq war lasted eight years, in which the regime was willing to endure pain and “negotiate, negotiate and more negotiate”, while giving very little in the way of concessions. The same slow-burn approach is being applied now.
Also read: Pakistan has now realized the dangers of dealing with an aggressive President Trump
Since the Israelis were not present at the Swiss talks, Gupta suggests that the talks lacked a key stakeholder whose security dilemmas and electoral calendar would shape any real agreement. Netanyahu has already signaled that he will not let Iran cross the nuclear threshold or accept continued Hezbollah attacks, even if it means acting without Washington’s blessing.
Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and a new “normal” of instability.
The most immediate pressure point is the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran has demonstrated both the ability and willingness to disrupt maritime traffic. Gupta argues that Tehran understands Hormuz as “huge leverage”, a tool to inflict pain not only on Gulf adversaries but the global economy, putting broad international pressure on Washington to compromise. The strategic stakes are huge: about a quarter of global seaborne oil and vast quantities of LNG and other vital commodities pass through the strait, making it one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints.
Gupta links this to the latest explosions at Qatar’s Ras Laffan gas complex, officially described by Doha as an internal accident but widely viewed through the lens of the ongoing conflict in the region. Ras Laffan is the hub of global LNG supply, and recent attacks there have already roiled gas and oil markets. The combination of weakened Hormuz and the hit at Ras Laffan underscores how quickly regional events can translate into global price spikes.
Also read: How India joined the exclusive club of countries with advanced ballistic missile defense capability
He says Gulf countries have accepted that this is a “new normal”. Those that have geography in their favor, such as the United Arab Emirates, are turning to ports such as Fujairah and Khor Fakkan on the Gulf of Oman and building pipelines that bypass Hormuz entirely. Others—Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar—are geographically trapped inside the Gulf and must either negotiate a deal with Iran or bear the costs of continued risk. Across the board, you see moves toward hard infrastructure: underground desalination plants to protect water supplies from missile and drone attacks, expanded pipeline networks, and investments in better anti-ballistic-missile and anti-drone defenses.
The second major choke point is Bab al-Mandeb at the mouth of the Red Sea, where the Houthis—another ally of Iran—block passage to the Suez Canal. This narrow strait is already recognized as a strategic artery for global oil and container traffic, and recent disruptions have shown how quickly attacks there can devastate freight costs and supply chains. Between Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb, the Red Sea and even the wide northern Arabian Sea where Iranian forces have previously harassed shipping, Gupta sees a deliberate Iranian strategy of using geography as a weapon.
A weak MOU and the limits of US power
The MoU underpinning the current 60-day ceasefire is, in Gupta’s view, “generic” and full of flaws. This could easily be extended for another 60 days, but the key issues are conspicuously absent: no limits on Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal, no real checks on its expanding drones, loitering weapons, underwater drones or “kamikaze boat” capabilities, and no mechanism to take back control over proxies. As long as these tools remain intact, Tehran can control the pressure as it wishes.
Against this backdrop, he is dismissive of ideas put forward in Washington, such as Senator Lindsey Graham’s suggestion that the US “occupy” the Strait of Hormuz and impose security tolls. Gupta explains that true control would require “boots on the ground” on the Iranian side of the strait, not just standoff attacks from the air and sea. Given that Iranian positions are on the high ground along most of their coastline, any US effort at physical dominance would be costly and politically toxic domestically.
This flows into a broader critique of the notion that pressure alone can change the character of the Iranian regime. For Gupta, the Islamic Republic remains the result of the 1979 revolution, driven by fundamentalists and “political Islam”, with no meaningful moderates in charge. Absent regime change or a willingness to deploy ground forces — neither of which Trump has publicly acknowledged — Washington’s leverage is limited. The practical result is a pattern of “good days” and “very bad days” in Hormuz, repeated supply-chain shocks, and an arms race in defensive technologies rather than durable solutions.
Arbiter, rival empire, and beneficiary of anarchy
When the conversation turns to the mediation of Qatar and Pakistan, Gupta becomes skeptical. He describes the real power structure of the region as a competition between three inheritance poles: Iran as the heir to the Persian Empire and standard-bearer of Shia Islam, Turkey as the heir to the Ottoman Empire, and Saudi Arabia as the custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and the Sunni heartland. Qatar and Pakistan, in his framing, are “side players” whose relevance derives largely from American support and, in Qatar’s case, gas wealth and ties to movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
These smaller states can host talks and send messages, but they do not set strategic terms. It depends on major actors pursuing their own versions of political Islam and regional dominance – Shia, Sunni or neo-Ottoman. Under such circumstances, endless negotiations are possible, but “lasting peace” in the Middle East remains elusive.
One of the most important points comes near the end, when Ayesha Verma asks who can really welcome America’s plight. Gupta’s answer is simple: Russia and China. For Moscow, the way Iran is harassing the US through the Strait of Hormuz shows how Ukraine has tied up Russian military and political bandwidth. The crisis is an opportunity for Beijing. China is a rising power, a major supplier of arms to Iran, and a beneficiary of the distraction and polarization the Middle Eastern turmoil is creating for Washington in Asia. He suggests that instability in West Asia will be echoed in North and Southeast Asia as China takes advantage of openness to strengthen its position.
A “good” scenario: Iranian oil returns to the market
In a coda after the formal closing, Gupta identifies one possible positive outcome: if, as part of a negotiated framework, Iran is allowed to resume oil exports on a large scale. Iranian crude oil – he referred to high-quality “Basra sweet” – requires minimal refining and could meaningfully increase global supply. Theoretically, this would lead to lower oil prices and, by extension, worldwide inflation.
But here too there is a catch. If sanctions relief and financial incentives are combined with concrete constraints on Iran’s ballistic missiles, drones, and proxies, according to his estimate, Tehran could walk away with more than $300 billion, while retaining all the tools that make it a disruptive actor. This would turn the outcome into a “win for Iran,” funding capabilities that keep the region unstable.
Overall, the conversation portrays a Middle East in which war is too costly to win outright, yet too useful for key actors to abandon. Chokepoints become bargaining chips, proxies become the preferred tools of influence, and outside powers—from China to Russia—quietly profit from America’s strategic confusion. In that sense, the actual memorandum of understanding in the region is unwritten: everyone plays the long game, and peace can wait.
