Recent developments clearly show this. India has resumed purchasing Iranian LPG for the first time since 2018, a move that signals both a pragmatic recalibration and the severity of the existing shortage. Simultaneously, reports indicate that Indian refiners are set to buy about 60 million barrels of Russian oil for April, continuing the pattern that has defined India’s energy strategy since the Ukraine conflict disrupted traditional supply lines. These are not isolated transactions; They are symptoms of a deeper strategic flow.

At the core of the issue is a structural weakness: India’s excessive dependence on imported energy. About 85% of its crude oil needs are met through imports, making it vulnerable to external shocks. This dependence is compounded by relatively modest strategic petroleum reserves, estimated at around 100 million barrels, compared to the significantly larger reserves maintained by major economies. In an era where energy is a commodity as well as a geopolitical instrument, such asymmetry is untenable.

The comparison with China is instructive, if not sobering. China’s strategic reserves are widely believed to exceed one billion barrels, providing it with a safeguard against instability and a lever in global negotiations. In contrast, India operates with limited buffers, often reacting to crises rather than dealing with them. The need to expand the strategic reserves is no longer a matter of long-term planning but of immediate national priority.

Along with these weaknesses, the rapidly evolving geopolitical scenario is also responsible. The Strait of Hormuz, through which about a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes, has once again emerged as a potential flashpoint. Any disruption here would have cascading effects, not just on oil but also on critical materials like helium, a lesser-known but indispensable resource used in semiconductor manufacturing and advanced computing. About 35% of global helium trade passes through this narrow corridor. A blockade or escalation in the region would therefore impact industries far from traditional energy sectors, underscoring the interconnectedness of modern supply chains.

In this context, India’s energy policy will have to strike a delicate balance between strategic autonomy and geopolitical alignment. The decision to halt Iranian oil imports under US pressure in 2019 remains a controversial chapter. Although compliance with sanctions may have served diplomatic objectives, it also limited India’s supplier base at a time when diversification was essential. The shift to Russian oil, often at discounted rates, has partly reduced costs but has introduced new dependencies and risks, especially in a sanctions-heavy global environment.

However, it would be naive to consider India’s energy plight solely the result of external pressures. Domestic policy choices have also played an important role. Recent decision by the Government of India to reduce excise duty on petrol and diesel. ₹10 reflects an effort to protect consumers from rising global prices. While politically expedient, such measures raise questions about fiscal sustainability and structural reforms. More importantly, they highlight the persistent gap between global crude oil prices and domestic fuel pricing.

This gap between what India pays internationally and what consumers pay at the pump is shaped by a complex interplay of taxes, subsidies and pricing mechanisms. Even when global prices are low, retail prices are often volatile, reducing public confidence and complicating economic planning. In contrast, during price increases, the burden of adjustment falls unevenly on stakeholders, with the government bearing some of the costs and consumers bearing the rest.

However, the broader issue is not pricing but flexibility. India’s current approach to energy security is largely transactional, focused on ensuring supply at the best possible price, rather than strategic. What is needed is a paradigm shift towards energy sovereignty, defined not as autocracy but as the ability to absorb and adapt to external shocks without compromising national interests. Many major measures will have to be taken for such a change.

First, the expansion of strategic petroleum reserves must be accelerated. The existing facilities, while useful, are inadequate for a country of India’s scale and ambition. Public-private partnerships, innovative financing models and strategic global collaboration can help bridge this gap.

Second, supplier diversification must go beyond opportunistic purchasing. Long-term agreements with multiple countries, including those in Africa and Latin America, would reduce excessive dependence on any one region. At the same time, where geopolitically possible, re-engagement with previously sidelined partners should be pursued with practical clarity.

Third, India should invest more aggressively in alternative energy sources. Although significant progress has been made in renewable energy, particularly solar and wind power, the transition is incomplete. Natural gas, green hydrogen and biofuels offer viable pathways to reduce oil dependence, but require sustained policy support and infrastructure development.

Fourth, demand-side measures are essential: efficiency, smart urban design and public transportation can control demand, while electric mobility requires proportionate charging networks and grid preparation.

Ultimately, institutional coordination is necessary. Energy policy in India is divided among several ministries and agencies. A more integrated approach, perhaps through a dedicated Energy Security Council, could enhance coherence and accountability.

The global context adds urgency to these imperatives. Unlike early decades, when oil shocks were largely driven by cartel activities, today’s disruptions are multifaceted. Geopolitical rivalries, political power, climate policies, technological change, and financial markets all interact to shape energy outcomes. The result is a system that is not only unstable but also unpredictable.

In such circumstances, excessive reliance – whether on a single supplier, transit corridor, or policy orientation – ceases to be prudent and instead becomes a strategic risk. Describing India’s position as tied to any one power, be it the US or Russia, obfuscates a much more complex reality. New Delhi has shown remarkable adeptness in balancing competing pressures; Yet strategic mobility must now be underpinned by deep structural capacity.

Therefore, the more relevant question is not whether this moment rivals the oil shocks of the 1970s, but whether India is prepared for a future in which such disruptions are likely to be repeated with greater intensity. The answer, at best, remains unclear.

Recent policy steps such as renewed Iranian LPG purchases, expanded Russian sourcing and calibrated tax interventions underline the willingness to adapt. But adaptation, while necessary, is not sufficient. What is required is foresight: the ability to anticipate dislocations, build durable buffers, and influence outcomes rather than merely absorb their consequences. Energy, in this context, transcends its role as a commodity; It serves as an instrument of power. In a world where supply chains shape strategic alignment, control over energy flows becomes inseparable from the exercise of sovereignty.

Accordingly, India must move from transactional procurement to ex ante governance, placing energy security at the center of statecraft within a framework of strategic autonomy, diversified supply and calibrated engagement. Apart from imports or increasing reserves, this requires foresight, systemic flexibility and technological change in line with pricing, fiscal policy and long-term priorities. As energy interdependence becomes more asymmetric and geopolitically evolving, India’s strength will lie in turning vulnerabilities into advantages, absorbing shocks coherently and transforming episodic responses into sustained preparedness.

This article is written by New Delhi-based political analyst and columnist Amal Chandra.

US and Israeli hostility toward Iran certainly has a long history; Their strategic convergence on the latter’s nuclear and missile programs has strengthened following the tilt of the regional balance of power in Iran’s favor following the collapse of America’s Iraq project, but up to a point. The US President and the Israeli Prime Minister (PM) had described it as a low-cost operation, given Iran’s internal economic difficulties and widespread public discontent against the decades-old rule of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and significant military capability degradation from joint Israeli and US strikes last year.

The current phase began with joint strikes by Israel and the US on 28 February, following the Prime Minister’s visit to Washington (11 February). The apparent reason was the failure of the last round of indirect talks (27 February) between the US and Iran, the outcome of which caused the President’s “unhappiness”, but which was described as highly productive by his mediator, the Omani Foreign Minister: he rushed to Washington to brief US leaders, including the Vice President, and the media and later, in frustration, described the impending military operations as “not America’s war”.

In the first strikes, Israel killed Ali Khamenei and other top leaders – including those considered qualified to negotiate – in an intelligence-based operation, while the US strikes were reportedly aimed at Iranian nuclear and military installations. The purpose of successive tours was to extend military installations and leadership goals to civilian infrastructure. Iranian retaliatory strikes (drones and missiles) were aimed at Israeli positions, US military bases in the Gulf region, followed by drone attacks on Israel by the reactivated Hezbollah leadership, and another attack on a British base in Cyprus. These escalating attacks in turn have extended to Lebanon (including Hezbollah targets and Israeli ground incursions into Lebanon), attacks by Shia military groups on US bases in Iraq, and Iranian attacks on Gulf countries, including attacks on their civilian and military targets and on ships in the Persian Gulf that are not authorized by Iran, forcing countries to negotiate their passage with it.

Further serious escalation has taken the form of reciprocal attacks on oil facilities (Israel on Iran’s South Pars reserves and Iran on Qatar’s LNG facilities), which has led to tensions with the US leading to higher global and domestic oil/gas prices. The US is “rejecting” the sale of Iranian oil and Russian oil to global markets because its Gulf operations are not popular with the American public and the administration is caught up in extremely heated politics in its midterm election year. The administration is also approaching Congress for $200 billion in additional aid funding and a troop increase. Employing his typical soft-and-tough approach, the US President has called on Iran to “end” military operations by warning it to open the Strait of Hormuz by midnight on February 23 or face the devastation of its power generation infrastructure. In response, Iran’s leadership has threatened to shut down its intermediate ballistic missile capability by firing at Diego Garcia; It demonstrated similar capabilities by attacking the Israeli cities of Dimona (near its nuclear reactor “in retaliation” for the attack on the Natanz reactor) and Arad in Israel, causing significant damage to property and injuries.

Keeping the Strait of Hormuz open is a serious US military dilemma (concerns about the stability of the Gulf) and an irreversible decline in Iran’s military capability as essentially simultaneous activities are hypothetical with respect to their finality and the inherent costs in men and material; Thus, following the Venezuela model (finding an obedient leader within the existing regime) runs the risk of slipping into the Gaza model (destruction of the target regime’s leadership). In the former there was no Israel factor and in the latter the American factor was not that strong. In any case the effects on regional stability were not so severe.

The more material aspect is the importance of the smaller Gulf states in the global strategic balance where myriad stakeholders including China, Russia, Europe, India and Japan have invested immensely; Even though Russia and China have momentarily benefited from the relaxation of their immediate strategic environment, their larger concerns about global political-economic and energy stability are not far from their minds as the Gulf conflict assumes an aggressive character parallel to the situation in Gaza, where the territory is divided into two parts, with no predictable, immediate political solution – but because of too many external elements it has been transformed into a protracted conflict. The US-Israeli joint bombing of Iran’s Bandar Anzali port on the Caspian Sea on February 28 points to the former’s concern about Russian – and possibly Chinese – supply lines and to undisputed reports of Russian intelligence targeting against US regional military dispositions (tit-for-tat for Ukraine). Other stakeholders, who are deeply concerned about related domestic impacts in the energy sector and the broader economy, are reacting to this rapidly growing possibility, but are also concerned about aligning their forces with US-Israeli objectives for actions for navigation safety; The Iranian leadership sees an opportunity in this dilemma by offering “security” on a country-by-country basis. Given their inadequate air defense capabilities despite defense ties with the US, Gulf states’ concerns about their own economic and political stability are heightened by Iranian attacks, where their threats of retaliatory attacks on Iran risk leading to the very consequences they are naturally desperate to avoid; As the Arab Spring demonstrated, these countries have significant Shia communities that are likely to lead to domestic turmoil if the conflict prolongs; Closer to the subcontinent, Baluchi communities are spread along the Iran–Pakistan border.

Despite the Mossad’s heavy penetration, the post-Ali Khamenei Iranian leadership feels it can prolong the conflict by exploiting the strategic fault lines between the US and other stakeholders, including Israel and the Gulf states. The choice of the Revolutionary Guards, the choice of his son, reflects this; Similarly, statements by the Iranian Foreign Minister that Iran does not favor a ceasefire but an inter-state agreement, including a “protocol” for the Strait of Hormuz.

A messy outcome to this conflict will make a bad outcome even worse. The Israeli assassination of Ali Larijani, an important Iranian negotiator with foreign countries, including the US, and a bridge between the regime’s hardliners and moderates, who had attempted to bring in a moderate to succeed the deceased leader, is indicative of a significant divergence of objectives with the US and parallels the previous assassination of Ismail Haniyeh (July 2024), who was an indirect negotiator of Hamas and represented the US’s view of Hamas as ensuring its complete destruction. Had set a target to do. Impossibility of any form of governance. Another possible outcome of the unfolding Gulf conflict is that Israel would become the only country with WMD and missile capabilities in the region; Its potential impact was somewhat evident when Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a broad spectrum defense agreement (September 17, 2025) just after the Israeli attack on Qatar (September 9, 2025). Perhaps early speculation but worth considering whether such an intervention could set a new global trend – does the Pakistani offensive in Kabul and Kandahar represent its green shoots when the conflict between the Pakistani armed forces and the TTP is so asymmetric?

India faces a delicate, but increasingly challenging situation, which requires communication channels with all regional adversaries to handle a highly volatile situation. It is trying to take advantage of the relative equity in all these relationships while testing the limits of interdependence for the safety of its large migrant communities and navigational safety for its shipping.

This article has been written by Yogendra Kumar, former Ambassador of New Delhi.

Just off National Highway 66, about 22 kilometers from Mahad, is Dasgaon, a village of about 3,000 people in Maharashtra’s coastal Raigad district. There is no board indicating its importance in the history of India and the local people do not remember the contribution of their people to the Dalit movement. He remembers the shooting of the film starring Mammootty Dr. Babasaheb AmbedkarDirected by Jabbar Patel. That was in 2000, and in the film Crawford Lake was called Chavdar Tail, a reference to a lake in Mahad.

On the banks of the lake, the Government Guest House, Dak Bungalow as the British called it, is being renovated. Here too there is no board commemorating an important part of India’s history. This is the place where Dalit icon Dr. Ambedkar stayed during what is known as the Mahad Satyagraha.

The ground burns the head and feet, but the green waters of Crawford Lake are soothing to the eyes. Scores of laborers work along its shores, laying a web of wires to hold together the rocks that will define the lake’s boundary. “This embankment has pushed the lake in. Earlier it was wider,” says a local resident.

A jogging track and a lawn will soon be built on the banks of the lake. “It will be beautified so that we can use it,” says Ataullah Deshmukh at his ancestral home right next to the lake. There is a well of historical importance outside his house, but Deshmukh is unaware of its significance. He is the third generation to live in this house.

He narrates stories of his grandfather Dawood Khan Deshmukh, who started an Urdu school in the nearby Tudil village and spread awareness in his community to send their children to school. His father, Dr. Abdur Rauf Deshmukh, had assisted renowned physician, Padmashree awardee Dr. Himmatrao Bawaskar, in his research on the treatment of scorpion stings and snakebites.

“Nobody has ever talked about the well and the lake in the context of Satyagraha,” he says. His wife, a pharmacist, brings cool sherbet to cool the afternoon heat.

His neighbor Faizar Shekhnag says that his grandfather YB Shekhnag was the sarpanch of the village. He says his family once owned the land on which the post office stands. “It was given on lease to the government for 99 years. The lease has now ended. We are fighting to get the land back.” Even Shekhnag does not know about the Satyagraha or Dalit mobilization here. He says, “Our grandfather died before we were born. No one talked about it.”

A few buildings away lives Vasant Dalvi, a retired school teacher. His daughter-in-law Vishakha Dalvi says that she has never heard any story about Dalit mobilization here.

An awakening and a movement

“It’s a legacy we fear being lost,” says civil rights activist Subodh More. Subodh’s grandfather, Ramchandra Babaji More, was a Dalit leader who led a satyagraha in 1926 to drink water from the well that now stands on Deshmukh’s property.

Satyagraha was inspired by the resolution passed by the Bombay Legislative Council in 1923, which “allowed the untouchable classes to use all public water places”. In 1924, Mahad municipal body also passed a resolution reiterating this point. Although this was an important initial step against caste-based exclusion in India, it was not implemented.

Babaji was then 23 years old. He united the people in Dasgaon and held a public meeting for the implementation of the Bole resolution. On December 4, 1926, about 300 people, considered untouchable by the upper castes, gathered to go to Crawford Lake and Crawford Well to draw water. Until then, Dalits were not allowed to drink water from public tanks, as upper caste people believed it would pollute the water.

The protest was local and went unnoticed. But its success strengthened Babaji’s resolve to organize a massive protest in Mahad under the leadership of Dr. Ambedkar. On 20 March 1927, a large number of protesters led by Dr. Ambedkar marched to the public tank at Chavdar Tala in Mahad. “This struggle is not just for water, but for basic human rights… We have to go to Chavdar Tail not only to drink the water there, but also to prove that we are human beings like others,” Dr. Ambedkar had said in Mahad during the Chavdar Tail Satyagraha.

Babaji was the main organizer of Mahad Satyagraha. Deeply inspired by Dr. Ambedkar, he was one of the leaders who started referring to him as Babasaheb.

His awakening to injustice was early and personal. When he was 11, a local school did not admit him despite passing the scholarship examination. Babaji later wrote in an article, “There were no concessions for students up to the age of 11. I passed the scholarship examination held at Alibaug. The government gave me a scholarship of ₹5 and asked me to enroll in an English medium school.” This is about 1913-14. The local school had refused him admission because of his caste.

It said Dalits were not allowed to sit with upper caste children and the school did not want to risk closure due to one admission. Guided by social reformers, he wrote a letter demanding that the government grant for the school be withdrawn as it had refused to admit a meritorious student despite government instruction. This letter was published in his name in the local newspaper enlightenmentForced the school to admit him. But he was made to sit on a stool in a corner outside the classroom.

foundation of a house

From 1931 to 1941, Babaji was exiled by the British from 1931-1933 and went underground. Subodh, who now lives in Mumbai, remembers playing in the house where his grandfather was hiding. It was the house of Babaji’s uncle, and was one of the few houses built up to the first floor at that time. In fact, his uncle was called Madiwale Joshi, or Joshi whose house had a madi (First Floor, in Marathi), a rarity at that time. The ruins now consist only of black basalt rock blocks and stairs. This was the first permanent house built by a Dalit.

“The Brahmins who did this bhoomi pujan They were then ostracized by the upper castes,” says Rajendra Hate, a school clerk who lives near the ruins. He says that unfortunately it had become so dilapidated that it had to be demolished.

Subodh talks about personal stories of conflict based around the intense caste battles fought in the region at that time. Het remembers how the village elders used to tell stories of the time Babaji came out of hiding. “When he came out of hiding after years, he had to be made to sit in a separate cattle pond to wash off the dead skin from his body,” he says.

Last week, Communist Party of India (M) general secretary MA Baby visited the school established by Babaji as well as the lake and well. “This is the place where the seeds of the historic Mahad Satyagraha were sown. It is a historically important site,” says Dr Ashok Dhawale, CPI(M) Politburo member who accompanied MA Baby.

Dhawale says, “Caste-based discrimination is still not over from India. Be it the Chavdaar Katha protest or the burning of Manusmriti, which was the source of India’s anti-caste struggle, Comrade RB More played an important role. He has a special place in our history.” He further said that Babaji was a prominent leader of the communist movement.

Lakes and their symbolism

While Dasgaon has been largely forgotten, Mahad remains the center of attention of the Dalit community. Every year, lakhs of people march on 25 December and 20 March to mark Manusmriti. combustion (Burning) and Chavdar Katha Satyagraha, respectively. Manusmriti is an ancient text which codified the caste system.

Konkan Republican Samajik Sanstha, a grassroots non-profit organisation, has written to the Raigad district authorities, appealing to them to declare the entire area as a national monument. Deepak Pawar, secretary of the organization, says, “We have written a letter to the District Collector that Crawford Well, Crawford Lake, Dak Bungalow, the temple where Manusmriti was burnt, the landing dock where Baba Saheb landed and other such places should be declared national monuments. Every year lakhs of people march here. We have not yet received any response to our pleas.” Despite repeated attempts, Raigarh District Collector Kisan Jawale did not respond to queries. The Hindu.

Maharashtra Social Justice Minister Sanjay Shirsat says the government will now try to preserve the history of the region where Dalits broke the social order. “We don’t have information about it yet. But our officials will go to the spot and see. At Dasgaon, we will not only install a plaque to inform about the importance of the place, but will also do other work to bring the history alive.”

Shobha Dhone, a daily wage laborer from Latur, is one of the hundreds of women who reach Mahad every year to drink the water of Chavdar Tail, most of them from Marathwada and Vidarbha. They talk to their children about Ambedkar, pay respect to the statue in the middle of the lake and then drink water from taps located nearby. She says, “We are here because of him. We were treated worse than cattle. We had no rights. Only our hearts know what Baba Saheb has done for us.”

Amrita Waghmare lives in Mahad and runs Mahila Utkarsh Social Organization, which works to organize unorganized labourers. He believes, “There is no doubt that things have changed from what they were a century ago, but casteism still exists; Brahminism still exists. Nobody is concerned about the community. They are only concerned about their individual material development. The Ambedkarite movement has become weak.”

vinaya.deshpande@thehindu.co.in