Hindustan Times Executive Editor Shishir Gupta and Senior Anchor Ayesha Verma discussed pahalgam terrorist attack and its wider geopolitical consequences. During the conversation, they look back at the massacre, question Pakistan’s terror network and ask what India should do to prevent another such tragedy.
A massacre that shook Pahalgam
A year ago, 26 Hindu tourists were shot dead by Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists in Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam, in one of the most brutal communal massacres in recent years. The attackers identified Hindu men and shot them in front of their families, adding to the holiday horror.
Gupta described the “cost of terrorism” as heavy: lives lost, families destroyed, and a country forced to confront the failure of its security architecture in the face of a “rogue state” on India’s western border. He argues that in retrospect, every link in the security chain – from intelligence to the local police response – was found to be weak.
Three Lashkar terrorists working under the guise of “The Resistance Front” carried out the Pahalgam attack. All three-Faisal JatHamza Afghani and Jibran – were Pakistani nationals who had infiltrated into North Kashmir through Gurez-Tulai sector between 2022 and 2023. Gupta explains that Faisal Jatt, a former Pakistani Army para-commando, was armed with an AK-103, while the group also had an M4/M9 rifle, GPS devices, satellite phones and ultra-high-frequency radios to stay in constant contact. Operators across the Line of Control.
The trio attacked on 22 April And managed to survive for more than three months in the glaciated upper reaches of the valley, before being neutralized in the Harwan forest near Dachigam National Park on 28 July 2025. For Gupta, the long gap between the attack and the elimination is in itself an indictment of the system.
Where India’s security grid failed
Gupta presents an ideal chain of defense in four stages: better intelligence for pre-emption, stronger enforcement for prevention, stronger tactical capability for rapid response and finally investigation. He believes that order in Pahalgam collapsed at several points.
He first points towards local policing. The Jammu and Kashmir police station responsible for the area was barely six kilometers away, yet the response on the ground was delayed and inadequate, despite the fact that it is familiar terrain to the security forces. Counter-insurgency responsibilities in the belt were shared between the CRPF and Rashtriya Rifles while the Army guarded the LoC to prevent infiltration, but the system failed to translate this deployment into a real-time response when it mattered.
Gupta is clear that the political leadership since 2014 – namely Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and Home Minister Amit Shah – has been keen to empower the security forces and give them the necessary capabilities. He says the problem lies with “institutional leadership” within the security grid, which must now be held accountable if it fails to prevent, stop or rapidly respond to such threats.
Gupta says that everyone in Srinagar knew about the terrorists infiltrating the valley, it is estimated that 60-70 such fighters were present at that time. According to his assessment, this prior awareness makes the failure to anticipate a mass casualty attack on soft Hindu tourist targets all the more glaring.
Asim Munir: The “arsonist” as the mediator.
The Pahalgam massacre came to light days after then Pakistani Army chief General Asim Munir delivered an anti-Hindu hate speech on April 16, which Gupta considers more than coincidental. Today, Munir has been promoted to the rank of field marshal and is publicly hailed by US President Donald Trump as an “honest mediator” between Washington and Tehran.
Gupta is sharply criticizing this image change. In his view, “Only his position has changed; the man is the same.” He argues that Pakistan has mastered the art of playing the role of incendiary and firefighter at the same time: the same military that offered to mediate between the US and Iran is accused of supporting the Sunni group Jaish-ul-Adl to attack Iran’s Sistan province, prompting Iranian ballistic-missile retaliation against Balochistan.
This duplicity, he said, has a long history. He recalls how Pakistan allowed US U‑2 spy planes to operate from its soil in the 1950s, supported Washington during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War and then played both sides with the Taliban and the US after 9/11. At each stage, Islamabad extracted strategic rents by nurturing jihadist proxies, and Gupta believes Munir is now trying to cut a similar “deal” in a new era.
Pakistan’s jihad factory is “alive and active”
Asked whether groups like Lashkar‑e‑Taiba and Jaish‑e‑Mohammed were still thriving, Gupta’s answer was clear: the terror infrastructure in Pakistan is “alive and active”. LeT is primarily active against India, while Jaish continues to operate from Bahawalpur; Both are Punjabi based Pakistani organizations focused on targeting India, especially Jammu and Kashmir.
Beyond these India-centric organizations, Gupta delineates a broader ecosystem of Pakistani groups targeting Afghanistan, Iran, and the United States, and describes Pakistan as a “global jihad factory”. He argues that ostensible narratives of mediation or restraint cannot hide the reality that “terrorist factories are alive and kicking” and will inevitably manifest in fresh attacks whenever the ISI seeks to provoke them.
The illusion of Track‑2 and a “changed” Pakistan
In this context, Gupta is deeply skeptical about the periodic discussions regarding India‑Pakistan Track‑2 dialogues. He dismisses them as “junk” for retired bureaucrats and military officers whose official shelf life is over, leaving them with little real influence unless directly empowered by the political leadership.
He reminds the audience that Modi himself took a dramatic political gamble by landing in Lahore to meet then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on December 25, 2015, but was rewarded with the Jaish-e-Mohammed attack on the Pathankot airbase just days later. He suggests that it is an illusion to expect fundamental changes in Pakistan from talks.
Gupta compared the US’s opening to China in the 1970s under Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, which was driven by the hope that engagement would nudge Beijing toward democracy. He says that half a century later, American leaders recognize that this assumption has failed as China is emerging as a peer rival. For them, the lesson is clear: deal with the “absolute facts” of Pakistan – where the political and military leadership thrives on anti-India rhetoric and a radicalized society – rather than fantasies about its imminent transformation.
America-Pakistan-India: A delicate triangle
Does Munir’s equation with both Washington and Beijing mean that the US will now take a soft stance on Pakistan’s terror record? Gupta hopes Washington will maintain a “soft corner” for Pakistan for transactional reasons. He points to cooperation on Iran, cryptocurrency channels, and reports side deals with figures like Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner that could translate into IMF support, Gulf funding, or even military aid going to Islamabad.
Yet he also underlined that US-India relations are “equally strong”, and any notion of Trump taking a soft stance on Pakistan after a major terrorist attack on India would damage bilateral relations with New Delhi. In other words, Washington’s balance between opportunistic partnership with Pakistan and strategic embrace of India will only become difficult if there is another Pahalgam-style atrocity.
stopping the next step
In the final section, Verma brings the discussion back to the original question: How can India prevent another Pahalgam? Gupta breaks down the answer into concrete steps.
First of all, stop infiltration on LOC in Kashmir. He acknowledges the mountainous, snow-covered terrain but insists there can be “no excuse” given the intensity of troop deployment.
Second, strengthen the counter-terrorism grid so that the CRPF and Rashtriya Rifles keep terrorists under constant pressure, forcing them to flee rather than sit, plan and execute.
Third, intelligence gathering, both within Pakistan and within Kashmir, should be dramatically improved to detect and neutralize terrorists before they strike.
Fourth, ensuring a strong ground response by the Jammu and Kashmir Police, who are the real eyes and ears on the ground. They must not only pass on information but also respond quickly rather than giving attackers a free hand for hours.
Gupta warned against misguided invocation of human rights when confronted by terrorists who asked victims to pull down their trousers and killed them solely on the basis of religious identity. He argues that in such circumstances, the primary responsibility of the state is to protect innocents through “sustained pressure, deterrence and deterrence” supported by strong institutional leadership in all security arms.
As the conversation ends, Verma ended the episode of “Point Blank” by remembering the 26 lives lost in the “horrific Pahalgam terrorist attack”, while the discussion considered the difficult choices India and the world must make to deal with Pakistan’s perpetual jihad enterprise.
