Twenty-five years after the September 11 attacks transformed the global security landscape, terrorism remains far from defeated. In a conversation with Senior Anchor Aayesha Varma on Point Blank, Hindustan Times Executive Editor Shishir Gupta argued that while the methods, networks and technologies used by terrorist groups have changed, the underlying political purpose of terrorism remains the same: to seize influence, spread fear and advance ideological goals through violence.
The discussion came against the backdrop of the approaching 25th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, in which 2,977 people were killed after al-Qaeda hijackers weaponised commercial aircraft and struck the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon and a field in Pennsylvania. For many, 9/11 remains a deeply personal memory—not only of loss and horror, but also of the fear, racism and suspicion that followed, particularly affecting non-white communities in the United States in the aftermath of the brazen strikes.
Gupta’s central argument was that the world has not fully absorbed the lessons of 9/11. Terrorism may no longer dominate global headlines in the way it did during the “war on terror” era, but its networks have adapted, its recruitment methods have become more sophisticated, and its political utility for state and non-state actors persists.
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From 9/11 to a changing global threat
The 9/11 attacks were not an isolated event. They followed the September 9, 2001 assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the anti-Taliban commander in Afghanistan, by al-Qaeda operatives posing as journalists. Two days later, al-Qaeda carried out the attacks on the United States, pushing Washington into a war in Afghanistan aimed at dismantling the Taliban regime that had hosted Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
The consequences were immediate and global. Terrorism, Gupta said, was suddenly placed at the centre of international security thinking. Countries such as India, which had already faced years of cross-border terrorism in Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere, found that the wider world was finally paying attention to a threat New Delhi had long highlighted.
Within months, India itself was targeted in the December 13, 2001, attack on Parliament. Seven years later came the November 26, 2008, Mumbai attacks, in which Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists launched coordinated assaults across the city, killing more than 160 people.
But despite the post-9/11 global focus, the problem did not disappear. Instead, it fragmented. Large organisations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State continue to operate, directly or through affiliates. At the same time, terrorism has become more decentralised, with local cells, online recruits, lone attackers and loosely connected ideological networks replacing the rigid hierarchy of earlier militant organisations.
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Gupta pointed to militant activity in the Sahel and Maghreb regions of Africa, the continuing presence of al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Islamic State affiliates and Iranian-backed armed groups across West Asia. He also highlighted alliances that cut across sectarian divides, arguing that terrorism is often driven less by theology than by political power.
The result is a threat environment in which organisations with differing religious identities or regional goals can cooperate when their strategic interests align. In this view, terror is not merely a tactic of isolated extremist groups; it is also a tool deployed in wider struggles for influence, territory and political legitimacy.
India and Pakistan-based terror networks
For India, the most persistent concern remains Pakistan-based terrorism. Gupta said groups including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, al-Qaeda-linked organisations and Islamic State Khorasan Province continue to pose a danger, despite repeated crackdowns, international sanctions and Pakistan’s assurances of action against terror financing.
The central challenge, he argued, is that India remains a target for groups that view terrorism as a way to pursue Pakistan’s long-standing claims over Kashmir and to challenge India’s rise. The pattern has stretched across decades: separatist militancy in Punjab during the 1980s, terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir through the 1990s, and high-profile attacks in Indian cities and institutions in subsequent years.
Gupta contrasted India’s earlier approach with the more overtly retaliatory posture adopted after 2014. He cited the 2016 surgical strikes, the 2019 Balakot airstrike and Operation Sindoor as examples of India signalling that cross-border terrorism would not be met only through diplomacy or defensive measures.
However, deterrence does not eliminate the risk. Terror groups can exploit ideological networks, encrypted communication platforms, financial channels, criminal syndicates and vulnerable individuals. As Gupta noted, the task for India is not simply to respond after an attack but to remain proactive enough to prevent one.
That requires understanding how militant networks recruit, communicate, finance themselves and activate dormant cells. Terrorism, he said, works through “nodes”: narcotics trafficking can fund weapons purchases, weapons can sustain militant modules, and those modules can then be activated for attacks. The objective of counterterrorism, therefore, must be to disrupt the entire ecosystem rather than merely arrest individuals after violence has taken place.
Different posture
Global terror networks are entering the 25th anniversary of 9/11 in a fundamentally different posture than the immediate post-2001 threat picture. There is no longer a single “paramount” threat; instead, the terror landscape has shifted to become increasingly complex and unpredictable involving formal groups, loose networks, and lone actors. Al-Qaeda affiliates and Islamic State provinces continue to pose the greatest threat in West Asia and Africa, many of them growing in strength. Both organisations are expected to keep exploiting conflict zones and ungoverned spaces to expand geographic reach and operational tempo.
The Sahel remains one of the fastest-growing terrorism hotspots and Islamic State West Africa Province is assessed as probably the largest IS province worldwide. Groups in this belt are also adopting new capabilities, with terrorist organizations making increasing use of unmanned aerial systems and artificial intelligence.
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Despite their organisational degradation, al-Qaeda and Islamic State continue to operationally engage, a dynamic visible in lethal but rare attacks like the New Orleans truck attack on New Year’s Day 2025. When it comes to effective organisational resurgence, the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre carries the risk of formal reconstitution. The region continues to serve as a safe haven for Islamic State Khorasan Province, which keeps signaling interest in external operations. On the other hand, al-Qaeda maintains a quieter presence in the region, but carries a serious risk that it could slowly rebuild its ranks, including by working with al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) fighters.
Adoption of AI
Islamic State has treated online platform resilience as a core operational priority. Telegram remains its primary long-term home for both official media and supporter-generated content. The newer shift is into AI: IS-Khorasan’s English-language magazine Voice of Khorasan, in June 2025, presented AI literacy as an individual religious duty for every Muslim. The same publication also warned about deepfakes, surveillance, and data collection, while offering practical guidance for self-protection — indicating the group is simultaneously weaponising AI for propaganda/translation and coaching its own operatives on counter-surveillance tradecraft.
Terror supporters have all begun actively using artificial intelligence technologies in their propaganda output. Al-Qaeda’s digital architecture is more centralised around branded news infrastructure than Islamic State’s diffuse channel model. Al-Qaeda-linked media were circulating likely AI-generated images as early as 2023, alongside AI tools to translate its messaging into multiple languages.
The online radicalisation challenge
One of the most consequential changes since 2001 is the growth of online radicalisation. Terrorist recruitment no longer necessarily begins in a training camp, a seminary or a face-to-face meeting. It can begin with an online message, a social-media interaction, propaganda video, gaming platform, encrypted chat group or a carefully cultivated ideological grievance.
Gupta described a process in which potential recruits are profiled, approached and gradually drawn into a worldview built around victimhood. Recruiters assess their vulnerabilities, reinforce grievances, provide ideological validation and, in some cases, direct them toward violence.
Artificial intelligence, deepfakes and increasingly sophisticated digital propaganda could make this challenge harder. Manipulated videos and synthetic voices can be used to spread inflammatory narratives, impersonate trusted figures and intensify communal or political tensions. Terrorist groups can reach recruits across borders without physically moving people, money or instructions in the ways security agencies once learned to monitor.
This makes counter-radicalisation as important as counterterrorism. Gupta identified intelligence-sharing, community engagement and structured counter-radicalisation programmes as essential components of any long-term strategy. Countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and India have developed frameworks intended to counter extremist messaging, but he argued that a broader international effort is required.
The principle, he suggested, should be straightforward: political differences cannot justify attacks on civilians. The distinction between “freedom fighter” and “terrorist” becomes indefensible when innocents are deliberately targeted.
Intelligence failures and the need to “join the dots”
The most difficult aspect of counterterrorism is often not the absence of intelligence, but the failure to interpret and connect available warnings. Gupta’s assessment was blunt: every successful terror attack is, in some sense, an intelligence failure.
That does not mean agencies never prevent attacks. Security services may disrupt numerous plots that never become public. But even a single missed threat can cause mass casualties and reshape national policy, public confidence and regional geopolitics.
The 9/11 attacks are widely seen as a case where different warning signs existed but were not assembled into a complete picture. Gupta made a similar point about the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, saying information and maritime alerts had been available but did not translate into effective prevention.
The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel likewise demonstrated how an adversary can exploit complacency, miscalculation and institutional blind spots. Gupta described it as both an intelligence and enforcement failure, noting that an operation of that scale could not have been organised overnight.
The lesson is that intelligence cannot rely only on surveillance technology. Signals intelligence, data analysis and digital monitoring are indispensable, but human intelligence—sources embedded in networks, local knowledge and on-ground assessment—remains critical. Gupta pointed to the operations that located Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul as examples of the continuing importance of human intelligence.
Terrorism remains a political tool
The broader point emerging from the conversation is that terrorism cannot be understood only as a law-and-order issue. It is tied to geopolitics, proxy conflicts, state support, regional rivalries and struggles for political power.
Gupta argued that Pakistan has repeatedly benefited from support or strategic accommodation from major Western powers, even as India has raised concerns about terror groups operating from Pakistani soil. In this reading, global powers often treat terrorism selectively, prioritising their own regional interests over consistent action against extremist infrastructure.
For India, that means expecting no permanent external solution. The country must strengthen intelligence capabilities, improve coordination among agencies, expand cross-border information-sharing and maintain the ability to pre-empt threats before they materialise.
Twenty-five years after 9/11, the world is dealing with wars in Ukraine, Gaza and West Asia, alongside great-power rivalry and economic uncertainty. Terrorism may no longer occupy the top spot in every global conversation, but it remains a persistent, adaptive and deadly challenge.
The enduring lesson of 9/11 is not simply that terrorism can strike without warning. It is that preventing it requires vigilance long before the attack—through better intelligence, stronger institutions, credible deterrence and a refusal to treat violence against civilians as politically acceptable.
