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The real question is not whether India and China can become friends again. It is whether they can become better competitors, without becoming enemies
Xi’s 2026 Delhi visit is not the beginning of the thaw. It is the latest stage of a thaw that began after the border disengagement process. (Reuters)
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s return to New Delhi after seven years is more than a high-profile diplomatic visit. It is a snapshot of just how dramatically India-China ties have changed since the two leaders last met in India.
When Xi and Prime Minister Narendra Modi met in Mamallapuram in October 2019, the two sides were still talking about how to manage differences while expanding cooperation. The official account of that meeting said PM Modi and Xi agreed that India and China should prudently manage their differences and not allow them to become disputes. They also spoke about deepening bilateral interaction as the two countries’ global roles grew.
Then came 2020.
The Galwan Valley clash transformed the relationship, producing the deadliest India-China confrontation in decades and triggering a prolonged military standoff along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). India subsequently tightened scrutiny of Chinese investments, apps and economic engagement, while political and people-to-people ties suffered. Reuters describes the period since Galwan as one of the most severe downturns in bilateral relations.
Now, Xi is back in Delhi for the 18th BRICS Summit on September 12-13.
The question, therefore, is not simply why Xi is visiting India after seven years, but what has changed between the India and China that PM Modi and Xi knew in 2019 and the India and China that are meeting in 2026?
2019: A Relationship Built Around Managing Differences
The India-China relationship was hardly trouble-free in 2019.
The two countries had already experienced military tensions at Doklam in 2017, and the boundary dispute remained unresolved. But there was still an established political understanding that the border should not derail the broader relationship.
That was the backdrop to the informal summits between PM Modi and Xi in Wuhan in 2018 and Mamallapuram in 2019.
The Ministry of External Affairs said after the 2019 meeting that the leaders reiterated the Wuhan understanding that India and China were factors for stability in the international system and should ensure that differences did not become disputes. They also agreed on the importance of a rules-based and inclusive international order.
The relationship, in other words, was being managed through a formula of competition plus cooperation. There were disagreements over the border, trade imbalances, Pakistan and China’s regional ambitions. But there was also expanding economic engagement and regular high-level political contact.
Seven years later, the basic disagreements remain. What has changed is the level of mistrust surrounding them.
2020: The Galwan Break
The rupture came in 2020.
According to the Indian government, Chinese actions from April-May that year attempted to unilaterally alter the status quo along the LAC in the western sector. India responded militarily and diplomatically, and the subsequent confrontation seriously disturbed what New Delhi calls peace and tranquillity along the border.
The Galwan clash in June 2020 resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers. It was the first fatal military confrontation between the two sides since 1975.
The consequences went far beyond the immediate border. India restricted Chinese investment, tightened scrutiny of Chinese companies and banned a number of Chinese apps. Direct flights and several other forms of people-to-people engagement were disrupted.
The political message from New Delhi was also clear—the border could no longer be treated as one compartment of the relationship while everything else carried on normally.
That changed the fundamental equation. Before Galwan, the broad assumption was that economic and political engagement could continue despite the unresolved boundary dispute. After Galwan, the boundary became a test of the entire relationship.
From Confrontation To Cautious Stabilisation
The thaw did not happen overnight.
For years, military and diplomatic channels worked to disengage troops from friction points. The MEA says India and China held repeated meetings through the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination and military commander-level talks after 2020.
The major breakthrough came in October 2024.
India and China reached an agreement on patrolling arrangements in Depsang and Demchok. According to the Indian government, the agreement led to disengagement from all the 2020 friction points, with patrolling and, where applicable, grazing to resume according to longstanding practices.
That opened the door to political engagement.
At the BRICS Summit in Kazan in October 2024, Modi and Xi held their first bilateral meeting at delegation level in nearly five years. The MEA said both leaders agreed on the importance of using dialogue mechanisms to stabilise and rebuild bilateral relations.
And then came another important moment. In August 2025, Modi met Xi on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin. The MEA said the two leaders welcomed the “positive momentum” in ties.
So, Xi’s 2026 Delhi visit is not the beginning of the thaw. It is the latest stage of a thaw that began after the border disengagement process.
The China Xi Is Returning With Is Not The China He Left Behind
The China of 2026 is operating in a substantially different geopolitical environment.
Since 2019, the US-China strategic rivalry has intensified. Technology restrictions, supply-chain restructuring and competition over semiconductors, manufacturing and critical technologies have become central features of the global economy.
China has also placed greater emphasis on the Global South, BRICS and a more multipolar international system.
What began as Brazil, Russia, India and China is now an 11-member grouping with 10 partner countries, giving China a much larger platform through which to engage developing economies across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. For Beijing, this creates a much broader diplomatic constituency.
But there is an important distinction: China’s growing influence within BRICS does not automatically mean that every BRICS member shares Beijing’s strategic objectives. India is perhaps the clearest example.
And The India Xi Is Returning To Is Different Too
India has changed substantially since 2019.
The country has deepened strategic partnerships with the US, Japan, Australia and Europe, while remaining closely engaged with Russia and other non-Western powers. The Quad has become an important part of India’s Indo-Pacific strategy. India has also expanded its engagement with the Gulf, Europe and the wider Global South.
At the same time, New Delhi has repeatedly insisted that these partnerships do not amount to joining a bloc against China.
This is where India’s concept of strategic autonomy becomes important. In a 2019 speech, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar described India’s foreign-policy approach as one of managing multiple relationships simultaneously, citing the apparent contradictions between forums such as the Quad and SCO, and between India’s relationships with the US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and others. He argued that the objective was to look beyond rigid alignments and focus on areas of convergence.
That approach has only become more important since 2020.
India today wants to work with Washington without becoming a US ally against Beijing; maintain its relationship with Russia without becoming dependent on Moscow; participate in BRICS without turning it into an anti-Western grouping; and engage China without accepting Chinese primacy in Asia.
That is the very different India Xi is returning to.
But, A Paradox
The political relationship may have deteriorated, but the economic relationship did not disappear. In fact, it remains one of the biggest contradictions in the bilateral relationship.
According to India’s Embassy in Beijing, India’s trade deficit with China reached $112.16 billion in 2025-26. Reuters reported that China became India’s largest source of goods imports in FY2025-26, with imports worth around $132 billion. That means India can seek to de-risk its economy from China, but a complete decoupling is far more complicated.
China remains important in sectors ranging from electronics and machinery to industrial inputs and components.
For India, the challenge is therefore not simply to reduce dependence on China but how to reduce strategic vulnerability while retaining access to an economy that remains deeply embedded in India’s supply chains.
The Border Dilemma
The 2024 disengagement agreement reduced the immediate military confrontation at the remaining friction points. But it did not resolve the underlying India-China boundary dispute.
The Indian government itself continues to describe the boundary issue as unresolved, while saying the priority is maintaining peace and tranquillity along the LAC.
There are also broader strategic concerns. India remains wary of China’s infrastructure and military activity in its neighbourhood, its partnership with Pakistan and its expanding footprint in the Indian Ocean. China, meanwhile, remains sensitive to India’s growing strategic cooperation with the US and other Indo-Pacific powers.
So, the relationship has moved from confrontation towards management. That does not mean the competition has disappeared.
What Does Each Side Want From The Other?
What China Could Want
1. A Stable Border: Another prolonged military confrontation with India would consume diplomatic and military bandwidth at a time when Beijing is already managing competition with Washington and tensions elsewhere.
2. Better Economic Ties: China has a major economic interest in India’s market and in maintaining access to one of the world’s fastest-growing large economies.
3. Greater Diplomatic Space: Beijing would benefit if India maintained strategic autonomy rather than becoming more firmly aligned with Washington.
4. A Stronger BRICS: India is one of the founding members and most influential countries in the grouping. Better India-China ties could make BRICS cooperation easier.
What India Could Want
1. Durable Border Stability: For New Delhi, this remains the foundation of any meaningful improvement in relations.
2. Greater Economic Reciprocity: India wants better access to the Chinese market and a reduction in the enormous trade imbalance.
3. Predictability: India does not need to agree with China on every global issue. But it has an interest in preventing sudden military or diplomatic crises from destabilising the relationship.
4. Strategic Space: India wants to cooperate with China where interests overlap without allowing the relationship to constrain its ties with the US, Europe, Russia, Japan or other partners.
Simply put, Xi is returning to an India that is more strategically confident, more deeply connected to the US and other partners, and more determined to retain room for independent manoeuvre.
He is also returning with a China that has become more assertive, more deeply invested in the Global South and more conscious of its rivalry with the US.
And yet, beneath all that competition is an unavoidable reality: the world’s two most populous countries remain neighbours, major trading partners and influential powers in the same Asian and global systems. That makes the objective of Xi’s Delhi visit less about reviving the relationship of 2019 and more about defining the relationship of the next decade.
The real question is not whether India and China can become friends again. It is whether they can become better competitors, without becoming enemies.
About the Author
Apoorva Misra is an Associate Editor at News18.com with a keen interest in politics and current affairs. She loves uncovering fresh angles and telling stories through long-form features and explainers…Read More
September 12, 2026, 12:43 IST
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