BRICS In 2026: Bigger Economic Weight, Wider Global Reach And A New Tightrope To Walk | Explainers News

Last Updated:September 12, 2026, 10:19 IST

Expansion has produced a giant negotiating platform for countries that want more room to manoeuvre in a changing world, even when they disagree on where that world should go

Two decades ago, when BRICS began taking shape around Brazil, Russia, India and China, it was a relatively small grouping of emerging economies with a fairly straightforward argument—the global order gave too much weight to the West and too little to rising powers.

Cut to 2026, that argument has travelled much further, quite literally.

BRICS now has 11 full members and 10 partner countries, stretching across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. The full members are Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Indonesia. The 10 partner countries are Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.

The enlarged grouping represents roughly half of the world’s population, around 40 per cent of global output in purchasing-power terms and about a quarter of global trade. It also brings together some of the world’s biggest energy producers, fastest-growing economies and most consequential developing countries.

On paper, that looks like a much more powerful BRICS. But there is a catch.

The bigger BRICS gets, the harder it becomes to agree on what exactly that power should be used for. That is the central paradox confronting the grouping as India hosts its 18th summit in New Delhi on September 12-13.

From BRIC To A 21-Country BRICS Family

The original BRIC grouping brought together Brazil, Russia, India and China. South Africa joined in 2011, turning BRIC into BRICS.

The big transformation came after the 2023 Johannesburg summit, when members agreed to expand the grouping. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE became full members in 2024, followed by Indonesia in 2025. The partner-country category was also created, bringing 10 more countries into the wider BRICS framework.

The geographical transformation is obvious.

BRICS is no longer primarily a grouping of four large emerging economies. It now includes major oil and gas producers in the Gulf, African economies, Southeast Asian powers and countries with very different relationships with the United States, Europe, China and Russia.

That gives BRICS something the original grouping did not have at the same scale: reach. The expansion has also increased its weight in energy markets. The addition of Saudi Arabia, Iran and the UAE brought three major energy players into the grouping, while China and India remain two of the world’s largest energy consumers. Brazilian researchers Octavio Oliveira and Enzo Godinho told Al Jazeera that the expansion has strengthened BRICS’ leverage in global energy markets.

But reach and cohesion are not the same thing.

The Iran-UAE Paradox

Nothing illustrates the problem better than the current West Asia conflict.

Iran is a BRICS member. So are the UAE and Saudi Arabia—countries with very different strategic relationships with Washington and very different calculations about Tehran. That means BRICS can bring countries affected by the same war into the same room without necessarily bringing them to the same conclusion about that war.

The problem has already surfaced.

At the BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting in May, the grouping failed to issue a joint statement on the US-Israel war with Iran. According to Al Jazeera, Iran wanted Washington and Israel’s actions explicitly named, while the UAE would not agree to that formulation.

That is not simply a diplomatic hiccup. It goes to the heart of the expansion question. Can a grouping become more representative of the Global South while simultaneously becoming less capable of speaking with one voice?

Geopolitical analyst Guy Burton told Al Jazeera that expansion has widened Global South representation but also “dilutes whatever coherent positioning the group had”. He stressed that BRICS does not operate on a “one for all, all for one” principle as members retain the freedom to act independently.

That’s exactly the point—BRICS was never designed as NATO. There is no common defence commitment, common tariff or common currency. There is no requirement that one member support another in a military confrontation. As analyst Imran Khalid told Al Jazeera, BRICS is better understood as a platform for autonomy than as a conventional geopolitical bloc.

India And China

The biggest internal question may be the one between the two largest Asian powers inside BRICS. India and China both support a more multipolar world. But they do not necessarily mean the same thing when they talk about it.

For China, BRICS can be a vehicle to increase the influence of the Global South, challenge Western dominance and push for greater reform of institutions created under the Western-led international order.

India’s approach is more cautious. New Delhi has long pushed for greater representation for developing countries in global institutions, but it has simultaneously maintained strategic and economic relationships with the US, Europe, Japan and other Western partners.

A recent Indian Express analysis by C Raja Mohan described the competing approaches inside BRICS as ranging from accommodation with the West and autonomy from it to parity within the existing order or outright confrontation.

India does not want BRICS to become an anti-US alliance because that would undermine one of the central principles of its foreign policy: strategic autonomy.

India wants room to work with Russia without becoming Russia’s ally, engage China without accepting Chinese primacy, deepen ties with the US without becoming part of a Western bloc, and work with the Global South without turning BRICS into an ideological coalition.

Brazil has broadly similar reservations. According to The Indian Express, Brazil supports reform of global institutions and alternative payment mechanisms, but has resisted the idea that BRICS should necessarily pursue outright de-dollarisation or create a common currency.

That makes the internal divide less about “pro-West vs anti-West” and more about how far BRICS should go in challenging the existing system.

China Wants A Bigger BRICS

Expansion gives BRICS greater collective weight. But the larger the grouping becomes, the more important China’s role inevitably becomes simply because of the scale of its economy and trade relationships.

China has been among the strongest advocates of a larger BRICS. For Beijing, more members mean a larger constituency for multipolarity, greater representation for developing countries and potentially more space to build alternatives to Western-led institutions.

But this also creates suspicion among some members that an expanded BRICS could become China-led rather than genuinely multipolar.

That is particularly sensitive for India.

According to Chatham House’s Chietigj Bajpaee, the India-China relationship will continue to shape the BRICS debate and the grouping’s difficulty in speaking with one voice could affect its future. He also suggests that the focus is likely to shift from further expansion towards integrating the members it already has.

Bigger Economic Muscle, But Limited Collective Leverage

There is no denying that BRICS has become economically more important.

The grouping now accounts for nearly half the world’s population, around 40 per cent of global output in PPP terms, roughly 44 per cent of oil production and about a quarter of global trade.

It has also built institutions of its own. The most prominent is the New Development Bank, created in 2015 and headquartered in Shanghai. Reuters reported that the bank has financed about $43 billion in infrastructure and sustainability projects. BRICS countries have also discussed alternative payment systems and greater use of national currencies in trade.

But this is where the distinction between economic weight and collective power becomes important.

The dollar remains deeply embedded in BRICS trade and global finance. Al Jazeera cited Brazilian researchers who noted that the majority of BRICS trade is still denominated in dollars and that most members continue to hold significant dollar reserves.

So, BRICS can talk about reducing dependence on the dollar without being anywhere close to replacing it.

The same applies to the New Development Bank. It provides an important alternative source of financing, but it is nowhere near the scale of institutions such as the World Bank.

So, Is BRICS Anti-Western?

Russia clearly sees BRICS as an important vehicle for resisting Western pressure. At the Delhi summit, President Vladimir Putin has called for BRICS to become a more practical economic alliance covering areas such as technology, infrastructure, investment and payment systems, while criticising Western sanctions and trade restrictions. China also talks increasingly about multipolarity and reducing Western dominance.

But India and Brazil are not looking to turn BRICS into an anti-Western alliance. Several Gulf members have deep economic and security relationships with the US.

And even China and Russia have different reasons for wanting a stronger BRICS.

That is why Franklin Templeton’s Kim Catechis describes BRICS as neither a military alliance nor a coherent geopolitical bloc. He argues that India and Brazil broadly retain the group’s original reformist approach, while Russia pushes a more explicitly multipolar vision and China increasingly emphasises multipolarity and development-led cooperation.

Then What Has Expansion Actually Achieved?

It has achieved three things that should not be underestimated.

Representation: A much larger part of the developing world now has a seat at a platform outside traditional Western-led institutions.

Bargaining power: Countries can use BRICS alongside other forums to diversify their diplomatic and economic options. Al Jazeera analyst Khalid described the bloc as potentially challenging “how cheaply the West can apply pressure to individual countries.”

Connectivity: BRICS has created channels for cooperation in development finance, trade, energy, health, technology and other areas. The group has gradually evolved from an economic conversation into a much broader institutional network.

But expansion has also created a fourth reality: There are now more interests to reconcile than ever before.

India and China have unresolved strategic competition. Iran and Gulf states can find themselves on opposite sides of regional conflicts. Russia wants a stronger counterweight to the West. India and Brazil want greater representation without turning BRICS into an ideological anti-Western coalition. Gulf states want economic diversification and strategic flexibility while retaining close ties with Washington.

The Real Test For BRICS

This is where the Delhi summit becomes important.

The success of an expanded BRICS cannot simply be measured by how many leaders attend, how many countries want to join or how large its combined GDP becomes. The harder test is whether the grouping can produce concrete outcomes despite its differences.

That could mean expanding development finance, making cross-border payments cheaper, improving trade mechanisms, coordinating on energy security or finding common ground on reforms of institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and UN Security Council.

Chatham House’s Bajpaee argues that BRICS’ greatest recent achievement may have been its convening power, bringing countries together even when they do not share the same strategic outlook.

So, yes, expansion made BRICS more powerful economically, geographically and symbolically. But not necessarily more powerful as a single geopolitical actor.

The original BRIC countries had fewer voices and therefore fewer points of disagreement. Today’s BRICS has more energy, more markets, more population, more regions and more diplomatic weight. It also has more rivalries, more competing priorities and more reasons to disagree.

That means expansion has not produced a bigger version of the old BRICS. It has produced a giant negotiating platform for countries that want more room to manoeuvre in a changing world, even when they disagree on where that world should go.

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