America’s West Asia drift is undermining its global trajectory

Kennedy argued that great powers generally did not collapse because they suddenly lost a decisive battle or their troops were exhausted. Instead, they weaken over time when their worldwide commitments grow faster than their economic strength, industrial base, and domestic support. In his landmark 1987 book, he showed how empires expanded their responsibilities, spent more on defense, and gradually exhausted the productive resources that made them strong in the first place. Today, the same pattern seems uncomfortably relevant to America’s situation.

Kennedy explained that the true measure of a great power is not just its current military numbers, but how its relative strength compared to others changes. When a nation invests resources in far-flung commitments while its economic lead slips, it sets itself up for long-term trouble. Military spending at the expense of investment in education, infrastructure, and new technology creates a slow decline. This is exactly the risk the US faces as it tries to manage both the China challenge and recurring West Asian emergencies at the same time.

In 2011, the Obama administration launched a plan called the “Pivot to Asia”. The thinking was clear and sensible. China’s economy was growing rapidly, its military was modernizing and its influence was growing throughout Asia. American leaders understood that the world’s strategic center of gravity was shifting eastward. They wanted to rebalance diplomatic efforts, military forces, trade policies and alliances to meet that new reality.

Yet the pivot never turned into a full, coherent grand strategy. Domestic political fights, budget pressures, and new crises elsewhere continued to hamper this effort. The decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement sent a worrying signal to allies in Asia. The partners there look for a stable, long-term U.S. commitment, not just strong speeches that could change after the next election.

Kennedy would likely see this as a missed opportunity to align the means with the ends. He emphasized that successful powers concentrate their resources where they matter most for the future. A true strategic shift will require sustained investment in the Indo-Pacific through strong alliances, industrial policy and credible diplomacy. Without that discipline, chronic problems in other areas could easily lead America off course.

The renewed crisis in West Asia has exposed how easily the United States can be drawn back into a region it once hoped to deprioritize. At the end of February, America and Israel launched major attacks on Iran. Iran responded with missile and drone attacks across the region and massive disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. This narrow waterway carries about one-fifth to one-quarter of the world’s oil trade. Iran’s actions, such as attacks on ships, threats and sanctions, have sharply reduced shipping, raised oil prices, increased insurance costs and sent shockwaves felt in economies beyond the Gulf.

American forces moved quickly to rescue the ships, counter threats, redirect ships, and maintain some flow of traffic. These operations demonstrated American military capability, but they also limited naval assets, munitions, attention, and command focus at a time when resources were already limited. Despite a ceasefire period and interruption of escort missions, tensions continued into May and June. Iran has pushed for new transit rules and tariffs, while the US has imposed its own measures. The result is ongoing stress on global energy markets and higher costs for all.

Kennedy’s outline helps explain why this is so important. A militarily superior power can still be strategically trapped by a less powerful opponent if that opponent can use geography, proxies, missiles, cyber operations, and disruption to impose disproportionate costs. A stronger but less capable opponent like Iran does not need to win a conventional war. It just needs to keep the price of participation consistently high. Again, the reality is clear to the world as to how Iran’s asymmetric warfare is increasing the cost of war for the US. Each new US deployment or crisis response adds another layer of commitment. Over time, these layers drain the bandwidth needed for the bigger strategic picture in Asia. This is imperial hyperbole in real time: the ability to respond is still there, but the cumulative cost in resources, readiness and focus continues to grow.

History shows many examples where great powers were drawn into secondary theaters and later had to pay the price. Kennedy traces how Spain, France, and Britain all faced similar pressures when their global duties outstripped their economic foundations. Today the US is not in immediate danger of collapse, but its pattern of repeated involvement in West Asia threatens the same slow erosion of relative power.

One of the less visible but more dangerous effects is coalition fatigue. American power has always derived from its ability to lead coalitions rather than acting completely alone. Yet when American priorities appear to move from one crisis to another according to the demands of the times rather than a coherent long-term plan, partners become more cautious. Some people hedge by building relationships with other countries, including China. Others quietly reduce their reliance on Washington or seek more concrete evidence of long-term support.

Kennedy said that great powers lose their edge not only through direct military spending, but also when they lose the multiplier effect of reliable allies. As predictability continues to decline, it is becoming increasingly difficult to build strong coalitions for any challenge, whether in West Asia or against China. In the Indo-Pacific, allies and partners have already expressed concerns about whether the US can maintain a steady focus while managing fresh flare-ups elsewhere. This erosion of credibility is one of the most important warning signs of excessive stress.

America does not need to abandon West Asia completely. The region remains important for energy security, key alliances, and preventing widespread instability. But it should avoid assuming that every new contingency requires a leading and permanent American role in crisis management. Restraint in this sense is not weakness. It is the discipline of matching commitments with means.

True discipline in Kennedy’s sense means carefully matching commitments to available resources. This requires protecting core interests without turning every regional setback into an open strategic liability. This will include more sustained investment in the Indo-Pacific through deeper alliances such as the Quad, stable trade and technology cooperation, and credible diplomatic engagement. It also means accepting that America can remain a global leader without trying to solve or lead every problem with all its might all the time.

Continuing on the current path risks confirming Kennedy’s warning: Great powers become weak when they become too dispersed, too busy to react, and convinced that another deployment or temporary fix will always suffice. A superpower can be global but not unlimited. The true test of leadership is not how often he intervenes, but whether he knows when intervention matters most. If Washington continues to become deeply involved in West Asian contingencies while making less sustained efforts to respond to the defining challenge in Asia, it may discover that imperial overreach is no longer merely a historical principle. This has become a description of the present.

(Views expressed are personal)

This article is written by Hilal Ramzan, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Akal University, Punjab.