The Iran-US conflict in the Gulf has entered a dangerous new phase, with a fragile ceasefire turning into a measured but increasingly intense shadow war across the Middle East.
What began as a dispute over shipping lanes in the strait Hormuz Now this has escalated into direct attacks on US bases, attacks on critical infrastructure across the Gulf and a growing sense of unease in regional capitals from Doha to Muscat and Kuwait City.
From MOU to missiles
In the latest episode of Point Blank, Executive Editor Shishir Gupta The current spiral is based on a digital memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States, which focuses on freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
A prominent line referring to the “Iranian system” in Memorandum of understanding Tehran read this as an implicit recognition of its control over the strategic chokepoint, while Washington saw it as a technical provision on safe passage.
As commercial traffic adjusted, shipping companies began to prefer the southern corridor hugging the Omani coastline over the northern channel, which runs closer to Iranian waters. Gupta says, when ships used the northern route, they “discreetly” paid tolls to Iran; Once they moved south, Tehran faced a loss of both leverage and revenue – and responded by targeting ships on the southern corridor, Which also included ships with Indian crews, some of whom were killed.
Armistice collapse and American retaliation
Iranian attacks on shipping in the Southern Route prompted an American response, with Washington strengthening its maritime blockade and toughening its position in the Gulf.
According to Gupta, this escalation led President Donald Trump to formally revoke the ceasefire around July 8, ending a tenuous pause in direct hostilities.
After this a tit-for-tat pattern started which has now become stronger. Iran began attacking US military facilities in the Gulf Cooperation Council states – particularly bases in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, and, on occasion, in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, including King Faisal Air Base.
In parallel, the US conducted a sustained air campaign along Iran’s southern coast, from Chabahar to Bandar Abbas, attacking bridges and logistics nodes to disrupt the movement of missiles, and reportedly targeting new nuclear facilities under construction.
In particular, Gupta emphasizes that Washington has stopped short of attacking Iranian power plants, refineries or other key energy infrastructure – a sign that the US is trying to keep the confrontation below an all-out strategic war.
Jordan base attack and increasing US casualties
The latest flashpoint is Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, where an Iranian ballistic missile attack killed two US soldiers, while the remains of a third were later recovered.
Around the same time, another US soldier was killed in Iraq while attempting the controlled detonation of an Iranian drone, bringing the total number of recent deaths to four and bringing the total US military deaths to 18 since the beginning of this phase of the war.
Gupta highlights an important asymmetry: As an authoritarian state, Iran does not feel obliged to disclose its casualty figures, whereas the US, like India, must publicly account for every soldier killed or injured. He argues that this transparency creates domestic political pressure in Washington and leaves the US leadership “no choice but to retaliate”, thereby starting a cycle in which each loss of life almost automatically triggers another round of attacks.
An escalatory staircase, not yet a full-fledged war
According to Gupta, both Washington and Tehran are climbing what he calls the “escalatory ladder” – pushing hard, but in a deliberately controlled manner.
They suggest that Trump had waited for the soccer World Cup to conclude before authorizing more aggressive operations to avoid global disruption during the tournament; With that hurdle overcome, larger and more intense attacks have begun, pointing to a calculated vertical escalation.
Iran’s approach reflects this logic. He says its leadership is choosing targets in countries where it is difficult to respond independently – so focusing on facilities in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan rather than directly provoking major powers or heavily armed regional actors, who could in turn cause serious damage. The Iranian attack on a desalination plant in Kuwait, the attacks on oil depots, and the attack on the Jordanian base all fit into this pattern of calibrated pressure, designed to show resolve without crossing the lines that would trigger heavy retaliation.
Web of domestic politics and negotiations
On paper, negotiations remain an option; In practice, Gupta argues, both sides are mired in their own domestic politics. Trump is headed to the midterm elections in November and must convince American voters that he is not backing down in the face of Iranian attacks, especially as American deaths are rising and publicly documented.
Conversely, the Iranian leadership must reassure radical sections of society and the clerical establishment that it is not bowing to American pressure. This creates a mirror-image dilemma: each side out-talking the other and performing primarily for its own base. Gupta compared Washington’s situation to “riding a tiger” – the US cannot lose without looking weak, yet continued bombing increases the risk of Iranian retaliation and miscalculation. In his view, unless Iran backs down or makes some internal changes, the default trajectory is more skirmishes, more attacks, and a steady climb up the upward curve.
India’s diplomatic rope in the Gulf
In this background, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s recent week-long visit to Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait reflects India’s effort to manage both security and energy risks. Gupta says these countries, all of which are within range of Iranian missiles and already feeling the effects of the war, host a significant Indian diaspora and are under pressure to reassure expatriate communities that they remain safe.
For New Delhi, the message was two-fold: to stand with its citizens and partners in the Gulf, and to understand how long this conflict could go on. Gupta says the assessment that has emerged is bleak: this war is unlikely to end soon and will oscillate between low and high intensity phases, keeping oil prices hovering around $80-85 a barrel as long as periodic skirmishes continue to threaten supply lines.
Houthi “options” and energy shock risks
One of the biggest concerns of the Gulf is that Iran has not yet fully activated the Houthi card in the Red Sea. So far, Tehran has largely confined the maritime harassment to the Hormuz region, but its allied Houthi militia controls the Bab al-Mandab Strait, another key choke point for global shipping and oil exports.
If Iran encourages the Houthis to begin targeting commercial vessels there, the combined effect of Iranian pressure in Hormuz and Houthi attacks in Bab al-Mandab could seriously disrupt global energy flows. Gupta warned that this scenario would not only send oil prices sharply higher, but could also make it physically difficult for some Gulf producers to export, leading to energy and economic shocks around the world.
divided bay, uncomfortable umbrellas
The Gulf states themselves are far from united, each trying to deal with the crisis in its own way, often by defending itself between rival protectorates. Gupta believes that some are effectively paying “protection money” to Iran, others are placing greater emphasis on American security guarantees, and still others are seeking closer ties with China as an additional insurance policy.
Qatar and Oman, once seen as mediators, now find themselves under fire because they are perceived to be under the US security umbrella. He says that despite its rhetoric about the broader Ummah, Iran has no qualms in attacking fellow Muslim countries and has been pursuing its agenda for more than four decades without regard to pan-Islamic sentiments. In this fragmented environment, survival instincts dominate, and no coherent Gulf-wide strategy has emerged.
Why is Israel retreating?
A notable feature of this phase of the conflict is Israel’s relative silence. Gupta points out that Israel is currently focused entirely on Hezbollah and has not yet been directly targeted by Iranian ballistic missiles in this round of hostilities. For its part, Iran appears to be deliberately avoiding Israeli targets to avoid opening another front that would trigger a fierce reaction.
If Iran attacks Israel directly, Jerusalem will almost certainly respond with operations designed to further degrade Hezbollah and Iranian military capabilities, including strikes deep beyond the Litani River to push Hezbollah back and create a more reliable security buffer. For now, Israel is effectively waiting for an opportunity – or provocation – that would justify a more decisive attack against Iran and its Lebanese ally.
UAE, Saudi Arabia and Calibrated Restraint
An interesting question raised in the discussion was why Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps has so far attacked Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar more than the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Gupta offers two explanations popular in strategic circles. There is a suggestion that the UAE has reached some kind of understanding with Tehran – possibly involving quiet payments or concessions – to reduce the possibility of being targeted, although he emphasizes that this is only an “approach”.
The second, and in his view more plausible, explanation is that Iran recognizes the risks of attacking states that not only have US support but also have close security ties with Israel. Any major attack on the UAE could provoke a strong trilateral response. In the case of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan under the leadership of Field Marshal Asim Munir has reportedly signaled to Iran that a serious attack on the kingdom would force Islamabad to act under its defense arrangement with Riyadh. As a result, while both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have faced limited attacks, Iran has so far kept them at a lower level, reinforcing the picture of a carefully managed, albeit dangerous, escalation.
A war first casualty far from the explosion
Throughout the conversation, Gupta returned to a central caveat: Calibrated growth is inherently unsustainable. Each side is trying to signal a solution without crossing red lines, but in the dense battlefield of missiles, drones and overlapping alliances, a single miscalculation or mishap could spark “all hell,” triggering a chain reaction that no one is prepared to manage.
With nine consecutive days of US aggression, Iran probing vulnerabilities across the Gulf and global energy markets already on edge, the region is just one serious incident away from a wider conflict. For now, the Iran-US conflict remains a limited war fought on an ascending ladder – but each rung climbed reduces rather than reduces tensions and increases the likelihood of the ladder collapsing.
