On the winter morning of January 9, 2026, a consignment of weapons dropped by drone from Pakistani Punjab was recovered from a forward area near the International Border (IB) in Ghagwal area of Samba district of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The cache included two pistols, three magazines, 16 rounds and a grenade. A packet wrapped in yellow tape was found on a stream bank and was later opened with the help of a bomb disposal squad. The incident highlighted Samba’s continued sensitivity to cross-border drone activity and the increasing use of unmanned air routes for arms smuggling.
This pattern was not limited to any one incident. On March 10, security forces launched a fresh search operation after receiving information about movement of suspicious drones during the intervening night of March 9 and 10 in areas along the International Border in Samba district. Officials said the suspected drone came from Pakistan, prompting a coordinated operation by the police and Border Security Force (BSF) to check the possible airstrike carrying weapons or narcotics. Overall, these recurring incidents underline the evolving nature of cross-border tactics, with drones emerging as a preferred mechanism to maintain terrorist logistics, narcotics smuggling and arms supply networks without the need for direct physical infiltration across the border.
Samba District directly borders Shakargarh Tehsil in Narowal District of Pakistan and parts of Sialkot District in Punjab Province, including the Zafarwal, Chak Amru and Pasrur belts, which have historically been included in anti-infiltration assessments. The area is part of the strategically sensitive “Shakargarh Bulge”, a stretch of Pakistani territory between the Ravi and Chenab rivers that has remained militarily important since the 1965 and 1971 wars. The geography on both sides of the international border is marked by dense vegetation, river courses, farming belts and seasonal streams, making monitoring extremely challenging. On the Indian side, villages like Supwal remain particularly vulnerable as infiltrators who manage to cross the border can quickly reach National Highway 1A and move deeper into the interior.
It was through this wide infiltration zone that, on the morning of 14 May 2002, three heavily armed terrorists infiltrated from Pakistan. After targeting a civilian bus, the attackers entered the Indian Army’s family residential quarters inside the Kaluchak military camp, killing 31 people, including soldiers, women and children. As an eyewitness to the attack and its aftermath, I remember that when the bodies of the terrorists were searched, pink-coloured cinema tickets from the nearby Pakistani city of Sialkot, which is internationally known for its sporting goods industry, were reportedly found in their pockets. The description stayed with me because it provided a chilling reminder of the immediacy and closeness of the cross-border infiltration route.
It becomes important to remember these facts after a year Operation SindoorThe larger strategic reality remains unchanged: India and Pakistan are far from any meaningful dialogue process, while the infrastructure of cross-border terrorism exists. At a time when Pakistani diplomacy has gained steam as it has tried to mediate talks between Iran and America, the ground reality has come to the fore. Dropping of weapons through drones, presence of launch pads across the Line of Control (LOC) and infiltration attempts remain permanent features of the conflict scenario. This is compounded by the fact that on January 13, Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi said that at least six terrorist camps were active across the Line of Control and two across the International Border, and estimated that 100–150 terrorists were present in these facilities. he repeated this Operation Sindoor The campaign against cross border terrorism will continue.
As in the past, any major terrorist attack is likely to rapidly escalate tensions between India and Pakistan. And Jammu and Kashmir remains the most unsafe. The geography of the region, its complex demography and the deeply embedded nature of insurgency make it unrealistic to assume that the threat can simply disappear.
Recent operations within the region further underline the persistence of the physical terrorist infrastructure. On 6 April, Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operative Usman alias Khubaib was arrested in Srinagar district. A day later, Pakistani terrorist Abdullah along with four more Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives including Mohammad Naqib Bhat, Adil Rashid Bhat and Ghulam Mohammad Mir were captured. The operation, which began on March 3, involved coordinated searches at 19 locations in Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan and Haryana with the cooperation of central agencies and police units from several states.
The current standoff with Pakistan does not mean strategic and tactical helplessness. While quantitative metrics and violence statistics are important in assessing the security landscape, they can sometimes obscure uncomfortable realities that are inadequately addressed. The Baisaran attack exposed such weaknesses. Located about 220 kilometers from the Line of Control, the site of the attack raised tough questions internationally as to how Pakistan-backed terrorists were able to strike so deep into the hinterland with such ease.
At another level, the incident also exposed the consequences of fragmented institutional coordination under the dual power structure of Jammu and Kashmir. The tourist facility was opened by the Tourism Department functioning under the elected Union Territory Administration, while security clearance and law-and-order responsibilities remained under the police and security apparatus reporting to the Lieutenant Governor. The apparent absence of seamless coordination between these parallel centers of power appeared to create serious gaps in security assessment and preparedness. As a result, civilians were exposed in an area where adequate protective deployments were absent despite the existing threat environment and extensive history of terrorist activity in the area.
Rather than confronting this emerging reality with candor, the political narrative in recent years has often leaned heavily on claims of “normalcy.” The claim that the abrogation of Article 370 has fundamentally changed the security situation risks creating dangerous complacency. It also undermines decades of painstaking institutional efforts by the armed forces and local police networks, which together shaped the counter-terrorism architecture in Jammu and Kashmir.
However, the reality is far more complex. In Jammu and Kashmir, it is often difficult to clearly separate local initiatives from plans conceived and supported across the border. Insurgent operations often unfold through interactions between external direction and local facilitation, making nuanced intelligence indispensable.
The recent investigation of the Red Fort-related terror module, though in its implication linked to national and Pakistan-backed networks, has once again demonstrated the decisive importance of local intelligence gathering. In this case, the estranged girlfriend of one of the accused reportedly provided the initial clue that helped investigators move quickly and unearth the network.
The problem is not just one of rhetoric. Countering terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir has always depended on local intelligence and trust-based partnerships with communities. In areas like the Pir Panjal region, cooperation between the local population and security forces once played a vital role in disrupting LeT networks and terrorist movement routes in the Kashmir Valley. For a period, these corridors were transformed from militant transit zones into spaces of flexibility. But trust is a perishable thing. Once weakened it becomes exceptionally difficult to rebuild. A more grounded and sustainable strategy must therefore return to fundamentals. Technology and militarized responses may contain dangers, but they cannot be a substitute for community trust, institutional sensitivity, and sustained local engagement.
The current governance structure in the Union Territory also presents its own complexities. With law and order directly under the administration of the Lieutenant Governor, concerns have repeatedly arisen that local input and institutional knowledge are not always adequately incorporated into policy making. The realities of Jammu and Kashmir are too layered and complex for a highly centralized approach. The institutional memory accumulated over decades by local stakeholders, police officers and field activists cannot be easily replicated through top-down administrative control.
A credible assessment of the situation requires acknowledging that terrorism remains an enduring challenge in Jammu and Kashmir rather than treating every decline in violence as evidence of a permanent solution. Meaningful analysis should be based on recent and emerging trends, not comparisons with the peak violence of the 1990s or 2000s.
Ultimately, the most authentic and strategically valuable counterterrorism strategies emerge not from official narratives alone, but from the lived experiences of people on the ground. Lasting peace cannot be built through rhetorical posturing or carefully managed optics. It requires humility, analytical rigor, and a willingness to hear difficult truths.
India’s long-term credibility domestically and internationally will depend not only on asserting the existence of cross-border terrorism but also on demonstrating a sophisticated, grounded and fact-based understanding of the realities of the region. In a politically and socially complex region like Jammu and Kashmir, security is not just about force projection; It is equally about trust, inclusion and institutional sensitivity.
At a time when the global war on terrorism has increasingly driven narrowly defined geopolitical and strategic interests, India faces the challenge of building a more durable and credible counter-terrorism framework while simultaneously presenting a persuasive case to the international community. This becomes particularly important at a time when Pakistan’s diplomatic relevance has seen a relative increase due to changes in regional equations, its geography adjacent to West Asia and renewed engagement by major powers driven by strategic and security compulsions. In such an environment, India’s case cannot rest solely on official claims or rhetoric. There is a need to demonstrate that the concerns emerging from Jammu and Kashmir are rooted in the realities experienced by local communities.
For this reason, local stakeholders should be placed front and center in both policy making and international outreach. Genuine local voices, including those directly affected by terrorism, extremism and cross-border violence, have legitimacy and authenticity that official state narratives alone often cannot. In this context, restoration of statehood to Jammu and Kashmir assumes significance not only as a political commitment but as a critical national security imperative. A representative political structure with greater local accountability can improve institutional coordination, restore trust between communities, and ensure that realities on the ground are more effectively reflected in governance and security responses.
Statehood would also help blunt the argument, often fueled by separatist and Pakistani narratives, that Jammu and Kashmir is being administered directly by the BJP-led Center without adequate local political agency, thereby contributing to alienation and discontent. In a sensitive conflict zone like Jammu and Kashmir, it is difficult to maintain sustainable stability in the absence of meaningful political participation and responsive local institutions.
Ultimately, the most effective and deterrent counterterrorism strategy may come from the ground. Local partnerships, credible human intelligence networks and responsive political institutions are essential not only to detect and disrupt extremist ecosystems before they escalate into violence, but also to project credibility internationally. A counter-terrorism framework rooted in local realities sends the strongest possible signal globally that the fight against terrorism is not simply a state narrative, but is based on the experiences, aspirations and security concerns of those directly affected by it.
(The author has written two books on Jammu and Kashmir, including The Open Face of Extremism and Across the Line of Control).
