TeaHere much focus has been placed on the recent Aravali decision and its implications for mining operations in the green belt, as well as the government’s commitments with respect to environmental standards and regulatory protection for ecologically sensitive areas.

At the Paris summit, India had committed to four quantitative climate targets based on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” – a position that reflects how historically, India’s per capita emissions were small compared to the emissions of other major countries such as the US (however, India is currently the world’s third largest absolute emitter). The centerpiece of Prime Minister Modi’s statement at the Paris summit was a pledge to reduce emissions intensity by 33-35% by 2030 (based on a 2005 baseline), with commitments to increase non-fossil energy capacity by 40%, 175 GW of renewable energy and 2.5-3 billion tonnes of carbon sequestration through forests.

Now, more than 10 years later, one needs to evaluate whether these promises have actually been fulfilled.

incomplete decoupling

The reduction in India’s GDP emissions-intensity (greenhouse gases per unit of economic output) may appear to be a policy success. Using 2005 as a baseline, emissions intensity was reduced by about 36% by 2020, enabling India to meet its original 33-35% target well ahead of the 2030 deadline.

Three structural drivers explain this trajectory. First, the rapid expansion of non-fossil energy capacity (solar, wind, hydroelectric and nuclear) reduced the carbon intensity associated with the exploitation of electricity. By 2023, non-fossil capacity exceeds approximately 43%, and by mid-2025 it will reach approximately 50%. Second, India’s economic structure shifted toward low-carbon services and digital sectors, resulting in reduced emissions per unit of GDP. Third, national efficiency programs like Performance, Achievement and Trade (PAT) and UJALA curbed demand growth in industry and households; The national assessment has recorded measurable electricity savings and emissions avoidance in the financial year 2020-21.

However, increases in intensity still coexist with persistently high absolute emissions. India’s regional greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions stood at about 2,959 MtCO₂e in 2020, and absolute emissions remain high thereafter.

This phenomenon exists because of partial decoupling: GDP growth has outpaced emissions growth, so emissions have declined in intensity without an economy-wide complete decline. This matters because the national intensity average hides regional deviations, as shown by the continued increase in emissions from the cement, steel and transport sectors, even as the power sector’s CO2 growth in 2024-25 is reduced.

Analysis by Climate Transparency and the International Energy Agency shows that India’s rate of intensity decline is higher than many G-20 peers, but its large share of coal keeps absolute per-kilowatt emissions high. To make India’s 2070 net-zero pledge credible, remaining intensity gains must be translated into full emissions reductions through a transparent coal phase-down timetable and industrial decarbonization roadmap.

generation gap

The scale of India’s renewable capacity is dramatic, but it has not yet replaced the fossil baseload. Non-fossil capacity to increase from ≈29.5% in 2015 to ≈51.4% by June 2025. Solar led the build-out (from ≈2.8 GW in 2014 to ~110.9 GW by mid-2025), supported by tariff competition and domestic photovoltaic manufacturing expansion. Wind power grew modestly (from ≈21 GW to ~51.3 GW over the same period) but was hampered by land, grid-connection delays, and state-level regulatory barriers. Crucially, power generation lacks capacity – renewables supply ~22% of power in 2024–25 despite over 50% non-fossil capacity due to low capacity factors and storage constraints; Thermal (mainly coal) capacity stood at ~240 GW in mid-2025 and still provides baseload.

The 175 GW renewable energy target for 2022 was missed, and although the 500 GW 2030 ambition is technically feasible, converting installed capacity into sustained generation and emissions reductions will require rapid expansion of storage, transmission upgrades and strong policy delivery.

The renewable energy targets that India has set for itself, initially 40% non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030 and now 50% by 2030, are major successes that hide an important subtext: limitations in renewable integration and intermittent patterns lead to a sharp gap between potential and actual generation. The share of non-fossil fuel capacity in India’s cumulative installed capacity of 495 GW by June 2025 was 51%, marking the achievement of the first commitment. But this is overshadowed by the essential reality that more than 70% of power generation in India comes from coal, despite it comprising 51% of non-fossil fuel capacity. This is because renewables operate at much lower capacity than coal, as they produce intermittently based on solar and wind. In contrast, coal generates continuous “baseload” electricity.

Storage is the major bottleneck point. The Central Electricity Authority has estimated the demand for energy storage at 336 GW for the period 2029-30. However, as of September 2025, only 500 MW of battery energy storage capacity is operational.

Government-run programs like National Solar Mission, Solar Park Scheme, UDAY, PM-KUSUM and rooftop solar have successfully added 25 GW of renewable energy every year. However, the scope of execution remains a challenge, due to delays in grid connectivity and limited land acquisition in the power sector. Although the pace of renewable energy in the Indian power sector has reached unprecedented levels, the backbone of the country remains 253 GW of coal-fired capacity.

Forest only on paper

The carbon sequestration figure of 2.5-3.0 billion tonnes CO2 equivalent by 2030, as India has promised, appears achievable in terms of numbers. India’s State of Forest Report 2023 shows that India has already sequestered 30.43 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalents of the total carbon stock, which represents an additional sequestration of 2.29 billion tonnes over 2005 levels, while only 0.2 billion tonnes remains to achieve the target by 2030.

However, official statistics do not reflect the elasticity of the definition. The Forest Survey of India’s definition of “forest cover” includes any land of more than one hectare whose upper floor is 10% canopied, and includes eucalyptus monocultures and plantations of mango, tea and roadside trees in addition to natural forests. Satellite imagery indicates that the country has 7,15,343 sq km of forest cover in 2023, an increase of only 156 sq km from the previous census in 2021, confusing ecological performance with administrative designation.

Policy mechanisms indicate friction in implementation. Under the Compensatory Afforestation Fund Act (2016), approximately ₹95,000 crore has been accumulated. However, there is uneven implementation, as states like Delhi have been able to utilize only 23% of the allocated amount from 2019-20 to 2023-24. The revised Green India Mission, launched in June 2025 after a decade of ‘moderate progress’, proposes to regenerate five million hectares through regional projects in the Aravali, Western Ghats and Himalayas. However, ‘tree planting’ is considered equivalent to ‘natural regeneration’.

Furthermore, climate change is an additional stressor. While satellite evidence suggests leaf index values ​​that indicate “greenness”, net primary productivity and actual carbon assimilation rates are challenged by warming and water stress, especially in the Western Ghats and northeastern parts of India. The country is likely to meet its “forest sink” target by 2030 through mechanisms that limit plantation dominance and governance, prioritizing carbon accounting over ecological restoration.

the way forward

While India has achieved meaningful progress on specific metrics, they also obscure fundamental problems with climate action in India. The increase in intensity achieved with increasing absolute emissions, and renewable capacity expansion, has not translated into a proportionate share of production due to the strong baseload of coal which hides the real ecological impact.

The transition path ahead demands sustained effort in areas requiring systemic coordination and coordinated governance, such as rapid scaling of battery storage to bridge the capacity generation gap, development of a coal transition roadmap, reform of forest governance to ensure quality biodiversity outcomes alongside carbon target numbers, and increased data transparency to track progress across regional and regional variations, as technology and capital flows alone will no longer suffice.

The coming five years offer a critical window for India to accelerate renewable energy development, resolve storage bottlenecks, and strengthen government coordination on grid connectivity and land acquisition.

In short, India’s performance standards have largely met its quantified commitments. Yet, the results that matter most go beyond the headline metrics, into converting now installed capacity into sustainable production and intensity gains into full emissions ‘abstinence’.

Dipanshu Mohan is Professor and Dean of OP Jindal Global University and Director of the Center for New Economics Studies (CNES). He is Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics and Visiting Fellow at AMES, University of Oxford. Nagappan Arun and Saksham Raj are research analysts at CNES. With inputs from Simar Kaur and Anvita Tripathi.