Pakistan today faces an unusual historical dilemma. A state built in 1947 on the foundation of Muslim political identity is increasingly presenting itself as the guardian of a civilization that flourished in South Asia thousands of years before the arrival of Islam. Harappa, Mohenjo-Daro, Taxila and Gandhara have gone beyond archaeological sites of historical importance and have become symbols of Pakistan’s national identity, cultural diplomacy and international image-building. Pakistan is increasingly presenting itself as the inheritor of one of the world’s oldest urban civilizations Indus Valley Civilization (IVC), which flourished more than 5,000 years ago.
Indus River and the Politics of Ancient Heritage
The renewed focus on the Indus Civilization comes at a time when the Indus River system has become increasingly important in India-Pakistan relations. The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960 with the mediation of the World Bank, has long governed the division of the Indus River system between the two countries.
Following India’s decision to suspend the treaty following the Pahalgam terror attack in 2025, the Indus became not only a technical water-sharing issue but also a geopolitical symbol. By highlighting its connection to the Indus Civilization, Pakistan adds a historical and emotional dimension to its argument over the river system that predates modern political boundaries.
It is another matter that talks have actually taken place in favor of the Indus Water Treaty. Pakistan Because about 80 percent of the water from western rivers goes to the Islamic Republic while only 20 percent is for use in India.
The Narendra Modi government postponed the IWT to put pressure on Pakistan to destroy terror factories in that country because after Pahalgam the Indian Prime Minister had made it clear that water and blood cannot flow together.
Even though Pakistan is playing the victim card globally on IWT, the truth is that India has not withheld even a single cusec of water as the dam and canal construction work is still in progress. The only thing that has happened is that India has stopped sharing data of western river flows to Islamabad. Given the slow pace at which the Indian bureaucracy works, Pakistan will not face any impact at least in the coming few years.
But Pakistan’s politicians are already trying to score brownie points with the West by threatening to bomb Indian river dams on western shores as well.
The Indus Valley story also suited the Rawalpindi rulers as it united troubled provinces like Sindh and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa as basin states of the mighty Indian river system.
The unity narrative message under the Indus Civilization brand comes at a time when entire Pakistan including Occupied Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan, Balochistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa is burning and there is serious military tension on the Durand Line and the ruling Taliban is giving a befitting reply to Islamabad.
Going back to its pre-Islamic history is not limited only to Pakistan but also to countries like Iran, Egypt and Iraq as the younger generation wants to know their past and does not want to be held captive by radical Islamists and Mullahs. So when Pakistan and its Western supporters want to tout the Indus Valley civilization, Iran suddenly remembers its Persian past, Egypt its Pharaohs and Iraq its Mesopotamian past.
But Pakistan, as dishonest a state as it is, has revived the story of the Indus Valley Civilization by claiming lineage from the Turks after having close relations with Turkey and Arabs after having close relations with Saudi Arabia. The main thing for this chameleon nation is opportunity and a shared hatred towards India, with Hindus in particular being targeted by Asim Munir and his poisonous ideology.
The story of the Indus Valley Civilization has clearly been helped by the Western powers that Pakistan inherited, who think they still run the Indian subcontinent. There are some people within India who are playing the China card to remind the Modi government that the Indus and its major tributaries originate in Tibet and are controlled by Pakistan’s iron brother Xi Jinping. There is a deliberate attempt to create fear within India that China may do to India in the eastern and western sectors what New Delhi is possibly doing to Islamabad. What India is asking Pakistan to do is to stop targeting innocent people across the border by using terror as a weapon of state policy.
Since Zia-ul-Haq weaponized Islam to gain political power in Pakistan and against India, several thousand innocent lives have been lost in terrorist attacks, IED-bomb attacks and indiscriminate firing by regional weapons in Kashmir, Punjab and the hinterland.
While cowardly Indian governments in the past did not retaliate, the current Modi government has openly declared that terrorism is an act of war. IWT has been kept in abeyance only to remind the military ruler of Pakistan that Modi government is not afraid of nuclear blackmail And unlike Manmohan Singh, the government will not allow massacres like 26/11 to go unpunished despite any international pressure.
By shining a flood light on Harappa, Mohenjo-Daro and the wider Indus heritage, Pakistan places the river system within a civilizational narrative rather than viewing it solely through the legal framework of the 1960s water-sharing agreement.
The message is that Pakistan is not merely a downstream state dependent on the modern treaty system; It is also the geographical custodian of one of the world’s oldest river-based civilizations.
Islamic Foundation of Pakistani State
The story of Pakistan’s founding was not built around an ancient civilization. This argument led to the fact that the Muslims of South Asia represent a separate nation. The ideological foundations of Pakistan’s state identity were institutionalized through constitutional developments that placed Islam at the center of governance.
The 1949 Objectives Resolution declared that “sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone,” establishing a framework linking state authority to Islamic principles. This direction was reinforced by the 1956 Constitution, which declared Pakistan an Islamic republic, and further strengthened by the 1973 Constitution, which made Islam the state religion and required laws to be consistent with Islamic principles. In 1985, the government of Islamist dictator General Zia-ul-Haq incorporated the Objectives Resolution into the Constitution as Article 2A, giving it constitutional authority.
These developments strengthened Islamic identity as a core element of the Pakistani state.
This ideological framework continues to influence the official discourse of Pakistan. In April 2025, then Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir repeatedly invoked the two-nation theory in public addresses. Speaking to overseas Pakistanis after the Pahalgam attack, Munir said that Muslims and Hindus were separate communities with differences in religion, traditions and social values, citing this difference as the basis of the two-nation theory.
At the Pakistan Military Academy he again emphasized that the creation of Pakistan was rooted in a distinct Muslim identity. The importance of these comments lies not only in the words but also in who gave them.
Pakistan’s military has historically played a central role in defining questions of national identity, security priorities, and ideological boundaries. The message is consistent: Pakistan was created as a state based on Muslim political identity.
From Muhammad Bin Qasim to Mohenjodaro
Its historical importance has evolved significantly since the creation of Pakistan. For much of the country’s history, official narratives gave greater importance to Islamic political history. Pakistan Studies textbooks traditionally focused on Muslim rulers, the arrival of Islam in Sindh in 712 AD, the Mughal period and the Muslim League movement.
Scholars such as KK Aziz in his influential work ‘The Murder of History: A Critique of History Textbooks Used in Pakistan’ criticized Pakistan’s education system for selectively presenting history through ideological preferences. During the era of General Zia-ul-Haq, educational policies placed even greater emphasis on Islamic identity and ideological themes.
Even today, Pakistan’s educational curriculum places significant emphasis on the country’s identity as an Islamic republic, while questions remain regarding the representation of religious minorities and pluralistic interpretations of history.
A 2025 study published in the British Journal of Religious Education examining Pakistan’s National Curriculum textbooks found that educational materials contribute to the construction of religious identity and the portrayal of the “religious other”, raising concerns about the limited space provided for inclusive narratives.
Another 2025 study, Inclusive Education for a United and Cohesive Pakistan, analyzing Punjab’s textbooks, identified gaps in inclusivity, under-representation of minority communities and the need for reforms that promote tolerance and critical thinking. These findings echo earlier concerns raised by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), which documented instances where public school textbooks reinforced negative stereotypes about non-Muslim communities.
Against this background, Pakistan’s renewed celebration of Harappa, Mohenjo-Daro, Taxila and Gandhara represents a remarkable adjustment. The question is not why Pakistan should celebrate these sites. The question is why those same sites are now being elevated within a national narrative, which has historically placed greater emphasis on Islamic origins.
minority rights paradox
The most difficult question for Pakistan’s civilizational narrative concerns contemporary pluralism. International organizations have repeatedly expressed concern about religious freedom in Pakistan. International organizations including: united nations Special Correspondent; Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch and the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) have repeatedly documented the following concerns: abuse of blasphemy laws, mob violence, discrimination against religious minorities, restrictions faced by Ahmadis, who were constitutionally declared non-Muslims through the Second Amendment in 1974.
The contradiction remains visible. Pakistan seeks recognition as the inheritor of an ancient civilization associated with urban planning, trade, intellectual exchange and cultural diversity, while continuing to face international criticism regarding the protection of religious minorities within the modern state.
conclusion
Pakistan’s renewed embrace of the Indus Valley Civilization represents not only a cultural revival but also a broader effort to reshape its historical image through heritage diplomacy. However, the selective emphasis on pre-Islamic heritage raises questions about its compatibility with the ideological foundations of the modern Pakistani state, which has repeatedly defined its identity through the two-nation theory, Islamic values, and a distinctly Muslim political narrative. When this cultural pluralism is examined against contemporary realities the contradiction becomes more apparent.
If Pakistan’s engagement with history reflects a genuine commitment to diversity and civilizational continuity, then the same principles should apply to the treatment of religious minorities within the country. A civilizational identity cannot be limited to archaeological sites and international cultural expeditions; It is also measured by how a state protects the rights, heritage and dignity of the communities living within its borders. And in that aspect, Pakistan and its anti-India political-military leadership has failed miserably.
